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Still Relevant? The Importance of National Interest in the Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy

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Introduction by the Guest Editor:

Still Relevant? The Importance of National Interest in the Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy

Ivana RADIĆ MILOSAVLJEVIĆ¹

The current issue of *International Problems* revisits the concept of national interest and its implementation problems. The idea for the topic of this issue arose from the project “National Interests of the Republic of Serbia: from Contestation to Legitimation – NATIONAL(s)”,² funded by the Science Fund of the Republic of Serbia (program IDEAS) and implemented by researchers from the University of Belgrade—Faculty of Political Sciences (FPS). It was made possible by the joint recognition of the FPS project team and the Institute of International Politics and Economics that such a topic is relevant and very much needed in current geopolitical circumstances.

Although a contested and somewhat neglected concept in contemporary academic debates, national interest remains an important idea and a measure for the evaluation of states’ foreign policy actions. Global powers and small states both strive to properly define and implement their national interests and use various strategies in that regard. This issue covers both types of states, with three papers dealing with American national interests and four with Serbia’s attempts at defining, implementing, and legitimising national interests. While the United States operates within the framework of foreign policy strategies, as Stevan Nedeljković aptly presents in his paper dealing with the “offshore balancing”, the role of short-term events (such as elections) and personalities (e.g., ambassadors or presidents) in defining national interests must not be neglected. These factors are tackled in two papers. One is by Dragan R. Simić, who analysed the contemporary political polarisation in the US and its impact on the presidential candidates’ positions on national interests. The other is by Saša Mišić and Dragan Živojinović, who delve into history to discuss the role of George Frost Kennan in shaping American national interests and relations with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

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² No. 7752625, conducted between 2022–2025.

On the other hand, the Republic of Serbia, as a small state, also invests in defining and pursuing its national interests. This task might be more challenging for small states than great powers, as they tend to have fewer national resources and less leverage in the international arena. Thus, the historical and geopolitical context in which they operate is harder to influence and must be taken into consideration more carefully. Nevertheless, small states (however defined) are not powerless, and their actions matter in contemporary international relations marked by increasing interdependence, the importance of international organisations and international law, and democratisation. Foreign policy choices and actions influence others as well as a country's relations with the broader world and its immediate surroundings, as Dragan Đukanović and Marko Dašić point out in their paper on the positioning of Serbia in the Central European context.

In this issue, the authors tackled the various ways of implementing national interests, like Miloš Hrnjaz and Aleksandar Milošević do in analysing the implications of participation of Serbia in (sub)regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkans. The term "national interests" is often taken to legitimise statesmen's actions, but sometimes, the defined national interests also need legitimisation in the wider international arena. Legitimising national interests is especially important for Serbia, which is not only a small but a stigmatised country, primarily due to the experience of the 1990s break-up of Yugoslavia. The destigmatisation process is indispensable for successfully attaining national interests and is rightly pursued through the regional and sub-regional integration processes. However, that is not the only way, and by dissecting the case of the International Commission for Missing Persons, Vesna Knežević-Predić and Janja Simentić Popović explore how this can be accomplished through participation in international organisations and using international law.

Finally, the irrevocable relationship between foreign policy conduct and national interests is brought to us by the paper of Milan Krstić and Nikola Jović. They have developed the national interest implementation matrix for measuring Serbia's foreign policy achievements, which can be replicated and used to evaluate other countries' foreign policies.

The papers presented in this issue show that the concept of national interest remains relevant for studying the foreign policy conduct of states, both small and big, despite the theoretical differences in its understanding and definitions. Regardless of their non-unified approach to studying national interests, the authors shed new light on how national interests are defined, legitimised, and pursued and whether and how they can be used to evaluate foreign policy performance.

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Pozicioniranje Srbije u srednjoevropskom kontekstu: između „dve/tri“ Srednje Evrope

Dragan ĐUKANOVIĆ¹, Marko DAŠIĆ²

Apstrakt: Polazeći od konstituisanja posebnosti Srednje Evrope, pre svega tokom proteklog veka, autori ukazuju i na temeljne razlike koje postoje u vektorima uticaja u ovoj evropskoj regiji. U tom smislu razdvaja se grupa zemalja oko regionalne forme saradnje Višegradske grupe (V4), kao i zemlje alpskog subregiona (Nemačka, Austrija, Hrvatska i Slovenija). Sve više nastaju i razlike između država aranžmana V4 imajući u vidu njihov odnos prema napadu Rusije na Ukrajinu od 2022. godine, kao i vezano za različitu dinamiku demokratskih procesa u njima. Srbija je tokom svoje savremene istorije uglavnom imala loše odnose sa svojim srednjoevropskim okruženjem, te autori ukazuju na pojedine faze s tim u vezi posebno od početka XIX veka. Stoga je posebna pažnja posvećena i analizi aktuelne spoljne politike Srbije u kontekstu njenih odnosa sa državama i inače složene Srednje Evrope. U tom smislu, ukazuje se i na širi kontekst objektivno uspoređenih evropskih integracija Srbije, ali i na njene intenzivne odnose sa Kinom i Rusijom. U svetlu takve analize autori zaključuju da će pozicija Srbije u njenom neposrednom srednjoevropskom okruženju ostati nepromenjena i prilično otežana.

Ključne reči: Srbija, Srednja Evropa, Višegradska grupa, Nemačka, Austrija, spoljna politika, Evropska unija.

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Uvod

Srbija se u širem kontekstu svoje savremene istorije predominantno okretala zbivanjima i potragom za vlastitom teritorijalnošću na Balkanskom poluostrvu, a tokom značajnijeg dela svoje savremene istorije imala je prilično loše odnose sa svojim srednjoevropskim okruženjem. Takođe, nekoliko je veoma kratkih perioda kada se Srbija u srednjem veku uspešno oslanjala na svoje tadašnje srednjoevropsko okruženje usled naleta Osmanske carevine (Ćorović 2005, 334–343). Interakcije između Srednje Evrope i Srbije pod Osmanskom carevinom trajale su posebno u XVIII veku, kada se pojavljuju pokušaji ekspanzije Habzburške monarhije na Balkan, ali i kada jačaju tendencije Srba južno od Save i Dunava da ojačaju svoju nacionalnu samobitnost i obnove državnost (Đukanović 2019, 98–101). U drugoj polovini XIX veka Srbija je uspela da se proširi pre svega prema jugu, odnosno da konstituiše nove granice zahvaljujući podršci Austrougarske.

S druge strane, Srednja Evropa se nalazila, posebno u XIX veku, u internim protivrečnostima i nabojima nacionalnih pokreta do mere da je Habzburška monarhija bila suočena sa ozbiljnim vlastitim problemima na relaciji pre svega između nemačkog i mađarskog faktora, ali i sa jačanjem panslovenskih sentimenata prvenstveno kod Čeha i Slovaka, ali i Južnih Slovena (Hrvata, Srba i Slovenaca) (Rejdi 2024, 323–339). U tom smislu se može sagledavati 1918. godina i nestanak Austrougarske, kao i nastanak brojnih novih i malih nacionalnih država na njenom tlu, koje su međusobno najčešće bile u lošim odnosima. Istovremeno, u razdoblju između dva svetska rata ideje vezane za stvaranje Dunavskog saveza, kako bi se prevladale ekonomske teškoće tadašnje Velike finansijske krize, nisu uspele da zažive (Milanović 2011, 614–689). Mađarska nije bila za to, kao ni Nemačka i Austrija, iako je određena mera razumevanja potrebe za formiranjem podunavskog/srednjoevropskog međudržavog aranžmana postojala u tadašnjoj Čehoslovačkoj i Jugoslaviji. No, i koncept međuratne i prilično interno antagonizovane Srednje Evrope brzo se raspao, a nakon Drugog svetskog rata jedan njen deo je postao poznat kao Istočna Evropa sa dominacijom Sovjetskog Saveza (Orel 2012, 80–84). Ona je tako postala otrgnuta od Zapada i prekinuta je svaka njena ranija interkonekcija i dubinska zavisnost od njega (Kundera 2024, 37–68).

Srednja Evropa je tako, kao geopolitički konstrukt, posve skriveno egzistirala ili gotovo da uopšte nije postojala od 1945. do 1989. godine. Naime, ideja Srednje Evrope je u ovom periodu predominantno bila tumačena i vezivana za Austriju, južne delove Nemačke (Bavarska) i severne delove Italije. Ona je u ovom razdoblju izgubila svoj realni identitet, koji se u državama nekadašnje Istočne Evrope nastojao restaurirati tek u razdoblju nakon 1989. godine (Mikanowski 2023, 450–470). Tako nastaje i prvobitno grupisanje Mađarske, bivše Čehoslovačke i Poljske u tada novi

okvir intenzivne saradnje – Višegradsku grupu (1991). No, i dalje je postojala ozbiljna razlika ove grupacije zemalja u odnosu na alpsko-jadranski deo Srednje Evrope. Stoga se kao izraz neretko koristio i termin „Nova Evropa“, kao oznaka za države koje su bile pod dominacijom Sovjetskog Saveza u okviru ranije „Istočne Evrope“, i njihovo postupno vraćanje u „orbitu“ Srednje Evrope (Sedivi, Zaborowski 2005, 1–28).

Tako je zapravo u okviru prvobitne ideje, koju je Fridrih Nojman (Friedrich Neumann) tokom Prvog svetskog rata prezentovao o Srednjoj Evropi (*Mitteleuropa*), oslonjenoj na Nemačko i Austrougarsko carstvo, *via facti* u savremenom razdoblju došlo do temeljnog razgraničenja dve interne sfere uticaja (Neumann 1917). S jedne strane, „alpsko-jadranska“ sfera sa predominantnim nemačkim uticajem (Bavarska, Austrija, delovi Italije, Slovenija i Hrvatska), a, s druge strane, zemlje grupe *Višegrad 4* (Češka, Slovačka, Poljska i Mađarska). Ova podela se očuvala i nakon velikog proširenja Evropske unije 2004. godine kada je većina država od Baltika do Mađarske ušla u njeno punopravno članstvo. No, u ovako rekonceptualizovanom okviru Srednje Evrope ostali su na njenim obodima i pojedini regioni Ukrajine, Rumunije i Srbije, koji se smatraju sastavnim delom ovog „kulturnog područja“ (Jordan 2005, 162–173).

Podunavlje – viševjekovna geostrateška kičma Srednje Evrope – sa izuzetkom Srbije i dela delte Dunava, integrisano je u najširi okvir Evropske unije, a mahom i u Severnoatlantski savez.³ Značaj Dunava i njegovog basena posebno je ojačan nakon napada Rusije na Ukrajinu početkom 2022. godine. To je i formalno potvrđeno isključenjem Rusije iz rada Dunavske komisije krajem 2023. godine, a odluka o tome je doneta jednoglasno (DK 2023). Ovaj strateški veoma značajan evropski koridor bitan je i u krugovima podržavalaca ideje ruskog prekomponovanja konstelacije prilika u širem evropskom okruženju (EUSDR 2024) Naime, postoje brojne najave da je jedan od ciljeva napada na Ukrajinu od februara 2022. godine bio vezan i za aspiraciju da Rusija izađe na Dunav. Ovim bi Rusija pokušala osnažiti svoj položaj u široj Jugoistočnoj Evropi, a potom i na Balkanskom poluostrvu. To bi svakako za posledicu imalo i jačanje ruskog uticaja u V4 delu Srednje Evrope, gde Rusija prilično bliskom smatra Mađarsku i njenu sadašnju vlast premijera Viktora Orbana (Viktor Orbán). Ovo je potvrđeno i njegovom nedavnom iznenadnom posetom zvaničnoj Moskvi početkom jula 2024. godine, a mimo saglasnosti Evropske unije i ostalih zapadnih partnera (Lukiv 2024). Takođe, nedavno uspostavljena vlast u Slovačkoj pokušava da se distancira od dosadašnje značajnije podrške Ukrajini tokom perioda u kojem je napadnuta od strane Rusije. Njeni

³ U Podunavlju Austrija, Srbija i Ukrajina nisu članice NATO.

aktuelni ministri najavljuju čak i krivične prijave protiv svojih prethodnika koji su izvozili naoružanje iz Slovačke vlastima u Kijevu (RSEa 2024).

Pored navedenog odnosa spram politike Rusije prema Ukrajini, u okviru „V4 Srednje Evrope“ usledilo je postepeno interno razmimoilaženje po drugoj osnovi. Naime, ranije je Poljska bila prilično oslonjena na liberalne okvire svoje politike, ali nikako se ne može kazati da je bila bliska Rusiji. Mađarska je svoj odnos prema Rusiji modifikovala i snažila paralelno sa povećavanjem deficita u oblasti vladavine prava i ljudskih prava, ali i *de facto* kroz jačanje populizma. I Slovačka pod premijerom Robertom Ficom (Robert Fico) ima slične probleme nakon njegovog povratka na vlast od oktobra 2023. godine. Treba napomenuti i da su ovo svojevrsni odrazi određenih istorijskih zbivanja. Naime, sa izvesnim izuzetkom Mađarske, koja je u poslednjim etapama postojanja Austrougarske carevine ipak bila njen konstituent, Slovačka je pak bila marginalizovana periferija imperije sa dubokim poricanjem njenog identiteta (Magris 2007, 223–243). U „obnovljenoj“ Srednjoj Evropi Slovačka se veoma teško snalazila i tokom 90-ih godina prošlog veka kada je na vlasti bio populist Vladimir Mečjar (Vladimír Mečiar). Stoga i savremeni populizam, liberalizam i izvesna bliskost sa Rusijom, i pored ranije sasvim različite spoljne politike koju je vodio premijer Robert Fico u svojim prvim mandatima (2006–2010), postaje dominantna u inače prilično podeljenoj zemlji (Pantelić 2024).

Srbija se nalazi pred realnim izazovima ostvarivanja vlastitih nacionalnih interesa u prilično za nju neželjnim, ali zadatim regionalnim okolnostima. Njena spoljna politika tako više reflektuje aspiracije ka drugačijem okruženju, kako u geopolitičkom tako i u smislu unutrašnjeg ustrojstva. Stoga oslanjanje na Istok (Kinu i Rusiju) postaje sve više markantna crta srpske spoljne politike i pored sasvim deklarativnog zalaganja njenih političkih elita za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji. Novi pansrpski nacionalni program nedavno je predstavljen na Svesrpskom saboru, koji je bio održan u Beogradu 8. juna 2024. godine. U okviru ovog skupa doneta je i posebna deklaracija koja pokazuje da je Srbija i dalje predominantno okrenuta ka Balkanu i tamošnjim, kako se ističe, nerešenim pitanjima (Svesrpski sabor 2024). Istovremeno, proteklih nekoliko godina, uočljiva je ojačana saradnja Srbije sa Mađarskom, u odnosu na sve ostale aktere u širem tumačenju Srednje Evrope. Podvučeno je i strateško partnerstvo između Srbije i Mađarske (2021), kao i jačanje i produbljivanje strateških partnerstva ovih dveju zemalja sa Kinom. Srbija je, mora se naglasiti, ipak „korak ispred“ – naime početkom maja 2024. godine ona je ušla u Zajednicu sa zajedničkom budućnošću u novoj eri sa Narodnom Republikom Kinom (Zajednička izjava 2024). Mađarska je u maju 2024. godine potpisala unapređeno strateško partnerstvo sa Kinom, što je Srbija prethodno zaključila još polovinom 2016. godine (*Al Jazeera Balkans* 2024a). Očita je i podrška Rusije takvom jačanju međusobnih odnosa između Mađarske i Srbije, ali i dizanju nivoa

njihovih pojedinačnih odnosa sa Narodnom Republikom Kinom. Paralelno sa ovim procesom ide i česta podrška Mađarske Srbiji za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji, koja se reflektuje kroz pokušaje da se u institucijama u Briselu osigura jači glas za proširenje Unije na Zapadni Balkan. Istovremeno, uočljiva je izvesna tendencija da se snaže odnosi između Srbije i Slovačke nakon povratka na vlast Roberta Fica s kraja 2023. godine. Slovačka je jedina država u okviru Višegradske grupe koja nije priznala jednostrano proglašenu nezavisnost Kosova, a i spoljnopolitička nastojanja vlasti u Bratislavi i Beogradu postaju veoma slična.

Nakon održanih izbora za Evropski parlament u junu 2024. godine u Evropskoj uniji su se pojavili problemi sa pitanjem njene unutrašnje konsolidacije i budućeg koncepta razvoja. To otvara i perspektivu daljnjeg lutanja kada je u pitanju odnos Evropske unije prema Zapadnom Balkanu, odnosno kako spojiti dva veoma bitna geostrateška *locusa* – srednji tok Dunava i južni deo Jadrana. Snaženje desnog centra i radikalne desnice u kontekstu nedavno održanih izbora za Evropski parlament odraziće se, pored brojnih drugih pitanja, i na buduće proširenje Evropske unije (Tuhina 2024). No, treba ukazati da savremena evropska krajnja desnica po mnogim pitanjima nije saglasna i da ima značajna interna odstupanja. I u okviru EU/njenih država članica nesumnjivo jačaju suverenističke tendencije, a to se može odraziti i na nedovršavanje ovog *sui generis* projekta u pravcu potencijalne federalizacije. Naravno, otvara se i pitanje perspektive transatlantskih odnosa ukoliko u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama ponovo na predsedničkim izborima pobedi Donald Tramp (Donald Trump). To bi moglo dovesti do smanjenja interne kohezije u odnosima najuticajnih država na Zapadu, ali i ugrožavanja aktuelnih veoma čvrstih odnosa EU–SAD. Nesumnjivo od ovoga bi zavisila i usmerenost Zapada generalno prema Srbiji i čitavom Zapadnom Balkanu (Politicki.ba 2024).

„Dve/tri“ Srednje Evrope – različiti savremeni vektori uticaja?

„V4 Srednja Evropa“ postupno se odvaja od ostatka ovog geostrateškog konstrukta. To potvrđuju i najavljene prilično čvrste sankcije prema Viktoru Orbanu i vlastima Mađarske s kraja 2023. godine u slučaju odbijanja/blokiranja davanja pomoći Ukrajini od strane Evropske unije (RSE 2024b). U tako konfuznim i difuznim previranjima u Srednjoj Evropi pojavljuju se i drugi problemi. To se pre svega odnosi na sagledavanje buduće uloge NATO-a u Srednjoj Evropi, vojne neutralnosti Austrije, ali i na jačanje desnice u ovoj zemlji (TANJUG 2024a). S druge strane, otvaraju se i pitanja uloge Nemačke i njenog pozicioniranja u Evropskoj uniji kao suštinski vodeće zemlje. Postavlja se i pitanje njenog položaja u okviru Srednje

Evrope, od toga jeste li ili nije njen deo, i takođe kako Nemačka percipira svoju ulogu u „trouglu“ između Alpa, Jadranskog mora i srednjeg toka Dunava.

Slovenija i Hrvatska, kao takođe srednjoevropske zemlje koje su tako uspele da se pozicioniraju nakon 1991. godine i nestanka Jugoslavije, umnogome su bliže nemačkom faktoru u Srednjoj Evropi nego zemljama Višegradske četvorke (Kaplan 2023, 190–191). Ostvarivanje njihovih nacionalnih interesa u postjugoslovenskom kontekstu realno je bilo lakše ostvarivo uz podršku Nemačke i Austrije, nego tada još uvek nekonsolidovanih novih demokratija zemalja Višegradske grupe.

Dakle, ukoliko analiziramo savremenu Srednju Evropu možemo uočiti zapravo osnovnu poddelu na zemlje osnaženog nemačkog uticaja i Višegradsku četvorku. No, čini se da interna neslaganja postepeno počinju da se šire i unutar Višegradske četvorke (Jozwiak 2024). Kao što je već rečeno, to se pre svega tiče odnosa ovih zemalja prema ratu u Ukrajini i globalno pozicijama Zapada, a sve više i na rastuće demokratske deficite u ovim zemljama koji nisu kompatibilni sa njihovim statusom članica EU i NATO. Činilo se, s druge strane, da neuklopljenost Slovenije i Hrvatske u koncept „V4 Srednje Evrope“ i njihov ulazak u Evropsku uniju pomaže da se prevaziđu ova skretanja u čemu su se one predominantno oslonile na Nemačku i Austriju u svom okruženju (Rosanda 2023). Tako je njihova naglašena evroatlantska orijentacija podrazumevala pre svega vezivanje uz Sjedinjene Američke Države, ali i za Nemačku u kontekstu članstva u Evropskoj uniji. Nemačka i Austrija su umnogome još od kraja 70-ih podržavale prekogranično vezivanje Slovenije i Hrvatske sa regijama u Austriji, Nemačkoj i Italiji. Ovo se pre svega odnosilo na tadašnju Radnu zajednicu Alpe-Jadran. Odmah nakon raspada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije postojala su nastojanja da se Hrvatska priključi Višegradskoj grupi. No, tadašnji hrvatski predsednik Franjo Tuđman odbio je poziv Višegradske grupe da se pridruži ovoj inicijativi još 1992. godine. S druge strane, predsednica Hrvatske Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović pokušavala je da oživi ovo pristupanje tokom 2015. godine, ali za to nije bilo istovetne spremnosti od strane Višegradske grupe (Vladić 2019). Ni trenutno ne postoji želja u vladajućim krugovima u Hrvatskoj da se zemlja pridruži V4 grupi. Slično je sa faktičkom nezainteresovanošću Slovenije da pristupi ovom regionalnom srednjoevropskom aranžmanu od proglašenja nezavisnosti 1991. godine.

Izvesni jaz u okviru Srednje Evrope se posebno širio od 2009. godine i nakon ponovnog dolaska Viktora Orbana na vlast u Mađarsku. Njegova populistička vlast ima istorijske osnove i zapravo je utemeljena na mađarskom podunavskom nacionalizmu, kako ga označava Katrin Orel (Catherine Horel) i mešovini elemenata ideologije agrarnog socijalizma i socijalnog hrišćanstva između dva svetska rata (Orel 2012, 272–303). I politička alternativa koja se rađa gotovo deceniju i po kasnije je prilično slična. Najnoviji izbori za Evropski parlament tokom juna 2024. godine u

Mađarskoj potvrđuju snaženje uticaja Petera Mađara (Péter Magyar) i njegove političke organizacije TISZA (Stranka poštovanja i slobode) (Pantelić 2024). Ovaj doskorašnji podržavalac premijera Orbana gotovo da u ideološkom smislu nastavlja sa njegovim odnosom prema Rusiji i insistiranjima na dodatnoj etnohomogenizaciji i populizmu u Mađarskoj. Zapravo jedini jasni otklon u odnosu na Orbanovu vlast Peter Mađar ima kada je u pitanju nužnost borbe protiv visoke korupcije. On stoga u svojim javnim nastupima uglavnom akcenat stavlja na velike korupcionaške afere.

I u Slovačkoj su oživele veoma slične unutrašnje tendencije demokratske regresije, ali i pokušaji približavanja Mađarskoj i njenom premijeru Orbanu. Nedavni pokušaj atentata na premijera Roberta Fica, 19. maja 2024. godine, pokazuje i dubinu tenzija u slovačkom društvu. Takođe tu su i problemi koji se odnose na „zaostavštinu“ njegove prethodne vlade, pre svega vezano za potencijalnu korupciju u koju je bio, prema određenim navodima, umešan i sadašnji predsednik Slovačke Peter Pelegrini (Peter Pellegrini) (Pantelić 2024). Odnos zvanične Bratislave prema Rusiji postaje gotovo identičan mađarskom, a sve je više i paralela koje upućuju da će se Slovačka na određeni način naći u izvesnoj (samo)izolaciji, kao i u vreme vlasti Vladimira Mečjara s kraja XX veka. Međutim, ona je zahvaljujući geopolitičkim okolnostima nužnosti hitnog širenja EU na središnje delove Evrope, pre dve decenije, ipak uspela da nadoknadi zaostatke u određenim reformama i uđe u članstvo Evropske unije 2004. godine.

Poljska pripada istom krugu srednjoevropskih zemalja, ali tradicionalno ima najbolje odnose sa Mađarskom (Orel 2012, 137–141). No, njen odnos prema Rusiji je drastično drugačiji, pre svega zahvaljujući kako lošim iskustvima tokom postojanja Sovjetskog Saveza, tako i aktuelnim tenzijama koje se odnose na ruska nastojanja da utiču na prilike u ovoj zemlji. Stoga se po ovom pitanju Poljska suštinski umnogome razlikuje u odnosu na Mađarsku i Slovačku. Ovo je posebno postalo očigledno nakon neočekivane posete mađarskog premijera Vikora Orbana ruskom predsedniku Vladimiru Putinu početkom jula 2024. godine, nakon čega je usledio čitav niz međusobnih optužbi i kvalifikacija (RSE 2024c). S druge strane, u Poljskoj su zahvaljujući pre svega veoma značajnoj ulozi Rimokatoličke crkve ojačale tendencije klerikalizacije društva i propagiranja tzv. patrijarhalnih i porodičnih vrednosti. No, nakon odlaska sa vlasti braće Kačinski (Kaczyński) i dolaska proevropskog političara Donalda Tuska (Donald Franciszek Tusk), od oktobra 2023. godine, čini se da se u izvesnoj meri takvo stanje menja.

Nemačka i Austrija, s druge strane, nesumnjivo imaju ojačani uticaj u ostatku Srednje Evrope. Austrija je tokom protekle decenije pored već brojnih foruma za saradnju u Podunavlju i Srednjoj Evropi pokrenula i dve trilateralne inicijative. Prva je sa Hrvatskom i Slovenijom uspostavljena 2017, a druga Mađarskom i Srbijom 2021. godine. U ovom kontekstu Austrija je posebno zainteresovana za saradnju u

oblasti bezbednosti i sprečavanja ilegalnih migracija sa Balkana. Veliki Dunavski basen smatra se jednom od fundamentalnih geostrateških tačaka u Evropi i u njemu Austrija pokušava dodatno da osnaži svoj položaj (Maršal 2019, 102–105). No, jačanje desnice u Austriji u kojoj živi veliki broj građana poreklom sa Zapadnog Balkana, a posebno Slobodarske partije Austrije, može u perspektivi pogoršati ove odnose. Čini se da u Austriji odnos prema Evropskoj uniji, migraciji i prema okruženju postaje modifikovan i da nosi potencijal pogoršanja odnosa, pre svega sa balkanskim okruženjem.

Značajno je i prisustvo Nemačke na Zapadnom Balkanu, gde se Srbija u njenoj vizuri percipira jednom od ključnih zemalja. Nemačka je svakako dominantni ekonomski partner Srbije, iako to ne korespondira i sa njihovim podjednako kvalitetnim političkim odnosima (PKS 2024). Vlasti u Berlinu konstantno uviđaju značaj stabilnosti prilika u Jugoistočnoj Evropi i čitavu deceniju, pre svega kroz Berlinski proces, podupiru balkansku komponentu regionalne saradnje. Nemačka takođe ima značajna ulaganja u svim zemljama regiona Zapadnog Balkana. No, u širem srednjoevropskom kontekstu Nemačka ima prilično loše odnose sa Mađarskom i Poljskom. Sukob Viktora Orbana i ranije vladajuće koalicije u SR Nemačkoj Hrišćansko demokratske unije i Socijalno hrišćanske unije (CDU–CSU), produbio se i za vreme sadašnje vlasti kojom dominira Socijaldemokratska partija (SPD) od početka rata u Ukrajini u februaru 2022. godine (TANJUG 2024b). Treba istovremeno imati u vidu da Bavarska ima poseban interes za pozicioniranje u Srednjoj Evropi, što preko jačanja podunavske saradnje u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, što zbog bliskosti sa Austrijom i Slovenijom i težnje bržeg povezivanja sa Jadranom. Demografske promene u Nemačkoj uskoro će dovesti do nedostatka od oko tri miliona radnika, što znači da će značajan deo kvalifikovane radne snage sa Zapadnog Balkana da se relocira u ovu zemlju (Štavljanin 2024). Ovo može predstavljati ozbiljan demografski problem i za šire Balkansko poluostrvo, uključujući Grčku, Bugarsku i Rumuniju. Evropske integracije kao najširi okvir povezivanja, što podrazumeva i daljnja proširenja EU na Zapadni Balkan, svakako će iz ugla Nemačke biti poduprte i užim okvirima saradnje između država Srednje Evrope.

Problemi razlikovanja odnosa zemalja Srednje Evrope prema Rusiji, s jedne strane, kao i prema Zapadnom Balkanu, s druge strane, nastavljaju se. Pre svega u Evropsku uniju neintegrisani Zapadni Balkan ostao je problematičan iz više razloga. Ni EU, ni Srednja Evropa nemaju viziju šta preduzeti da ubrzaju integracije zemalja Zapadnog Balkana. Takođe, Zapadni Balkan poseduje ozbiljan potencijal nestabilnosti koji može uticati i na čitavu Srednju Evropu, koja i sama ima određene probleme, pre svega vezane za korpus manjinskih pitanja. Osnažena je i podrška konzervativnih i liberalnih vlasti u Srednjoj Evropi istim takvim režimima na Zapadnom Balkanu, što može dalje doprineti ovdašnjoj demokratskoj regresiji (RSE

2022). Istovremeno, treba napomenuti i da je uticaj Ruske Federacije umnogome veći na Zapadnom Balkanu nego u Srednjoj Evropi, čije su zemlje u tom smislu ipak ograničene članstvom u EU i Severnoatlantskom savezu.

Treba istaći i da se u narednom periodu mogu pojaviti problemi koji se mogu reflektovati u dodatnim rascjepima između Zapada i pojedinih aktera na Zapadnom Balkanu. Reakcije koje su uočljive oko ponašanja pojedinih zapadnobalkanskih aktera prema Kini i Rusiji, ali i pojedina reagovanja sa Zapada vezano za Svesrpski sabor, to mogu samo ubrzati (RSE 2024d; *N/W* 2024). Udaljavanje pojedinih aktera u regionu od Zapada stoga se vrlo brzo može desiti sa brojnim reperkusijama, kako na njihov ekonomski razvoj tako i na širu stabilnost regiona. Takođe, snage koje su za integraciju u Evropsku uniju sve su malobrojnije u pojedinim delovima regiona Zapadnog Balkana i evroentuzijazam popušta pred jačanjem tzv. suverenističkih političkih opcija/tendencija. To potvrđuje stanje u Srbiji, ali i nedavno održani izbori u Severnoj Makedoniji gde je trijumfovala evroskeptična VMRO–DPMNE, nakon značajnog zaostatka ove zemlje u procesu evropskih integracija od 2018. do 2023. godine (Anđelković 2024).

Srbija i Srednja Evropa – udaljeni susedni region

Srbija je dugo u istorijskom kontinuumu imala loše odnose sa Srednjom Evropom. Posebno se to odnosi na nemački faktor zbog nastojanja širenja Habzburške monarhije na Balkan, ali i na odnose Mađara i Srba. Takođe tokom XVIII veka postojala su značajna očekivanja Srba južno od Dunava i Save da će Habzburška monarhija doprineti oslobođenju od Osmanske carevine. Osnivanje Habzburške Kraljevine Srbije (1718–1739) bilo je značajno podržano od Srba sa nastojanjem njenog širenja i oslobođenja srpskog naroda (Ćorović 2005, 474–493). Slično je i kada pogledamo ostatak XVIII veka kada se očekivanja od Habzburškog carstva često podižu u smislu oslobođenja od Osmanske carevine. I sam kraj XVIII veka bio je vezan za slična očekivanja, posebno u periodu postojanja tzv. Kočine krajine (1788–1791).

„Srpska revolucija“ i rekonstituisanje srpske države tokom prve polovine XIX veka ponovo je bilo vezano za očekivanja za povezivanje Srbije sa svojim severozapadnim okruženjem. U tom smislu se razvijaju odnosi kako sa Bečom tako i sa Budimpeštom. Period snaženja srpske državnosti u toku vladavine kralja Milana Obrenovića uspeo je da u Srbiji osnaži intelektualnu elitu koja je bila oslonjena za saradnju sa Zapadom. Tako se u ovom periodu može uočiti uticaj Milana Petrovića-Piroćanca, Jovana Ristića, Čedomilja Mijatovića, Živojina Perića i drugih. U tom sloju

noviformirane elite su razumele potrebu da se osnaže veze sa susednom Austrougarskom, ali i da se odustane od očekivanja podrške od Carevine Rusije koja tada nisu bila realna (Piroćanac 2019, 51–118). No, svojevrsno „strateško partnerstvo“, u savremenom govoru i rečniku spoljne politike, veže se sa Tajnom konvencijom koja je Srbiju dodatno povezala sa Austrougarskom 1881. godine (Tajna konvencija 1881). U ovom smislu od Austrougarske se očekivalo da podrži teritorijalno širenje Srbije ka jugu i jugozapadu, a za to vreme da se i unutar zemlje osnaže njeni institucionalni kapaciteti. Ipak, taj period traje dosta kratko i nova faza konfrontacije otpočinje nakon 1903. godine kroz Carinski rat (1906–1911), a potom i otpočinjanje Prvog svetskog rata (Đukanović 2019, 101–106). No, i sve otvorenije aspiracije Srbije prema južnoslovenskim područjima Austrougarske osnažile su navedenu konfrontaciju.

Rekonfiguracija Srednje Evrope i pozicioniranje nove države – Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca nakon Prvog svetskog rata – otvorilo je perspektivu novih vidova saradnje. Postojala su dva temeljna vektora njene regionalne saradnje – srednjoevropski i balkanski – a propast panevropske ideje francuskog ministra inostranih poslova Aristida Brijana (Aristid Briand) i stvaranja Dunavskog saveza s početka 1930-ih doprineli su revizionizmu u ovom delu Evrope (Zdenjek 2019, 131–184). Drugi krah koncepta Srednje Evrope u prvoj polovini XX veka bio je vezan za snaženje fašizma, ali i nakon Drugog svetskog rata, nametanjem ovom krugu zemalja sovjetskog modela razvoja i dominacije Sovjetskog Saveza u „Istočnoj Evropi“. Sovjetski uticaj je u svojim okvirima ove delove Srednje Evrope držao zatočenim sve do 1989. godine, a druga Jugoslavija pokušavala je da suštinski ostane po strani između tada sukobljenog Istoka i Zapada.

Transformacija Istočne Evrope u Srednju Evropu u hladnoratovskom razdoblju išla je ubrzano početkom 90-ih godina, između ostalog, i orijentacijom ovih zemalja da se integrišu što pre u NATO i Evropsku uniju (Mikanowski 2023, 450–469). „Povratak sebi“ šira Srednja Evropa je zapravo podrazumevala kao ponovno povezivanje sa Zapadnom Evropom. Naravno i tu su postojali određeni različiti uticaji jer se ona, zapravo, vezala kako za V4 tako i za „staru“ Srednju Evropu, sa pridruženim postjugoslovenskim državama Slovenijom i Hrvatskom.

U Srbiji se još u okviru postojanja Jugoslavije u njenim poslednjim godinama i u kulturnim krugovima govorilo i o njenom srednjoevropskom identitetu (Čiževski 2010, 9). Brojni jugoslovenski i srpski književnici bili su smatrani srednjoevropskim, poput Danila Kiša ili Aleksandra Tišme. Slovenija i Hrvatska već su kroz aranžman Radne zajednice (danas Saveza) Alpe-Jadran imali prilično razvijene prekogranične veze sa Bavarskom, Austrijom i severoistočnim delovima Italije. U gotovo čitavom periodu poslednje decenije XX veka možemo uočiti temeljno odvajanje Srbije od njenog srednjoevropskog okruženja, u očekivanju realizacije svog nacionalnog

programa mimo suštinske podrške iole značajnijih međunarodnih aktera. Dok se u potpunosti razgrađivao balkanski poredak uspostavljen posle Drugog svetskog rata, pre svega kroz nestanak Jugoslavije, Srednja Evropa se rekonstituisala uglavnom oslonjena na Zapad i težnje za evroatlantskim integracijama. Istovremeno, svojevrsan konflikt sa vlastitim okruženjem postaje poželjna mera nacionalnog interesa Srbije, tada još uvek u okviru Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Tada zapravo nastaju i koreni savremenog razmimoilaženja Srbije sa svojim okruženjem i neprihvatanje realnosti izmenjenih temeljnih paradigmi međunarodnog poretka nakon Hladnog rata.

Nastavak EU i NATO integracija u Jugoistočnoj Evropi išao je paralelnim tokom sve dok se Srbija od druge polovine 2000-ih nije našla u gotovo potpunom okruženju ovih zemalja. Iako je Srbija učestvovala u određenim formama regionalne srednjoevropske saradnje poput podunavske Radne zajednice (1990), kasnije i kroz Dunavsku strategiju Evropske unije (od 2009), realnog povezivanja sa Srednjom Evropom nije bilo zbog zaokupljenosti položajem Srba i entiteta Republika Srpska u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao i statusom Kosova. Novi „most“ ka Srednjoj Evropi vlasti u Srbiji posle 2012. godine uspostavljaju kroz jačanje odnosa sa Mađarskom u kojoj je na vlasti Viktor Orban, koji je i inače više puta govorio da Srbija zapravo i nije deo Balkana, već srednjoevropska država (RTS 2018). Naravno, njegovo tumačenje pojma Srednja Evropa umnogome je drugačije od tradicionalnih poimanja ove regije kao kulturnog prostora. Paralelno sa poboljšanjem odnosa sa Mađarskom ponovno kreću i oscilacije u odnosima sa Hrvatskom, posebno nakon 2017. godine, a tokom 2023. i 2024. godine vrlo izraženo i sa Slovenijom.

U aktuelnom i inače nekonsolidovanom okviru/modelu Srednje Evrope, Srbija s druge strane pokušava ostvariti dobre odnose sa Austrijom kao ključnom zemljom. Naime, značajan broj Srba kao ekonomska emigracija živi u ovoj zemlji (*Politika* 2022). Nemačka i njeno prvobitno ojačano političko prisustvo nakon 2012. godine izgubili su na značaju u Srbiji. Taj period započinje 2016. godine postepenim slabljenjem autoriteta nemačke kancelarke Angele Merkel (Angela Merkel) i njenog uticaja na vlasti u Beogradu. Pogoršani odnosi između vlasti u Berlinu i Beogradu eskaliraju tokom 2023. i 2024. godine kada Savezna Republika Nemačka pokreće inicijativu sa Francuskom oko „Sporazuma o normalizaciji odnosa između Srbije i Kosova“ (2023) (EEAS 2023), ali i kada ona postaje sponzor „Rezolucije o genocidu u Srebrenici Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija“ tokom aprila i maja 2024. godine (*Politika* 2024a). Insistiranje Nemačke na uvođenju restriktivnih mera od strane Srbije prema Ruskoj Federaciji još od 2022. godine takođe izaziva loše odnose sa zvaničnim Beogradom, koji uporno izbegava tu mogućnost. Srbija, premda je više puta bilo najavljivano, nikada nije zaključila aranžman strateškog partnerstva sa Nemačkom, iako je zahvaljujući određenoj ekspanziji ovog

spoljnopolitičkog instrumenta tokom proteklih petnaestak godina on prilično obesmišljen/relativizovan. Tako zapravo Srbija umesto uklapanja u svoje balkansko, ali i srednjoevropsko okruženje, zapravo realno teži jačanju veza sa Rusijom i Kinom. Tu „*snažnu naklonjenost Istoku*“, kako pre svega odnose sa Rusijom označava Tim Maršal (Tim Marshall) (Maršal, 2019, 111), Srbija za sada prilično uspešno prevazilazi. Međutim, imajući u vidu realno nova zaoštavanja Rusije i Kine sa Zapadom to pretili da će Srbiju, u najmanju ruku, ostaviti u nekoj formi samoizolacije ili dodatne izopštenosti, možda ne onako čvrste kakva je bila od 1992. od 2000. godine kada je u pitanju bila tadašnja Savezna Republika Jugoslavija.

Jačanje više veza sa V4 i Mađarskom nego sa ostatkom Srednje Evrope ostaće dominantno nastojanje vlasti Srbije i u narednom razdoblju. To potvrđuje i dodatno ideološko povezivanje kroz određene sastanke ministara u kojima se ističu antizapadni sentiment i potenciraju „tradicionalne vrednosti“ (RSE 2024e). Jedan od ne baš očekivanih poteza prethodne garniture aktuelne vlasti Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine polovinom 2023. godine jeste njen ulazak u prekogranični aranžman Savez Alpe-Jadran. (PSO 2023) Ovaj forum za saradnju regionalnih vlasti Srednje Evrope u širem kontinuitetu nazivan je čak i uzročnikom razbijanja i nestanka bivše Jugoslavije s kraja 80-ih i početkom 90-ih godina prošlog veka (Ekmečić, 1992, 28). Zbog toga je i ulazak AP Vojvodine u Savez Alpe-Jadran u atmosferi sličnih javnih diskursa u Srbiji danas prilično iznenađenje, imajući u vidu da u ovom aranžmanu učestvuju regionalne vlasti Austrije, Slovenije, Hrvatske i sada Srbije. Prvobitno je on od kraja 70-ih godina XX veka uključivao Bavarsku u Nemačkoj, Austriju, ali i delove Italije, tadašnje Jugoslavije i Mađarske. No, bilo bi uistinu pretenciozno izvlačiti neke dalekosežne zaključke s tim u vezi kada je pozicija Srbije prema Srednjoj Evropi u pitanju. Zapravo srednjoevropski identitet i kulturološka komponenta u Srbiji je dugo vremena potirana i izgubila je na stvarnom značaju.

Drugi alternativni most/poveznica Srbije ka Srednjoj Evropi – Hrvatska, nikada nije shvaćena kao mogućnost za približavanje pre svega ovoj regiji, a potom i Zapadu generalno. U tom smislu su i nerešeni brojni problemi u krajnje nekonsolidovanim odnosima između Beograda i Zagreba. Zategnutosti u navedenim odnosima su stalne i pored prividnih pokušaja i neuspešnog poboljšanja početkom 2023. godine (*Index.hr* 2023). Sve to prati i realno odsustvo interesovanja Srbije da se ubrza proces evropskih integracija i u tom kontekstu poboljšanja odnosa sa širim susedstvom. Zapravo, medijski su ustanovljeni i široko prihvaćeni narativi i očekivanja u srpskoj javnosti da će doći do jačanja uloge Rusije na Balkanu. Nakon toga bi se i suštinski i gotovo u potpunosti izmenio položaj Srbije i srpskog naroda u ovom delu Evrope. Intenziviranje saradnje sa Rusijom i Kinom kao postupno modifikovani prioritet spoljnopolitičkog delovanja Srbije ide uporedo sa

jačanjem neliberalnih tendencija. Stoga će biti nastavljeno negovanje i zasigurno produbljivanje sadašnjeg strateškog partnerstva sa aktuelnom mađarskom vlašću. Istovremeno, sasvim je očekivano i skorašnje zaključivanje sličnog aranžmana sa Slovačkom, a što će dovesti do postepenog daljnjeg odvajanja od uticaja Nemačke i Austrije u Srednjoj Evropi i na Zapadnom Balkanu.

Zaključak

Bezbednosno trusni Zapadni Balkan i dalje se nalazi na potpunoj evropskoj periferiji. Trenutno možemo zaključiti da se on istovremeno nalazi čak i u senci Ukrajine i Moldavije, čije je pitanje ubrzanja procesa evropskih integracija intenzivirano od ruskog napada na istočne delove Ukrajine, a posebno polovinom 2024. godine kada su obe države otvorile pregovore o pristupanju EU. Nejasna politika Evropske unije prema Zapadnom Balkanu, koji nije konsolidovan i stabilizovan nakon kraja Hladnog rata, ostavila je prostor za prodor drugih globalnih aktera, pre svega Rusije i Kine. One intenzivno koriste prilike da utiču i na odnose između ovdašnjih aktera, ali i da utiču na njihove spoljnopolitičke agende. Otvaranje mogućnosti za potencijalni samostalni ulazak Crne Gore u Evropsku uniju, krajem ove decenije, neće doprineti suštinskom poboljšanju prilika u ostatku Zapadnog Balkana i neće predstavljati podsticaj za slične procese kada su u pitanju druge zemlje (Milić 2024). Jadranska regija, kao značajno geopolitičko čvorište savremene Evrope, možda će time ipak biti dodatno povezana sa Zapadom, ali to nije potpuno rešenje za brojna balkanska pitanja.

Tu su i stalna i više nego uočljiva iščekivanja od Srbije da pokaže raspoloženje da ide ka Zapadu, dakle pre svega prema Evropskoj uniji. Sadašnja spoljnopolitička pozicija je, međutim, dvovekovni kontekst pozicioniranja Srbije, izuzev kratkog perioda za vreme vladavine kralja Milana Obrenovića i u razdoblju druge Jugoslavije (1953–1956). To, naime, potvrđuju i reči srpskog diplomate grofa Čedomilja Mijatovića o stalnom očekivanju Srba da ojača uloga Rusije na Balkanu (Mijatović 2017, 34–42). On je još 1917. godine ustvrdio da su proruski sentimente uvek jaki i čvrsti i pored brojnih iznenađenja koja su vremenom stizala od strane Rusije prema srpskom faktoru na Balkanu. Današnja Rusija ima značajna očekivanja od Srbije na međunarodnom planu, u smislu podrške koju očekuje za svoje spoljnopolitičke aktivnosti. Takođe, Srbija i dalje produbljuje odnose sa Ruskom Federacijom i posle 2022. godine i njenog napada na Ukrajinu, i to uprkos osudama koje stižu sa Zapada. Sve se više aktuelizuje i mogućnost ulaska Srbije u BRIKS i perspektiva

budućeg članstva u njemu, kao dodatne alternative pre gotovo dve i po decenije otpočetom procesu evropskih integracija (*Politika* 2024b).

Za sada je uspešno balansiranje na spoljnopolitičkom planu Srbije između Istoka i Zapada i pored izrazito nepovoljne situacije za takve aktivnosti nakon 2022. godine. Ipak, ostaje pitanje do kada će to i dalje realno biti održivo u narednom razdoblju. Zapravo, i nedavna očekivanja od izbora za Evropski parlament vezana za potpunu rekonfiguraciju snaga u njemu, nisu se pokazala kao tačna. Drugo, očekivanja od pobeđe Donalda Trampa krajem godine na američkim predsedničkim izborima takođe rastu, u smislu da će on temeljno izmeniti odnos Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i njihovih očekivanja prema Srbiji. Iako je Donald Tramp u svom prethodnom predsedničkom mandatu Srbiju više privukao u „američku orbitu“ (Vašingtonski sporazum iz septembra 2020), osigurao ulazak u NATO dve zapadnobalkanske zemlje (Crne Gore 2017. i Severne Makedonije 2020. godine) i uticao na rešavanje višedecenijskog makedonsko-grčkog spora kroz Prespanski sporazum iz 2018. godine, značajna su i dalje očekivanja temeljne promene pristupa prema Balkanu u narednom periodu u slučaju njegovog izbora. Međutim, čak i u ovakvom scenariju treba očekivati kontinuitet spoljne politike SAD-a prema Srbiji i Zapadnom Balkanu sa potencijalnim manjim modifikacijama (*Politicki.ba* 2024).

Odnos Srbije prema krizama u Ukrajini i na Bliskom istoku takođe će biti indikativan. Posebno se to odnosi na informacije o kontinuiranom snabdevanju Ukrajine municijom od 2022. godine (Russell, Dunai 2024). Štaviše, i pored toga za očekivati je i da će Srbija i entitet Republika Srpska ostati izvesna osa ruskog uticaja na Zapadnom Balkanu sa prenetim uticajem i na Crnu Goru. Kineski uticaj nakon početka rata u Ukrajini se umnogome smanjio na jugoistoku Evrope. Tako je i prethodni aranžman Kina + 17 zemalja Centralne i Istočne Evrope (*China-CEEC 17*), zahvaljujući napuštanju ove inicijative od strane pojedinih evropskih zemalja (Italije i pribaltičkih republika), sada manje delotvoran (Tan 2023). No, Srbija i Mađarska ustrajno su na tom putu osnažujući konstantno svoje veze sa Pekingom.

Mađarski premijer Viktor Orban uporno je ponavljao da je Srbija deo Srednje Evrope. On je u svoju srednjoevropsku orbitu uticaja i politike „zaštite“ Mađara, odnosno Karpatski basen, uključio i Srbiju, pored delova susednih Slovačke i Rumunije. Srednja Evropa, prema Orbanu, percipirana je i kao stecište konzervativnih režima (RSE 2024f). No, i nedostatak realne političke alternative u Mađarskoj sve to dodatno potvrđuje kao širi koncept, koji će po svemu ostati nepromenjen i nakon odlaska Orbana sa vlasti. Istovremeno, Srbija se trenutno nalazi na vetrometini svetske geopolitike, ali i dalje kao „zatočenica“ vlastite geografije (Maršal 2019, 111). Njen srednjoevropski i podunavski identitet ostaje u senci njenih drugih identiteta, dok je konstanta njenog položaja ostanak na periferiji savremenog kapitalizma. Srednja Evropa tako neće biti atraktivno

pribežište Srbiji, koja je u svojim očekivanjima oslonjena na globalni Istok. Štaviše, Srbija i unutar sebe heterogena Srednja Evropa se zapravo u značajnoj meri razilaze.

Nepoverenje prema Srbiji i njenim realnim namerama raste i u okviru njenog južnog okruženja. To se pre svega odnosi na Srbiju na Balkanskom poluostrvu. S druge strane, to se prenosi i na njen odnos prema progermanskoj Srednjoj Evropi. Ekonomska vezanost sa ovim delom Srednje Evrope je više nego vidljiva imajući u vidu relacije Srbije sa „trouglom“ – Nemačkom, ali i Slovenijom i Italijom, pre svega u ekonomskoj ravni, dok političko približavanje ovom krugu zemalja ide veoma otežano (PKS 2024). Pitanje neuvođenja sankcija Rusiji to istovetno pokazuje, kao i sveukupna višegodišnja veoma niska stopa usklađenosti pozicija Srbije sa Zajedničkom spoljnom i bezbednosnom politikom Evropske unije (ISAC fund 2023). Sve to udaljava zemlju od njenih barem i deklarativnih aspiracija za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji. Treba istaći i da se evidentni ekonomski napredak Srbije, ostvaren pre svega kroz ojačane veze sa Evropskom unijom, ne vezuje za druge okvire njene interne modernizacije.

Negovanje svojevrsnog kulta vesternofobije je više nego evidentno u Srbiji, pre svega u medijskoj, ali i u akademskoj sferi tokom protekle decenije. Zapad tako sobom nosi u simboličkom smislu loše predznake, dok se u ovoj crno-belooj dihotomiji Istoku (Rusiji i Kini) daju sve obrnute karakteristike. U tom smislu je i opšta ne preterano dobra percepcija Srednje Evrope, kao geostrateškog konstrukta šire integrisanog u Zapad, osnažena u srpskom društvu i pored izuzetaka poput Mađarske i Slovačke. I u tom smislu najveći deo javnosti je za pravljenje izvesne distinkcije i dodatno udaljavanje od Srednje Evrope, koje bi išlo paralelno sa približavanjem Rusiji i Kini kao više nego poželjnim akterima. Srednja Evropa se percipira i u ne baš povoljnom smislu zbog činjenice da ovom krugu zemalja pripadaju Slovenija i Hrvatska. Imajući u vidu stalnu zaoštrenost odnosa između zvaničnog Beograda i Zagreba, rešenje čitavog niza otvorenih pitanja sa Hrvatskom ostaje odloženo za naredni period. Nakon odlaska sa vlasti Janeza Janše u Sloveniji tokom 2022. godine, više je nego naglašen sasvim drugačiji odnos Beograda prema ovoj zemlji, kako zbog neimenovanja novog srpskog ambasadora u Ljubljani (2023), tako i vezano za brojne okolnosti oko predlaganja rezolucije o Srebrenici u Generalnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija, gde se ova zemlja pojavila kao njen kosponzor (2024) (*Al Jazeera Balkans 2024b*).

Spoljnopolitičko pozicioniranje Srbije može ujedno usloviti i njenu dodatnu „usamljenost“ na Zapadnom Balkanu, ali sasvim moguće i u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Za razliku od njoj susedene Mađarske, koja svoje ponašanje može ipak koordinisati u okviru šireg članstva u Evropskoj uniji i NATO, Srbija će mimo tog okvira teško samostalno uspeti da održi takav svoj kurs. Nekomplementarnost spoljnopolitičkih nastojanja Srbije sa ostatkom okruženja može uticati i na redefinisane sadašnjeg

položaja. Podrška Rusije i Kine u međunarodnim organizacijama, poput nedavnog glasanja o rezoluciji o Srebrenici u Generalnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija, nije, iako su to najuticajnije mediji u Srbiji drugačije predstavili, doprinela da se može realno sagledati uspešan efekat ove potpore. Štaviše, Srbija se u tim medijskim predstavama i percepcijama označava kao jedan od ključnih aktera „*slobodarskog sveta*“ (Šljukić 2024). Ponovno percipiranje sebe kao globalnog aktera, a ne regionalnog kako je sasvim realno, opet će Srbiju kao i u slučaju ranije politike četiri stuba (2008–2012), ali i u savremenoj paradigmi od 2017. godine, ostaviti mimo regionalnog i evropskog *mainstreama*.

Nesporazumi Srbije sa vlastitim balkanskim, ali i srednjoevropskim okruženjem (pre svega Hrvatskom), nastavljaju se, a interne podele u srpskom društvu takođe postaju gotovo nesavladive i umnogome su veće i u odnosu na deceniju raspada bivše Jugoslavije (1991–2001). Različite i podeljene sfere unutar srpskog društva tako utiču i na sagledavanje njenog okruženja. Uvek su u istorijskom kontinuitetu tokom protekla dva veka u Srbiji bile malobrojnije one snage koje su se zalagale za produbljivanje i poboljšanje odnosa sa akterima u Srednjoj Evropi. Dakle, očekivanja da će doći do konsolidovanja odnosa Srbije sa državama u regionu, i to vezano za potencijalno ubrzanje evropskih integracija i vezivanje za Zapad na globalnom planu, ostaju prilično nerealna i pored uočljive „*politike umirivanja*“ od strane aktuelne administracije američkog predsednika Džozefa Bajdena (Joseph Biden) (Serwer 2022). Stoga je i izvestan privid spoljnopolitičkog približavanja Zapadu, a zapravo suštinsko udaljavanje, uočljivo u oblikovanju javnog mnjenja u Srbiji tokom protekle i u prvoj polovini ove decenije (Sprint Insight 2022). Treba takođe istaći i da će transformacija tako oblikovanog mnjenja u Srbiji ostati dugoročno teška imajući u vidu sistematičnost, stalnost i dubinu poruka koje se već više decenija njemu šalju.

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Dragan ĐUKANOVIĆ, Marko DAŠIĆ

**SERBIA'S POSITIONING IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT:
BETWEEN THE "TWO/THREE" CONCEPTS OF CENTRAL EUROPE**

Abstract: The authors discuss the unique characteristics of Central Europe, particularly in the last century, and highlight the fundamental differences in the influence vectors within this region of Europe. In this regard, we can distinguish the regions of the Visegrad Group (V4) and the Alpine sub-region (Germany, Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia). The differences between the countries in the V4 arrangement are more pronounced, particularly regarding their positions on the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and their varying dynamics of democratic processes. Throughout its modern history, Serbia has predominantly had strained relations with its Central European neighbours. Regarding this, the authors specifically highlight many phases, particularly in the early 19th century. As a result, Serbia's current foreign policy is examined in the context of its relations with the states of an otherwise intricate Central Europe. In this regard, the broader context of Serbia's objectively slow European integration is highlighted, as well as its intense relations with China and Russia. The authors conclude that Serbia will continue to face challenges in its immediate Central European environment.

Keywords: Serbia, Central Europe, Visegrad Group, Germany, Austria, foreign policy, European Union.

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Nacionalni interes u eri političke polarizacije: američki predsednički izbori 2024. godine¹

Dragan R. SIMIĆ²

Apstrakt: Spoljna i bezbednosna politika, skoro tradicionalno, igraju malu ili sporednu ulogu na američkim predsedničkim izborima. Ipak, imajući u vidu globalni kontekst ovogodišnjih izbora koji odlikuju sukobi u Ukrajini, na Bliskom istoku i, potencijalno, u Istočnoj Aziji, kao i činjenicu da su u njemu glavni kandidati već bili predsednici, što znači da smo u velikoj meri upoznati sa njihovim potencijalnim spoljnim politikama, ovogodišnji izbori bi mogli da budu izuzetak. Kada se, međutim, uzme u razmatranje klasično, preovlađujuće značenje nacionalnog interesa, primetno je odsustvo jasne, razrađene i neprotivrečne koncepcije ovog pojma u programima i istupima oba kandidata. S obzirom na izrazito visok stepen političke polarizacije koja karakteriše ovogodišnje predsedničke izbore, osim konsenzusa povodom politike prema Narodnoj Republici Kini, kao i pretnje koja od nje dolazi, malo šta se može označiti pridevom nacionalni. Radi se, prevashodno, o „stranačkim“, i – još uže, pojedinačnim interesima samih predsedničkih kandidata. Drugim rečima, nacionalni interesi se razmatraju, ali pod drugačijim pojmovima, rečima i/ili sintagmama.

Ključne reči: nacionalni interes, nacionalna bezbednost, spoljna i bezbednosna politika, Sjedinjene Američke Države, predsednički izbori, politička polarizacija, međunarodni poredak, Donald Trump, Džozef Bajden.

¹ Članak je završen u vreme dok je predsednik Džozef Bajden još uvek bio izgledni kandidat Demokratske stranke na američkim predsedničkim izborima 2024. godine.

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Uvod

Pojmovi „nacionalni interes“ i „nacionalna bezbednost“ pojavili su se u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama krajem tridesetih i početkom četrdesetih godina prošlog veka u vreme administracije predsednika Frenklina Delana Ruzvelta (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) (Simić 2022, Roady 2024). Tako nešto se nije dogodilo slučajno, već je bilo rezultat teških spoljnih okolnosti u vidu uspona nacizma i fašizma u Evropi i agresivnog ponašanja Japana u Istočnoj Aziji. U igri su bile i unutrašnje okolnosti, čija je glavna odlika bila najveća ekonomska kriza u američkoj istoriji koja je započela 1929. godine i sa kojom se predsednik Frenklin Delano Ruzvelt borio pokrećući program sveukupnih ekonomskih reformi poznat pod nazivom „Novi dogovor“ (New Deal). Odjednom se na mnoga pitanja počelo gledati sa nivoa celokupne države i nacije, a ne samo iz ugla posmatranja pojedinaca ili iz aspekta interesa određenih grupa. Na primer, 1934. godine Čarls Bird (Charles A. Beard), poznati istoričar, piše čuvenu knjigu „The Idea of National Interest“ (Beard 1934), a ovaj pojam polako osvaja teorijske rasprave i krči svoj put u praksi određivanja nacionalnih/državnih politika, kao i u ukupnim međunarodnim i svetskim odnosima. Na taj način, u nekih dvadesetak godina, neposredno pre Drugog svetskog rata, tokom rata kao i na počecima Hladnog rata, ova kovanica/fraza postaje jedan od preovlađujućih pojmova nauke o međunarodnim odnosima.

U tom smislu, kad Hans Morgentau (Hans Morgenthau) 1951. godine piše temeljnu studiju o ovom pojmu (Morgenthau 1951), on se zapravo naslanja na snažnu idejno-teorijsku, ideološku i praktičnu podlogu koja nastaje i razvija se u ovom, događajima zahtevnom i bremenitom razdoblju. Nacionalni interes nije postao samo „zvezda vodilja“ (*Ein Stern in der Nacht*) američke spoljne politike, nego i teorijski telos u prvoj generaciji realističke škole međunarodnih odnosa. Glavna je tvrdnja ovog rada da se pojam nacionalnog interesa u današnjim političkim debatama uzima kao dat, pre nego što mu glavni kandidati predaju neko dublje teorijsko značenje. Pored toga, primetno je odsustvo konsenzusa o tome šta čini glavne pretnje američkoj nacionalnoj bezbednosti (osim u slučaju NR Kine) a, samim time, i šta su ključni američki nacionalni interesi u vremenu u kojem živimo, i posebno kako te interese ostvariti u praksi. Rad se pored uvoda i zaključka sastoji iz četiri celine. U prvoj ćemo izložiti pojam i različita shvatanja termina „nacionalni interes“ u nauci o međunarodnim odnosima, a u drugoj govorimo o nacionalnom interesu u istoriji spoljne politike SAD. Treća celina se bavi nacionalnim interesom u eri političke polarizacije, a četvrta nacionalnim interesom i američkim predsedničkim izborima 2024. godine.

Pojam i različita shvatanja termina „nacionalni interes“ u nauci o međunarodnim odnosima

Malo je, ako ih uopšte i ima, zamisli ili pojmova u nauci o međunarodnim odnosima i praktično-političkoj delatnosti koji su poput nacionalnog interesa u isto vreme toliko mnogo upotrebljavani i osporavani. Neslaganja su se javljala kad je reč o značenjskom sadržaju same kovanice, preko pojmova nacionalni i interes, (ne)promenljivosti koncepta u uslovima vremena i prostora, doktrinarnih, nasuprot strukturalno-konstruktivističkih pristupa ovom pitanju, sve do potpunog odbacivanja ovog složenog i protivrečnog pojma kao teorijski neutemeljenog, proizvoljnog oruđa/alatke u dnevno-političkim borbama. Dalje, višeznačnost i nedovoljna određenost, najčešće usled preterane upotrebe i zloupotrebe, dodatno pojačavaju nejasnoću i maglovitost kovanice nacionalni interes. Uzgred, strogo jezički govoreći, nije reč o pojmu koji se sastoji od jedne reči koja semantički treba da pokrije određen značenjski sadržaj. Nećemo pogrešiti ukoliko ustvrdimo da u političkom govoru, previše često i u teorijskim raspravama o *nacionalnom interesu*, mišljenje o tzv. društvenim ciljevima, ponekad o vrednostima, u XVII i XVIII veku o državnim razlozima, danas najšire o smernicama politika nacionalnih vlada, ne postoji dovoljno precizna jezička instrumentalizacija misli (Rolan Bart). Već samo napred navedene nedoumice navode na pomisao da smo u govoru o nacionalnom interesu bačeni u pravu „terminološku džunglu“ (Miletić 1978, 279).

Neophodno je, dalje, i razjašnjenje pitanja na šta se pretežno odnosi pojam *nacionalni* u složenici nacionalni interes. Da li je, naime, reč o interesu jedne nacije koja je određena po etničkom principu, na šta se, inače, pretežno misli kad se, npr. u Istočnoj Evropi, koristi pridev *nacionalni*, ili se misli na interes svih pripadnika jedne društvene zajednice građana, bez obzira na njihovu etničku, versku ili bilo koju drugu pripadnost, što je svakako mnogo poželjnije. U rečnicima zapadnih zemalja, pre svega u Sjedinjenim Državama gde je koncept nacionalnog interesa o kome govorimo i nastao, pridev *nacionalni* se odnosi na sve građane, članove političke zajednice i predstavlja neku vrstu *terminus technicus*-a za jedan širi društveni interes, i ni u kom slučaju nije etnički određen. Tako shvaćen nacionalni interes se, razumljivo, odnosi i na državni interes, kao i na interese svih pripadnika takve zajednice, pojedinačno i zajedno.

Krenimo redom da postavljamo prethodna pitanja, kao i da pokušamo da odgovorimo na njih. Prvo, koji nacionalni interes? Na drugi način to isto: na koje se dimenzije stvarnosti odnosi – vojnu, ekonomsku, političku, bezbednosnu, vrednosnu...? Drugo, u kakvim okolnostima i istorijskim prilikama ga formulišemo i/ili sledimo? Kada govorimo baš o nacionalnom interesu, a ne o nekom drugom

društvenom interesu? Na nacionalni interes, naime, pre svega sadržinu koju uglavnom pokriva i nastoji da pokrije, pozivali su se i određivali ga narodi i države, carstva i imperije, čak i onda kada su ga drugačije nazivali, bilo kao vitalne težnje, potrebe i ciljeve neke državne tvorevine, najčešće u Novom veku nazivan – državni razlog. Sve to, najpre, s težnjom da država opstane, uvećava teritoriju, očuva bezbednost i vlastiti način života i vrednosti do kojih drži... jednom rečju, uvećava svoju snagu i ukupnu moć u odnosu na druge u prirodnom stanju međunarodnih i međudržavnih odnosa.

Istorijski posmatrano, zamisao nacionalnih interesa u Evropi se prvi put pominje krajem XVI i početkom XVII veka (Ejdus 2024, 277). Bilo je to doba utemeljivanja modernih evropskih država. Kao što smo već ranije kazali, sadržina analiziranog pojma nacionalni interes jezički je iskazivana i u sintagmama poput: „državni razlog“ (fr. *raison d'état*, eng. *Reason of State*, nem. *Staatsräson*, ital. *Ragione di Stato*,...), „dinastički interesi“ ili jednostavno kao „volja vladara“. Po rečima Henrija Kisindžera (Henry Kissinger) „doktrina državnog razloga podrazumeva da dobrobit države opravdava sva sredstva što se koriste za njegovo ostvarenje; srednjovekovnu ideju o univerzalnom moralu zamenio je nacionalni interes“ (Kisindžer 1999, 41). Nastanak i razvoj nacionalnih država u Evropi pridodao je spisku ciljeva, vrednosti i interesa koji se brane i očuvanje i razvoj pojedinih etničkih skupina-nacija, u pojedinim slučajevima se isticala i potreba očuvanja određenog verskog opredeljenja.

Prethodni pregled razvoja različitih jezičkih izraza i kovanica je nužno neorganizovan, mestimičan, ispreturan i, što je najvidljivije iz aspekta modernih društvenih nauka, *nesistematičan*. Sasvim je, otuda, na mestu opaska našeg najznačajneg teoretičara nacionalnog interesa Andreje Miletića, da je „koncept nacionalnog interesa (je) ušao u političku teoriju tek posle duge upotrebe u političkoj praksi (podvukao D. S.). Pre nego što je postao instrument političke analize, on je bio oruđe političkih borbi“ (Miletić 1978, 263). Ipak, „čak i oni koji sumnjiče zamisao nacionalnog interesa da nije izašla iz odežde mita, ne odriču joj vrednost bar kao sredstvu političke akcije u odnosima država“ (Simić 2002, 33). Takav razvojni put, od „oruđa političkih borbi“ do „instrumenta političke analize“ može se videti i na primeru zemlje gde je taj koncept teorijski utemeljen i uobličen – Sjedinjenih Američkih Država.

Nacionalni interes u istoriji spoljne politike SAD

U istoriji američke spoljne politike nijedan koncept, kako god da su ga akteri gorljivih sporenja u različitim epohama nazivali, nije bio više osporavan od zamisli

nacionalnog interesa. I u ovoj zemlji, pojam nacionalnog interesa imao je, dugi niz decenija, visoku afektivnu vrednost. Često je služio, kako to primećuje H. V. Brands (H. W. Brands), kao „poziv na patriotizam“ (Brands 2002, 473.) Kao i kod svake druge države, i u američkom slučaju, nacionalni interes je najpre imao svoj temelj u obezbeđivanju nacionalne teritorije. Drugim rečima, na taj način se nastojalo da mlada država opstane i sačuva bezbednost suočena sa veoma delikatnim pretnjama: spoljnim i unutrašnjim. Prostorno gledano, trinaest bivših kolonija su predstavljale u odnosu na druge posednike moći na severnoameričkom kontinentu, kao i prema prostranstvima koja su se protezala sve do Tihog okeana, samo tanak pojas uz istočnu obalu. U svega nekoliko decenija, ključno pitanje očuvanja bezbednosti i jačanja Sjedinjenih Država postaće teritorijalno širenje.

Rasprave, često i svađe političkih prvaka o tome šta je za Ameriku najbolje, odnosno, današnjim jezikom kazano, šta je primarni nacionalni interes ove zemlje, započele su još od vremena njenog nastanka. Sloboda koju su Amerikanci oružjem osvojili porazivši Britance nije ih spasila od strateške dileme u koju su zapali izbijanjem sukoba 1792. godine, i počinjanjem niza ratova između njihove nekadašnje metropole Velike Britanije i Francuske. Našli su se u „unakrsnoj vatri“ između dve moćne države od kojih je svaka na svoj način bila važna za ispunjenje nacionalnih ciljeva Mlade Republike. Sudbonosno pitanje sa kojim su se suočavali bilo je: „Na kojoj strani leže američki nacionalni interesi?“ (Brands 2002, 474). Očekivano, Tomas Džeferson (Thomas Jefferson) opredelio se za približavanje Francuskoj i traženju oslonca za ukupnu američku politiku u snazi i uticaju zemlje koja je kapitalno podržala revolucionare u ratu za nezavisnost. Inače, shvatanje da su nacionalni interesi u spoljnoj i unutrašnjoj politici tesno isprepleteni, potrajalo je još najmanje dva stoleća američke istorije. Nasuprot Džefersonu i Republikancima, Vašingtonov (George Washington) sekretar trezora i najpouzdaniji savetnik prvog američkog predsednika, federalista Aleksandar Hamilton (Alexander Hamilton), zadivljen efikasnošću britanske izvršne vlasti i monarhista po opredeljenju, opredelio se za traženje podrške i što tešnje odnose sa Velikom Britanijom.

U nadgornjavanju pristalica pomenutih pristupa protekle su dve naredne decenije. Federalisti su kao prvi u hronološkom nizu, pre svih Džordž Vašington i Džon Adams (John Adams), prvo pravno i politički utvrdili odnose sa Britanijom kroz Džejev (John Jay) sporazum, a potom je Adams poveo i neobjavljeni pomorski rat sa Francuskom. S druge strane, shvatajući američki nacionalni interes sasvim drugačije od svojih prethodnika, republikanac Džejms Medison (James Madison) vodio je formalni rat sa Britanijom 1812. godine. Mlada Republika je doživela ne samo težak, nego i ponižavajući poraz od britanskih trupa: sukob se završio paljenjem svih vladinih zgrada u Vašingtonu. Bio je to, istovremeno, i otrežnjujući raskid američke političke i društvene elite sa verovanjem da se nacionalni interes

SAD-a može najbolje ostvariti u oslanjanju na bio koju stranu državu. Jednako važno, Sjedinjene Države su se dramatično suočile sa slabostima do tada postojećeg sistema bezbednosti i institucija koje su ga pridržavale. Ishod rata sa Britanijom 1814. godine bio je po Gedisu (John Lewis Gaddis) jedan od šokova u američkoj istoriji koji su natrali ovu zemlju da temeljno preispita i redefiniše dotadašnji sistem i ustanove bezbednosti, a pre svega da postavi temelje jednom izmenjenom strateškom mišljenju (Gedis 2008). Konkretna britanska pretnja i, još više, novi bezbednosni izazovi, zahtevali su od odlučilaca u Vašingtonu da iznađu delotvorne odgovore, sve u cilju ostvarivanja vitalnih nacionalnih interesa toga vremena.

Između mnogih koji su u tom poduhvatu dali doprinos, izdvaja se kolosalni učinak Džona Kvinsija Adamsa (John Quincy Adams). On je bio taj čovek koji je najbolje razumeo nalog vremena i potrebe mlade zemlje: prvo, kako da opstane u postojećem okruženju a, potom, na koji način da uvećava moć koja bi jemčila nesmetan razvoj. Strateški odgovor koji je Kvinsi Adams zagovarao podrazumevao je teritorijalno širenje SAD-a na nove prostore što je moguće dalje na Zapad, sve do Pacifika. Adams je smatrao da Americi ne odgovara dugoročno bilo kakav model ravnoteže snaga na severnoameričkom kontinentu. Pre nego što je u tom smislu započeo svoju najveću aktivnost kao državni sekretar u administraciji predsednika Džejmsa Monroa (James Monroe), posle dva traumatična iskustva federalista i republikanaca da ostvarenje američkih nacionalnih interesa vide u oslonu na druge države, Adams reafirmiše Vašingtonovo zalaganje koje je prvi američki predsednik izneo u Oproštajnom govoru poučavajući svoje sunarodnike da izbegavaju „stalne saveze“; ili kako je to Tomas Džeferson, nakon otrežnjenja od zanosa Francuskom posle Napoleonovog brodoloma kod Vaterloa 1815. godine, iskazao kao izbegavanje „zapetljanih saveza“. Jednom rečju, kako primećuje H. V. Brands, „nijedno određenje nacionalnog interesa nije potrajalo duže ili bilo više prihvaćeno od ideje da svađe drugih naroda stvar koju treba da rešavaju sami upravo ti narodi“ (Brands 2002, 474).

I pre poraza u ratu sa Britancima 1814. godine, Aron Bar (Aaron Burr) je ubistvom Aleksandra Hamiltona, u dvoboju 1804. godine, obezglavio pristalice vezivanja Amerike za trgovački i politički establišment Londona. Pomenuti rat je belodano pokazao ranjivost SAD-a na njihovoj teritoriji, kao i nesposobnost da se same odbrane; istovremeno, taj vojni sukob je označio i kraj prve velike debate o nacionalnom interesu Mlade Republike. Kako duhovito primećuje H. V. Brands, jedan od razloga zašto Amerikanci više nikako nisu želeli da ponovo krenu prema Istoku (čitaj: Evropi), bio je taj što su bili prezauzeti kretanjem dalje na Zapad (Brands, 2002, 474). Na tom putu kolosalnog uvećanja vlastite teritorije i, sledstveno tome, i moći, nisu stajali samo kolonijalni posedi Velike Britanije, Francuske i Španije, nego su potpuno pogažena i sva prava domorodačkih, „indijanskih“ naroda.

Jedna produbljena sociološko-antropološka, kao i kulturološko-psihološka analiza američkog shvatanja nacionalnog interesa, na početku XIX stoleća i kasnije sve do naših dana, zahtevala bi i razmatranja verovanja ovog naroda u vlastitu izuzetnost, posebnost, različitost od svih drugih naroda. Idealizacija vlastitog mesta u „svetsko-istorijskom procesu“ (Hegel) išla je *pari-passu* sa dostizanjem bezbednosti uvećanjem moći putem teritorijalnog širenja, što je sve bilo neuralgično jezgro nacionalnog interesa Amerike u tom razdoblju njene istorije. Dalje, nacionalni interes posle rata sa Britancima, preko okolnosti u kojima je doneta Monroova doktrina, sve do iza Građanskog rata 1865. godine, iskazivan je u okvirima geopolitičkog ključa. Širenje Amerike opravdavano je i tumačeno često i Božjom voljom, delovanjem Proviđenja, svejedno da li su odlučioi u Vašingtonu i tadašnje političke i intelektualne elite oslonac tražile u hrišćanskom protestantskom Bogu ili je osvajanja ovog naroda blagosiljao „prirodni“ Bog. Bog je, po takvim shvatanjima, uvek bio na američkoj strani.

Uz saradnju Boga sa Amerikancima, sredinom XIX veka, idejno-ideološki „Manifestom sudbine“, a u materijalnom smislu prisajedinjenjem Teksasa, Kalifornije i Novog Meksika, nacionalni interes Sjedinjenih Država tumačen je i kao „*interes čovečanstva*“ (Brands 2002, 475). U drugoj polovini XIX stoleća Amerika iz tzv. teritorijalne i ruralne faze razvoja, kad skoro više i nije mogla da se širi na nove prostore, nacionalni interes, čitaj: ključne nacionalne ciljeve, utemeljuje u urbanizaciji i ubrzanoj industrijalizaciji. To će sve, uz najširu i najdublju konsolidaciju samog društva, kada je tzv. indijansko pitanje „rešeno“, stvoriti osnove da SAD u smiraj veka sustignu i prestignu britansku privredu u svim ključnim parametrima ekonomske moći. Put u društvo svega nekoliko najjačih država sveta je bio širom otvoren.

Na prelasku u novi, XX vek, neki od najistaknutijih američkih političara i stratega videli su nacionalni interes ove zemlje u stvaranju svojevrstne „demokratske imperije“. Republikanci, predsednik Teodor Ruzvelt (Theodore Roosevelt), političar Henri Kabot Lodž (Henry Cabot Lodge), novinari Randolf Herst (William Randolph Hearst) i Džozef Pulicer (Joseph Pulitzer), strateg Alfred Tajer Mahan (Alfred Thayer Mahan), nešto pre njih i predsednik Vilijam Makinli (William McKinley), napuštaju neke od ključnih premisa Monroove doktrine i zalažu se za Sjedinjene Države koje treba da vode „mišićavu“ svetsku politiku, kao i koje učestvuju u rešavanju svih otvorenih međunarodnih pitanja na svakoj tački globusa, daleko izvan Zapadne hemisfere. Po njima, trijumfalna plovidba Velike bele flote oko Zemlje nije imala samo simbolički značaj, nego je trebala da pokaže spremnost ove zemlje da preuzme odgovornosti jedne od ključnih sila u svetskim poslovima; južno od reke Rio Grande, SAD su se ponašale kao hegemon koji po potrebi vrši i policijsku funkciju. Tumačeći Monroovu doktrinu drugačije nego do tada, Vašington je postao središte političke i ekonomske gravitacije čitave Zapadne hemisfere. U godinama

pred izbijanje Velikog rata, Sjedinjene Američke Države su postale neupitan arbitar u svim pitanjima ovog dela sveta. Preuzimanjem Guama i Filipina, uticaj Amerike se proširio i na ovo značajno područje koje će već u bliskoj budućnosti postati jedno od geopolitičkih i geoekonomskih neuralgičnih tačaka međunarodnih odnosa.

Prelazeći put od oruđa u političkim borbama sve do instrumenta naučne analize društvenih i međunarodnih odnosa, u tridesetim godinama prošloga veka prvi put se u Americi i svetu piše o nacionalnom interesu kao o teorijskom konceptu (Beard 1934). I ovaj put su praktično-političke potrebe jednog vremena, gigantske borbe protiv posledica Velike depresije i rasta fašizma na međunarodnoj sceni, kao i sukoba izolacionalizma i njegovih zagovornika protiv predstavnika liberalnog internacionalizma koji je otelovljavao najveći američki predsednik u XX veku, Frenklin Delano Ruzvelt (Franklin Delano Roosevelt), tražile da se nacionalni interes konceptualno, teorijski i filozofski domisli i utemelji kao poseban naučni pojam. Najpre su vodeći intelektualci toga vremena u Americi, nacionalni interes određivali isključivo u ekonomskim terminima, da bi sa približavanjem Drugog svetskog rata zamisao nacionalnog interesa obuhvatila i goruća bezbednosna, politička, a posle Drugog svetskog rata i kulturološko-vrednosna i identiteska pitanja i dimenzije što više idemo bliže dobu posle Hladnog rata. Otac realističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa Hans Joakim Morgentau (Morgenthau 1951), u delu „U odbranu nacionalnog interesa“ (*In Defense of the National Interest*) postavio je teorijske temelje ovog koncepta, određivši ga kao „zvezdu vodilju“ svake državne politike koji je nepromenljiv u vremenu i prostoru (Miletić 1978, 276).

Nacionalni interes Sjedinjenih Američkih Država u eri političke polarizacije

Ako je nacionalni interes, slobodnije kazano, neka vrsta objektivnog i/ili konstruisanog najmanjeg zajedničkog sadržaoca različitih interesa jedne političke zajednice (u ovom slučaju Sjedinjenih Američkih Država), postavlja se logično pitanje – gde je taj zajednički interes ako ga dve glavne partije i njihovi kandidati vide sasvim suprotno. A upravo je jedna od ključnih odlika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država danas duboka i višedimenzionalna polarizacija tog društva. Naime, čini se da postoji duboka podela oko toga koji su ključni problemi sa kojima se ova zemlja suočava i šta bi trebalo preduzeti da se ta pitanja reše.

Tako, po istraživanjima koje je u aprilu ove godine objavio istraživački centar Pju, „jaz među partijama... je sasvim veliki: 70% Demokrata i nezavisnih birača koji naginju Demokratama kažu da klimatske promene treba da budu top prioriteta,

dok 14% Republikanaca i onih koji naginju Republikancima misle tako nešto“ (Pew 2024, 3). S druge strane, Čikaški savet za globalne poslove u svom godišnjem istraživanju za 2023. godinu, stavova vezanih za spoljnu politiku, navodi da u pogledu pomoći Ukrajini 53% Amerikanaca smatra da je ona bila vredna finansijskih napora, a 45% smatra da nije (Chicago Council 2024, 2). Podrška Ukrajini ima većinu u Demokratskoj stranci (69 posto), neopredeljeni birači su neodlučni (51% za i 47% ne), dok većina od 61% Republikanaca smatra da to nije bilo vredno truda (Chicago Council 2024, 2). Slična je stvar i u pogledu stavova prema koristi kojoj Americi donosi savez sa Evropom gde 80% Demokrata i 63% neopredeljenih smatra da to donosi korist, dok samo polovina Republikanaca smatra tako nešto (Chicago Council 2024, 2). S druge strane, „danas 58% Amerikanaca vidi uspon Kine kao kritičnu pretnju Sjedinjenim Državama, što je najviši nivo zabeležen u istraživanjima Čikaškog saveta od kada je to pitanje prvi put postavljeno 1990. godine. Ovo je takođe prvi put od 2002. godine, da dvopartijska većina Republikanaca (71%), Demokrata (52%) i nezavisnih (53%) dele istu procenu uspona Kine“ (Chicago Council 2024, 11).

Sasvim je, dakle, vidljiva duboka podeljenost među američkim građanima osim u slučaju pretnje koja dolazi od narodne Republike Kine. Politička polarizacija podrazumeva po Kenetu Šulcu (Kenneth Schultz) sa Univerziteta Stanford nekoliko „međupovezanih fenomena“ (Schultz 2018, 8). „Prvi i najprominentniji je polarizacija ideoloških pozicija političkih elita... drugi, verovatno nastao kao odgovor (na prethodni – prim. D. S.) je neka vrsta razvrstavanja masovne javnosti u homogenizovanije stranke... treći aspekt polarizacije je povećanje onoga što je nazvano „afektivnom polarizacijom“ ili „negativnim partijsvom“: nepoverenje i nesklonost ka ljudima iz druge stranke... i konačno ovaj proces se odigrava uporedo sa fragmentacijom medija, osobito širenjem partijskih izvora vesti na kablovskoj televiziji, radiju i internetu. Kao ishod toga mnogo je lakše da ljudi izaberu vesti koje potvrđuju njihova već postojeća uverenja“ (Schultz 2018, 8–9).

Piter Bejker (Peter Baker), novinar „Njujork Tajmsa“, smatra da su građani najmoćnije države sveta „polarizovani ... duž ideoloških, kulturoloških i partijskih linija“ (Baker 2024), pa se ponekad čini da su podeljeni „u dve zemlje. Čak dve stvarnosti. Više nego bilo kada u generaciji, Amerikanci sebe ne doživljavaju kao deo kolektivnog poduhvata već opažaju sebe na suprotstavljenim stranama savremenih bedema“ (Baker 2024). Rezultati ispitivanja javnog mnjenja koje je sproveo Marist koledž iz Njujorka, a na koje se Bejker poziva, govore da čak „47 procenata Amerikanaca vidi mogućnost drugog građanskog rata kao verovatnu u njihovom životnom veku, što je podstaklo Holivud da snimi istoimeni film (Građanski rat – prim. D. S.) u kom se zamišlja kako to može izgledati“ (Baker 2024).

I ovo nije prvi put da se upozorava na tako nešto. Barbara Volter (Barbara F. Walter), jedna od vodećih istraživačica građanskih ratova, objavila je pre dve godine vrlo važnu knjigu na tu temu (Walter 2022). Ona je prepoznala tri činilaca koji predviđaju koja od država će najverovatnije skiznuti u građanski rat. Prvi je da li je zemlja u tranziciji (od autokratije – prim. D. S.) ka demokratiji i obrnuto (Bassin 2022). Ona takve zemlje zove anokratijama i pokazuje da takve zemlje mogu „dvostruko verovatnije da iskuse političku nestabilnost ili građanski rat od autokratija i trostruko više od demokratija“ (Bassin 2022). Drugi se odnosi na „frakcionalizam“. Po njenoj „definiciji o tome je reč kad je politička partija zasnovana na etnicitetu, religiji ili rasi umesto na ideologiji“ (Bassin 2022). Treći činilac je strah dotad dominantne grupe u jednoj zajednici od gubitka privilegovanog statusa (Bassin 2022). Ona smatra da je najbolji indikator opasnosti od građanskog rata kombinacija prvog i drugog činioca (anokratije i frakcionalizma), jer „politika ide iz sistema u kom se građani brinu o dobrobiti zemlje kao celine ka onom u kojem se brinu samo o članovima njihove grupe“ (Bassin 2022). Sasvim je moguće ovde prepoznati Sjedinjene Američke Države danas, jer kad se uzme prvi kriterijum sve ono što se dešavalo 6. januara 2021. godine na Kapitolu, jasno upućuje na lagano kllizanje ka anokratiji. Drugi kriterijum frakcionalizacije društva vidljiv je na svakom koraku, a posebno u visoko naelektrisanom atmosferi kampanje za ovogodišnje predsedničke izbore u kojima se kandidati najčešće obraćaju samo svom delu biračkog tela a ne građanima kao celini. Treći činilac možemo prepoznati u gubljenju dominantnog statusa koji je nekad imala tzv. „WASP America“ (*White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant*) odnosno bela, anglosaksonska protestantska Amerika i ugrožavanja tog statusa od druge najveće etničke grupe u SAD-u, a to su pripadnici hispano zajednice. O tome je pre 20 godina vrlo upečatljivo u studiji koja se bavila američkim identitetom pisao Semjuel Hantington (Samuel P. Huntington) (Huntington 2004).

Volter dalje zaključuje da su Sjedinjene Države „frakcionalizovana anokratija koja se brzo približava fazi otvorene pobune, što znači da smo bliži građanskom ratu nego što to bilo kod nas želi da veruje“ (Bassin 2022). Ona čak smatra da iako mnogi opisuju da je politička polarizacija postala „glavni uzrok problema“ i da „su liberali postali mnogo liberalniji, konzervativci mnogo konzervativniji i da postoje male šanse da se nađu negde na sredini“ (Walter 2022, 184). On veruje da nije polarizacija ta koja vuče zemlju ka građanskom ratu, već je to pre svega frakcionalizacija. Razloge za to ona vidi u tome što „kad građani formiraju grupe koje su zasnovane na etničkim, religijskim ili geografskim razlikama – a političke partije u zemlji postanu predatorske, isključujući rivale i vodeći politike koje donose benefite prvenstveno njima i njihovim biračima“ (Walter 2022, 184). Kao posebno važno sredstvo uspona ovog procesa Volter vidi društvene medije, odnosno društvene mreže (Walter 2022, 184).

Politička polarizacija usložnjava i unutrašnju i spoljnu politiku Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i dovodi do jedne vrste skleroze i paralize u ključnim institucijama američkog političkog sistema, a pre svega u Kongresu. Profesor Džefri Pik (Jeffrey S. Peake), sa Univerziteta Klemson iz Južne Karoline, u studiji koju je napisao na ovu temu bavio se baš ovim aspektom političke polarizacije i odsustvom mogućnosti dogovora dve velike partije oko bilo čega u Kongresu (posebno Senatu), što utiče i na to da se predsednici sve više oslanjaju na neke „unilaterlne mere (poput izvršnih sporazuma – prim. D. S.), slabljenje međunarodnih obaveza koje su preuzeli i time dovode u opasnost puno poštovanje međunarodnog prava od strane Sjedinjenih Država“ (Peake 2023, 10). S druge strane, recimo, u Predstavničkom domu sve je usporeno i tamo gde Amerika treba da reaguje brže tu dolazi do otežanih i produženih akcija koje često dovode do neefikasnih politika.

Kad je u pitanju spoljna politika, Šulc vidi četiri načina na koji politička polarizacija „utiče na to da Sjedinjene Države otežano vode spoljnu politiku i upravljaju svojom diplomatskom i vojnom moći u svetu“ (Schultz 2018, 9): „1. „mnogo je teže dobiti podršku obe partije za ambiciozne ili rizične poduhvate, osobito za upotrebu vojne sile ili zaključenje (međunarodnih – prim. D. S.) sporazuma; 2. teže je duž partijskih linija dogovoriti se o poukama spoljnopolitičkih neuspeha, stoga su komplikovaniji naponi da se uči i prilagođava; 3. rizici od dramatičnih političkih pomeranja od jedne administracije ka drugoj iz suprotne partije usložnjava ... sposobnost za prihvatanje dugoročnih obaveza prema saveznicima i protivnicima...; 4. četvrta i konačna opasnost od polarizacije je ta koju je jedva nekolicina, ako i iko pretpostavio pre 2016: ranjivost našeg političkog sistema (misli se na SAD – prim. D. S.) na intervencije sa strane“ (Schultz 2018, 9).

Taj visok nivo političke polarizacije utiče i na veoma nizak stepen nacionalne kohezije, što je po Džozefu Naju jedan od najvažnijih izvora moći država (Simić i Živojinović 2015, 19–21). Jasno je da povećani stepen političke polarizacije smanjuje moć Sjedinjenih Američkih Država kao i brzinu i slobodu delovanja u spoljnoj politici. Takođe, dolazi do porasta opažanja opadanja američke moći, što je možda i važnija posledica od objektivnog smanjivanja moći. Svojevremeno je veliki arapski mislilac Ibn Haldun (Ibn Khaldun) u svojoj knjizi „Mukadima“ uveo „pojam *Asabiyah* koji prevodioci njegovog dela na engleski jezik prevode na različite načine, ali je suština zapravo u nečemu što se može prevesti kao „grupna volja“, „kolektivna volja“ ili „konsenzus“ (Simić i Živojinović 2015, 20). U jednom širem smislu mi to možemo i nazvati nacionalnom kohezijom. Odsustvo, odnosno preciznije – smanjeni stepen nacionalne kohezije zapravo smanjuje pažnju usmerenu na spoljnu politiku, koja u društvima kao što je američko, koje je instinktivno više okrenuto sebi nego svetu, ionako nije velika. Naime, ako u spoljnoj politici ne „pričate jednim glasom“ ili barem sa što više harmonije, to znači da šaljete različite

signale o svojim namerama i postajete manje predvidiv i manje pouzdan prijatelj ili neprijatelj, saveznik ili takmac, svejedno. U obe situacije na vas se gleda sa manje ozbiljnosti. U okolnostima u kojima postoji jaz između onoga što Sjedinjene Američke Države žele i onoga što mogu, sasvim je jasno da je gradacija nacionalnih interesa i pravljenje prioriteta među spoljnopolitičkim ciljevima stvar nužnosti a ne izbora, tako da bi dogovor oko bazičnih zajedničkih interesa između ključnih aktera u američkom političkom sistemu bio više nego koristan.

Nacionalni interes i američki predsednički izbori 2024. godine

Jedna od dodatnih stvari, pored povećane političke polarizacije po kojoj se američki predsednički izbori 2024. godine razlikuju od uobičajenih, je i ta da posle 112 godina i izbora 1912, na kojima su se nadmetali tadašnji predsednik Vilijam Taft (William Taft), bivši predsednik Teodor Ruzvelt i Vudro Vilson (Woodrow Wilson), predstavljaju prvo sučeljavanje sadašnjeg i bivšeg predsednika. Takođe, ovo su izbori koji u pogledu posledica po američku spoljnu politiku, pa i ukupni međunarodni poredak, mogu da naprave razliku u odnosu na neke prethodne. Naime, stavovi predsedničkih kandidata se veoma razlikuju, a moć i uticaj Sjedinjenih Američkih Država su i dalje toliko veliki da pobeda jednog ili drugog kandidata dovodi do bitno drugačijih spoljnih politika, a samim time i do promena u sveukupnim međunarodnim odnosima. Tipičan primer ovoga je rat u Ukrajini i suprotne pozicije kandidata o tome da li nastaviti pomoć Ukrajini (Bajden) ili praviti neku vrstu dogovora sa Ruskom Federacijom, odnosno Vladimirom Putinom (Vladimir V. Putin) (Tramp).

Cilj ovog dela rada je da opiše i objasni kako dva glavna kandidata Demokratske i Republikanske stranke, aktuelni predsednik Bajden (Joseph R. Biden) i bivši predsednik, Donald Tramp (Donald J. Trump), vide nacionalne interese Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Na primeru ključnih, programskih intervjuja koje su kandidati dali časopisu „Tajm“, ali i njihovih prethodnih spoljnopolitičkih pozicija, kao i prve debate Bajden–Tramp koja je održana 27. juna u studiju CNN-a u Atlanti, moguće je videti kako kandidati vide ulogu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država u svetu i posredno (pošto se nacionalni interesi kao takvi nigde eksplicitno ne pominju) kako vide nacionalne interese.

Bitno je napomenuti da se ovi izbori odigravaju u kontekstu povećanog izolacionizma američke javnosti, odnosno još preciznije – okrenutosti Sjedinjenih Američkih Država sebi (što je i naslov izveštaja Čikaškog saveta za globalne poslove koji smo pominjali prethodno u tekstu). Primetno je, kad se pogledaju istraživanja

javnog mnjenja, da dominira stalnije, nacionalno-bezbednosno shvatanje nacionalnog interesa na račun promenljivog, vrednosnog elementa. Naime, „upitani da naprave prioritizaciju dugoročnih spoljnopolitičkih ciljeva Sjedinjenih Država, većina Amerikanaca vidi sprečavanje terorističkih napada (73%), smanjivanje priliva ilegalnih droga u zemlju (63%) i sprečavanje širenja oružja za masovno uništavanje (63%) kao najviše prioritete. Preko polovine Amerikanaca takođe vidi održavanje vojne prednosti Sjedinjenih Država nad drugim zemljama (53%) i sprečavanje širenja zaraznih bolesti (52%) kao prvenstvene spoljnopolitičke odgovornosti“ (Pew 2024, 3). Ubedljivo na poslednjem mestu (18%) je intervencija u stranim zemljama (Pew 2024, 4). S druge strane, ni podrška Ukrajini sa 23% i Izraelu sa 22% podrške građana, ne stoje mnogo bolje (Pew 2024, 4).

Stavovi Donalda Trampa kad je u pitanju spoljna i bezbednosna politika su, uprkos elementima nestalnosti u njegovom ponašanju a koji su posledica specifičnog karaktera, prilično konzistentni, otkad se sredinom 2015. godine pojavio na američkoj političkoj sceni. Naime, Tramp je vrlo brzo pokazao da su mu glavni priroteti slični onome što Volter Rasel Mid (Walter Russell Mead) označava kao Džeksonijansku (po predsedniku Endru Džeksonu) (Andrew Jackson) školu američke spoljne politike (Mead 2001, 218–263; Mead 2017). Ova škola, za razliku od Vilsonijanske ili Hamiltonijanske škole, vidi Ameriku pre svega okrenutu sebi, svojoj bezbednosti i svom boljitku. Patriotizam, populizam, „duh graničarstva“, jačanje Amerike pre svega u vojnom smislu (za razliku od Džefersonijanske škole), dobijanje ratova ako već u njih mora da se uđe i jedna vrsta anti-establišment spoljne politike, glavne su odlike ove škole. Tu takođe treba naglasiti i ono što je za Trampa veoma bitno, a to je poštovanje Amerike i respekt koji treba da joj ukazuju ostale zemlje. Pošto je „Amerika na prvom mestu“ sve ostalo se (pa i liberalni međunarodni poredak koji su Amerikanci stvorili i razvijali) sagledava iz ugla koristi koji neka politika ili poredak donosi Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama. Kako tvrdi jedan od najbližih saradnika Baraka Obame, Ben Rouds (Ben Rhodes), „veliki deo onoga što Tramp govori ima šireg smisla. Amerikanci su umorni od ratova; u stvari njegovo preuzimanje Republikanske partije ne bi bilo moguće da nije bilo rata u Iraku koji je diskreditovao republikansku elitu. Amerikanci takođe više ne veruju svojim elitama“ (Rhodes 2024, 11). Rouds kao razloge američkog nezadovoljstva koje Tramp odlično prepoznaje, ali po njemu nudi simplifikovana rešenja za kompleksne probleme, navodi, između ostalog, i populističku reakciju na globalizaciju sa obe strane političkog spektra, trošenje novca na rat u Ukrajini bez jasnih naznaka kada će se i kako rat okončati (Rhodes 2024, 12).

U programskom intervjuu za onlajn izdanje časopisa „Tajm“, Tramp je spoljnoj politici posvetio relativno malo pažnje (Time 2024a). Ipak moguće je prepoznati glavne putanje njegove eventualne spoljne politike ukoliko se vrati u Belu kuću u

januaru 2025. godine. Problemi na granici s Meksikom i veliki broj ilegalnih migranata koji se pojavio, naročito u vreme Bajdenovog mandata, visoko su na listi prioriteta Donalda Trampa. Narodna Republika Kina i carine koje je uveo na kinesku robu još su jedna od stvari kojih se Tramp dotiče, i to prilično uzrujano pominjući krađu poslova i nelojalnu konkurenciju, a ako probaju da sagrade fabrike u Meksiku, i tako zaobiđu carine, on će ih povećati na 100%, praveći tako, kako on kaže – neku vrstu „prstena“ oko Sjedinjenih Država (Time 2024a). Tramp vidi ekonomiju i ekonomski pritisak i kao način da se reši rat Izraela i Hamasa, tako što bi se finansijskim pritiscima Iran ekonomski iscrpeo, pa samim time i Hamas ostao bez podrške (Time 2024a). Predsednika Bajdena smatra odgovornim za to što je Rusija izvršila invaziju na Ukrajinu, jer da je on ostao na vlasti Putin to ne bi smeo da uradi i lako bi se dogovorio sa njim oko svega ovoga. U njegovom transakcionom shvatanju politike Evropljani moraju da plate za svoju odbranu, a ako to ne učine Rusija može da im radi šta želi. U maniru gesla iz svog omiljenog filma „Kum“ (Simic and Zivojinovic 2019, 18) on smatra da tu nema ništa lično i da je njemu Evropa draga, ali „posao je posao“. Amerika ima okeane koji ih štite, a Evropa je više na udaru, te da iz tih razloga i mora da plati više. Ovde je vrlo jasno primetno odsustvo onoga što države hegemoni u međunarodnom sistemu oduvek obezbeđuju, a to su javna dobra i da Tramp ne smatra da to Sjedinjene Države treba više to da rade. Kod Trampa toga nema i sve se samerava u skladu sa usko shvaćenim američkim nacionalnim interesima. Iako eksplicitno kaže da je u redu s tim da NATO postoji, ne veruje da će ih u slučaju da SAD budu napadnute evropske zemlje braniti, te da zato treba više da plaćaju svoje troškove za odbranu. Na pitanje da li bi branio Tajvan u slučaju napada Kine odbija da odgovori, jer kako kaže ne želi da otvara karte, što je još jedna od odlika njegovog pristupa međunarodnim odnosima, pa i životu uopšte. Slična je situacija sa Južnom Korejom – i oni ako žele da budu bezbedni, prosto moraju to i da plate.

Kad je u pitanju Trampov nastup na debati 27. juna, on je po nama obeležen Trampovim insistiranjem da se Amerika nalazi u situaciji da nije dovoljno poštovana (CNN 2024). Tramp je posebno bio kritičan prema američkom povlačenju iz Avganistana i katastrofalnom načinu na koji je to urađeno. Po njemu „kad je u pitanju Avganistan, ja sam izašao iz Avganistana ali mi smo izašli odatle sa dignitetom, sa snagom, sa moći. On je izašao (misli se na predsednika Bajdena – prim. D. S.), to je bio jedan od najsramotnijih dana u istoriji naše zemlje... I reći ću vam, mi ne samo da smo bili loši tamo, već nismo više poštovani kao zemlja. Oni ne poštuju naše liderstvo, oni više ne poštuju Sjedinjene Države“ (CNN 2024). Njegov transakcioni, *quid pro quo*, pristup međunarodnim odnosima najbolje se može videti u sledećem citatu: „Šta mi radimo za druge zemlje, a oni ne rade ništa za nas“ (CNN 2024). Tramp posebno naglašava, u skladu sa suštinom džeksonijanskog pristupa, podršku vojnim

veteranima, tvrdeći da Bajdenova administracija ne vodi dovoljno računa o njima. Mantra da Putin nikad ne bi napao Ukrajinu u njegovom mandatu se ponavlja i tvrdi da će još kao izabrani predsednik rešiti taj sukob pre nego što položi zakletvu 20. januara 2025. godine. Smatra da Evropska unija očekuje pomoć, a ovamo ne kupuje američke automobile i druge proizvode i ponaša se nefer u trgovini. Pošto uvek razmišlja u terminima relativnih dobitaka, odnosno meri ko iz neke saradnje dobija više, on je protiv sporazuma o klimatskim promena, jer bi „pariski sporazum nas koštao bilione dolara, Kinu ništa, Rusiju ništa, Indiju ništa. Bilo bi to guljenje do gole kože Sjedinjenih Država“ (CNN 2024).

Sjedinjene Američke Države su, po njegovom mišljenju, nacija u opadanju kojoj treba pomoć, odnosno pravi lider koji sve to može da reši – stari je Trampov stav koji su četiri godine odsustva iz vlasti samo dodatno zacementirale. Debata se završila ponovnim Trampovim insistiranjem o potrebi poštovanja Amerike i odsustvom tog poštovanja danas, što ostavlja posledice po celu zemlju (CNN 2024). I kako to kaže njegov četvrti savetnik za nacionalnu bezbednost Robert O’Brajen (Robert C. O’Brien) „do mira se dolazi preko snage“ (O’Brien 2024, 24). To zvuči prilično džeksonijanski i prilično trampovski.

Sa druge strane Džo Bajden, iako bi se kao višedecenijski pripadnik Demokratske stranke mogao na prvi pogled povezati sa vilsonijanskom školom američke spoljne politike, čini nam se da u njegovom slučaju to baš i nije tako. On više pripada onome što Dadni (Daniel Deudney) i Ajkenberi (G. John Ikenberry) navode kao petu, Ruzveltijansku (misli se na predsednika Frenklina Delana Ruzvelta) školu (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2021). Naime, postoji kod njega dovoljna količina političkog realizma koja ga ipak čini bližim FDR-u nego Vilsonu. Poredeći Bajdenove poduhvate sa naporima i uspesima najvećeg američkog predsednika u 20. veku, Dadni i Ajkenberi tvrde da „Bajdenov program povezuje domaću obnovu sa novom međunarodnom agendom“ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2021). Osobenost ove škole je „priznanje da opstanak i uspeh liberalne demokratije zavisi od periodičnih sveobuhvatnih institucionalnih i političkih reformi, kako kod kuće tako i u inostranstvu“ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2021). U tom smislu u ruzveltijanskoj tradiciji američke spoljne politike nacionalni interes se ostvaruje „teškim unutrašnjim reformama kao odgovorom na promenjive globalne izazove“ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2021). Bajden je toga bio veoma svestan, kako u vreme predsedničke kampanje 2020. tako i prilikom preuzimanja mandata u januaru 2021. godine.

Bajdenov programski intervju za „Tajm“ počinje konstatacijom (Time 2024 b) da je Amerika svetska sila, što je direktan odgovor na Trampovu kritiku da to više nije slučaj. Pored isticanja važnosti transatlantskih odnosa i NATO-a kao njihovog glavnog reprezentata, Bajden ističe i značaj drugih američkih saveza i savezništava za američku bezbednost, naročito onih koji su u vreme njegove administracije stvoreni

ili ojačani u Aziji poput AUKUS-a ili QUAD-a, ili novog trilateralnog sporazuma sa Južnom Korejom i Japanom (JAROKUS) (Time 2024b). Što se tiče rata u Ukrajini, on tvrdi da je Rusija tu pretrpela ogromne gubitke, a da je NATO iz svega toga izašao mnogo jači, proširen sa dve nove države članice, Finskom i Švedskom. Bajden je vrlo svestan važnosti trenutka i često ponavlja složenicu da se svet nalazi u „prelomnoj tački“ (*inflection point*) i da se sve menja (Time 2024 b). Vešto izbegavajući da optuži Izrael za prekomernu upotrebu vojne sile u području Gaze, on ipak na neki način priznaje da postoji i odgovornost Izraela, premda je naravno odgovornost Hamasa za sve to neporeciva. Naravno, najveći izazov američkoj moći je uspon Narodne Republike Kine i potencijalna kriza oko Tajvana, gde je Bajden bio vrlo eksplicitan da ne isključuje upotrebu američke vojne sile da brani Tajvan ako ga napadne Kina. Iako nevoljno, on priznaje da američka unutrašnja neslaganja „značajno umanjuju sposobnost da se stvari reše na međunarodnom planu“ (Time 2024b), i da je svet veoma zabrinut zbog potencijalnog novog povlačenja Sjedinjenih Država iz svetskih poslova. Iz tih razloga odluke koje sad budu donete imaće dalekosežne i dugoročne posledice.

Što se tiče debate sa Donaldom Trampom u CNN studiju u Atlanti 27. juna (CNN 2024), Bajdenov nastup je uglavnom ocenjen kao inferioran u odnosu na suparnika. Ipak, Bajden je uspeo da potcrta neke ključne stvari koje ga razlikuju od Trampa, barem u spoljnopolitičkom smislu. Naglasio je posebno važnost odupiranja Rusiji, jer se boji da će se posle Ukrajine, Poljska i neke druge evropske zemlje naći na ruskom udaru. Iz tih razloga ističe važnost jačanja postojećih i stvaranja novih saveza i savezništava za sveukupnu američku bezbednost (CNN 2024). Suprotno Trampovom stavu, on smatra da je Amerika najobožavanija zemlja na svetu i „da ne postoji ništa što Amerikanci ne mogu ostvariti“ (CNN 2024), budući da je njihova moć najveća i da iza nje stoji i najveća vojna sila u istoriji sveta. Ukratko, Bajden ostaje privržen održanju međunarodnog liberalnog poretka (uz potrebna prilagođavanja) i tradicionalnoj američkoj ulozi u njemu, jer je to najbolji način da se zaštite kako interesi drugih tako i američki nacionalni interesi.

Zaključak

Nacionalni interes je formalno ušao u politikološke rečnike krajem tridesetih i početkom četrdesetih godina prošlog veka, ali suštinski ono što se tim pojmom označava postojalo je pod različitim nazivima u raznim političkim zajednicama tokom istorije, a naročito od vremena nastanka modernog sistema država u Evropi, od XV veka naovamo. Vladarima je bio potreban termin kojim su mogli da

opravdaju svako arbitrarno i prekomerno korišćenje moći, a naročito vojne sile. U obliku kakav ga danas koristimo, nastao je u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama u vreme predsednikovanja Frenklina Delana Ruzvelta, paralelno sa terminom nacionalna bezbednost.

Pravi procvat nacionalni interes doživljava u okviru realističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa, kada na plodnom tlu rane faze Hladnog rata Hans Morgentau daje ovom terminu ključno mesto u svojoj teorijskoj konstrukciji. To njegovo prigrbljivanje ovog termina naslonilo se ne samo na tadašnje međunarodne okolnosti, nego i na snažnu tradiciju koju je, kad je u pitanju spoljna i bezbednosna politika SAD-a, moguće pratiti još od vremena „očeva osnivača“ i njihovog hladnokrvnog i u najvećoj meri racionalnog procenjivanja američke pozicije u tadašnjem međunarodnom sistemu. Sledstveno tome, oni su pronalazili najbolje načine da se vitalni interesi Mlade Republike zaštite i unaprede. Ipak, vremenom je ovaj termin počeo da se uzima „zdravo za gotovo“ i njegova upotreba postala je više implicitna nego eksplicitna, pogotovo u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama.

Iako se u zvaničnim dokumentima, poput Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti i Strategija nacionalne odbrane, ovaj termin i dalje koristi, naš pokušaj da ga pronađemo u okvirima kampanje za američke predsedničke izbore ove godine samo je potvrdio naše početne stavove. S druge strane, duboka politička polarizacija u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama stvara dodatne poteškoće da se umesto parcijalnih, a još uže – stranačkih i kandidatskih stavova u programima glavnih pretendenta na funkciju predsednika od januara 2025. godine, Džozefa Bajdena i Donalda Trampa, pronađe nešto što može da nosi naziv nacionalni, a ne stranački ili kandidatski interes.

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Dragan R. SIMIĆ

**THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN AN ERA OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION:
THE CASE OF 2024 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

Abstract: Foreign and security policy, almost traditionally, play a small or minor role in US presidential elections. Nevertheless, this year's election could be an exception, bearing in mind the global context of this year's elections characterized by conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and potentially in East Asia, as well as the fact that both main candidates were already presidents, meaning that we are largely familiar with their potential foreign policies. When, however, the prevailing classical meaning of the national interest is taken into consideration, the absence of a clear, elaborated and non-contradictory conception of this term is noticeable in the programs presented by both candidates. Considering the extremely high degree of political polarization of this year's presidential elections little can be labeled with the adjective national, apart from the consensus regarding the policy towards the People's Republic of China and where the threat is coming from. It is primarily about the „party” and, more narrowly - the individual interests of the presidential candidates themselves. In other words, national interests are indeed considered but under different terms, words and/or phrases.

Keywords: national interest, national security, foreign and security policy, United States of America, presidential election, political polarization, international order, Donald Trump, Joseph Biden.

Protecting National Interests through Non-Standard Institutional Frameworks: The Case of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP)

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Abstract: This paper explores the success factors behind the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), established in 1996 to address the issue of missing persons from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The ICMP's mission has expanded to foster state cooperation and provide expert assistance in locating missing persons due to conflicts, human rights abuses, and disasters. This study hypothesises that the ICMP's success stems from the interplay of exogenous factors, such as shifts in international law and humanitarian paradigms, and endogenous factors, including its flexible institutional design and expert-driven approach. By dissecting the ICMP's structure and functions, this research underscores the importance of adaptability and expertise in the effective operation of international organisations. The ICMP's engagement in the Republic of Serbia and the territory of Kosovo provides insight into how non-standard institutional frameworks can navigate political intricacies to achieve significant humanitarian outcomes, demonstrating the crucial balance between national interests and global humanitarian commitments.

Keywords: missing persons, humanitarianism, sovereignty, international law, international organisations, Republic of Serbia, Kosovo, transitional justice, institutional design, financing of international organisations.

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Introduction

The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) is an international organisation, albeit not the most well-known nor one that neatly fits into the traditional concept of an international organisation. Established in 1996 to account for the missing persons from the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, its tasks today are to enable the cooperation of states and other authorities in addressing the missing persons issue worldwide and to provide professional and expert assistance in searching for and identifying the missing persons in the contexts of armed conflict, human rights abuses, or other natural or man-made disasters (ICMP n.d.).

The 2014 Agreement on the Status and Functions of the International Commission on Missing Persons, Statute of the ICMP, counts ten signatory parties, including the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo³: Serbia ratified the Agreement in July 2017 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – International Treaties, n. 4/2017), and Priština accessed it in July 2023.⁴ The matter of missing persons is one of the issues burdening relations between the Republic of Serbia and the territory of Kosovo. This particular issue is part of the EU-led negotiations between Belgrade and Priština, one of the latest achievements in that process being the Vučić-Kurti Declaration on Missing Persons from May 2023 (EEAS 2023).⁵ Despite its significance, the missing persons issue often takes a backseat to the more prominent political debates regarding the legal position of Kosovo. Moreover, the membership of Priština in this international organisation has not stirred public debate, unlike the application for membership in the Council of Europe. Considering the joint membership of Belgrade and Priština in the ICMP, the gravity of the missing persons issue, and the EU's insistence on its resolution in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU, it is crucial to shed light on the nature and functions of the ICMP.

The impetus for this research lies in the fact that the success of international organisations such as the ICMP is not guaranteed and may not even be expected.⁶

³ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. This disclaimer is valid throughout the paper.

⁴ Other parties to the Agreement are Afghanistan, Chile, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

⁵ For an overview of the negotiations between the Republic of Serbia and the territory of Kosovo under EU auspices, consult: Đukanović Dragan. 2013. "Odnosi između Beograda i Prištine: od tehničkog do političkog dijaloga". *International Problems* 65 (3): 365-385.

⁶ It was as early as 2004 that Henry Schermers observed that "a certain aversion developed against the creation of new international organisations" (Schermers 2004, 7).

In the atmosphere of distrust towards international organisations (IO), when they “are no longer seen as the good guys of global governance that produce global public goods that states alone cannot furnish” because of the lack of accountability⁷ and legitimacy crises (Peters 2016, 41; Collins and White 2010, 2), the ICMP managed to become a successful story marked by slow but constant progress. This success is even more intriguing, considering that the ICMP operates in the troublesome waters of emergencies with the central goal of providing humanitarian relief pertaining to the field of missing persons.⁸

This research hypothesises that the success of the ICMP is the result of the interplay between exogenous and endogenous factors. While the line of division between the two is not easily discerned in practice, we will rely on it for the sake of research precision. The relevant exogenous factor present at the time of establishing the ICMP in 1996 was the shift in the sovereignty paradigm. That shift produced a conversion in the understanding of international law and humanitarianism. These motions proved fertile ground for establishing new actors to implement a new set of values, with the ICMP being one of these actors. On the other hand, the ICMP was established as a soft international organisation, and its endogenous structure was flexible enough to accommodate the new paradigms. The push of the exogenous factors and the endogenous structure’s flexibility enabled this organisation’s success.

The article will be structured as follows: The second section will distil the elements of the ICMP’s nascent period and present the exogenous factors that facilitated the establishment of the ICMP. The third section will explain endogenous elements of the ICMP (its institutional design and funding) to showcase how they

⁷ Collins and White noted the “lack of accountability within particular institutions and regimes, normative and jurisdictional conflicts causing a fragmentation of the international legal order, and a growing awareness of the internal pathologies and ideological biases of the most dominant international institutions” (Collins and White 2010, 2). For an opposite opinion, see Daugirdas, Kristina, and Katerina Linos. 2023. “Are International Organisations Obsolete?”. *International Organisations Law Review* 20 (3): 263–267.

⁸ On the occasion of the International Conference “The Missing: An Agenda for the Future”, held in the Hague in 2013, US Ambassador to OSCE Daniel Baer staunchly reiterated that the success of ICMP was not expected: “it could be easy to forget that most organisations don’t make it this far, that organisational success doesn’t come as a matter of course—it’s not inevitable... the success of the organisation and its work couldn’t have been predicted in the mid-90’s.” In Ambassador’s words, this success materialised because of ICMP’s dedicated leadership and staff; because of its effectiveness and its useful results that prompted further demand for its work; and because of the necessary support by States. In Ambassador’s words, it was the “combination of people, purpose, and impact that has delivered such an impressive track record.” (Ambassador Daniel Baer, 2013, 1)

affect the successful functioning of the ICMP. The fourth part concludes by returning to relations between the Republic of Serbia and the territory of Kosovo within the ambit of the ICMP.

Exogenous elements relevant to the establishment of the ICMP

Sovereignty revisited

Faith in the Organisation of the United Nations, founded to replace the defunct League of Nations and ensure world peace, security, and stability, started to decline very soon after its establishment.⁹ The Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR precluded effective collaboration in the Security Council (SC), the UN body primarily responsible for “maintaining international peace and security”. Even more, it paralysed the Security Council for decades. The UN member states tried to remedy or at least ameliorate the situation by redistributing tasks and powers once accorded to the Security Council in favour of the General Assembly¹⁰ and the Secretary-General.¹¹ These had a limited impact, and only the end of the Cold War enabled more substantive international cooperation. The end of the Cold War promised to be a turning point in the history of international relations. This end (or the new beginning?) is marked by different important factors, of which topical for this research are the shift in the understanding of the sovereignty of states and the pertinent revival of the activities of the Security Council.

The dominant position in the doctrine reveals that the shift from pre- to post-Cold War concepts has been heralded with the launch of “the negative vs. positive sovereignty theory”. The leading characteristic of negative or Westphalian sovereignty is considered to be the protection of internal matters from external, international interference. On the other hand, positive sovereignty rests on the

⁹ For the modern interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force see, e.g., Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, Nikolai Wessendorf, ed. *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume I, II* (3rd Edition). See also Corten, Olivier, *The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law*. London: Hart Publishing, 2010. v–vi. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 21 Sep. 2021.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Christina Binder, *Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950)*, Oxford Public International Law.

¹¹ See, e.g., Brian E. Urquhart, *The Evolution of the Secretary General*, pp. 15-32, James Cockayne, David M. Malone, *Relations with the Security Council*, 69-86 in Simon Chester ed. *Secretary or General, The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

existence and respect of democratic principles and the rule of law in a state. In other words, sovereignty can no longer be used as an excuse for the violation of human rights in the territory of a state and cannot preclude external intervention, including a forcible one (Jackson 1990, 29).

In a nutshell, the concept of sovereignty has been reframed. Instead of being considered a state's right, it has been redefined in terms of responsibility towards its population in the first place and then towards the international community. When a state is unable or unwilling to fulfil its obligation, the international community has to step in and comply with its own responsibility.¹² In the climate of deep distrust towards military intervention without SC approval, and to balance the newborn concepts of sovereignty with external intervention, the concept of Responsibility to Protect was born.¹³ Five years later, in 2010, the Secretary-General announced a New International Law "with four pillars of the modern international legal system: international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international refugee law".¹⁴

This shift in the sovereignty paradigm happened in parallel to the revival of the UN Security Council. However, as already presented, the landscape for Security

¹² The humanitarian intervention, the concept of military action to save human lives, well known in classical writings and often used in the second half of the 19th century, was not acceptable for the great majority of states. They considered it to be in obvious contradiction to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, inter alia, the principle of non-use of force.

¹³ Under the heading "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity", UN member states unanimously approved the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document's following paragraphs:

"138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity." (UNGA Res. 60/01)

¹⁴ Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, United Nations, March 2010, p. 3.

Council operations has been substantially transformed. New challenges to international peace and security have been born, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. The old challenges have changed as well, the most dramatic being the change in the prevailing nature of armed conflicts (ICRC 2016a, 194).¹⁵

As a corollary, the situations that may, or even have to, trigger international intervention to protect peace and security had to be redefined (Blokker and Wessel 2005). The starting point was Article 39 of the Charter, which contains a threshold requirement for adopting binding measures under Chapter VII. Although neither of the concepts from Article 39 have been defined by the Charter—threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression—the first one proved to be most eligible for the extensive interpretation in practice of the Security Council. Using the flexibility of the black letter, the Security Council expanded the concept of “threat to peace” to include, *inter alia*, the internal situations confined to a single territory or state, mostly internal armed conflicts, but also the situation of internal tensions and disturbances. Besides genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, other situations emerged that were considered a just cause to trigger intervention: “international terrorism, including a refusal to hand over terrorist suspects, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, violations of human rights law and violations of humanitarian law, piracy, organised crime, illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and overturning of democratic” (De Wett and Wood 2022, para. 9; see also Paige 2019).

The shift from the consequences to the deep roots of threats to peace was obvious. In that context, it seemed logical, even natural, to make a radical shift in the international effort’s purpose. Instead of keeping the peace, the main goal became much more ambitious: to provide peace by establishing or re-establishing a modern, positive sovereign state based on democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in the once-war-torn and post-conflict societies.¹⁶ To prevent crises’ recurrence, this New Humanitarianism addresses, *inter alia*, ending impunity, providing recognition and redress to victims, fostering trust, and contributing to reconciliation.¹⁷ Driven by inherently political goals, international

¹⁵ At the time when the Security Council was established, 90% of world conflicts were international, i.e., conflicts fought between states. In the 1990s, 85% of all armed conflicts were intrastate wars, i.e., armed conflicts fought in the territory of one state (Themne and Wallenstein 2011).

¹⁶ For the United Nation’s “enormous and imprecise experiment in societal rehabilitation” see, e.g., Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding” pp. 479-507, in Tomas G. Weis, Sam Dawis ed., *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*.

¹⁷ The whole new concept of transitional justice has been created in order to explain and define principles and guidelines for the (re)construction of war-torn societies. See, e.g., *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, Report of the Secretary

actors expanded their competence in various fields far beyond what was once considered the internal domain of the state, deeply encroaching on constitutional design, security issues, justice, and criminal justice in particular.¹⁸ A full range of applicable tools was developed to cope with myriad deficits, among which are the lack of institutional independence within the justice sector, lack of domestic technical capacity, lack of material and financial resources, lack of official respect for human rights, and lack of security. Among the tools emerged international and internationalised courts empowered with a critical task: to end impunity for the atrocities committed and to bring the perpetrators to justice.

New Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Organisations

The position of and expectations from humanitarian organisations changed as well. The transformation began in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the moniker of new, political, or military humanitarianism and challenged their traditional goals and operating principles. Namely, the traditional goal of humanitarian organisations was to protect victims of armed conflict, both belligerents and civilian victims, and provide them relief. With New Humanitarianism, the focus from emergency relief has been shifted to coping with post-conflict building.

Humanitarian organisations were expected to play their part in the newly created humanitarian landscape and policies, including fighting impunity. Providing food, blankets, tents, water, sanitation, and medical care was considered even more

General, (S/2011/634), available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/rule-law-and-transitional-justice-conflict-and-post-conflict-societies-report-secretaria-0> See also The EU's Policy Framework on support to transitional justice, 2015, https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/the-eus-policy-framework-on-support-to-transitional-justice?tx_felogin_login%5Baction%5D=login&tx_felogin_login%5Bcontroller%5D=Login&cHash=446bf63cccabb23a727b5e260489bf08

¹⁸ Responsibility to rebuild, envisaged as the third element of responsibility to protect in the report of the International Commission on State Intervention and Sovereignty, was not included in the paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. The peacebuilding process was decoupled, and the Peacebuilding Commission was established with the aim to “propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” [...] and “focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict” (United Nations 2005). Nevertheless, the concept of responsibility to rebuild is highly debated in the theory, sometimes as a part of *jus post bellum*. See, e.g., Athanasios Strathopoulos, Post-Intervention Reconstruction and the Responsibility to Rebuild, *Social Science*, 2022, 11, 368. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11080368>; Lary May, Responsibility to Rebuild and collective responsibility, in Jan Klabbbers, Touko Piiparinen ed., *Normative Pluralism and International Law, Exploring Global Governance*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 323-339.

senseless if it was not preceded or followed by other measures, including robust, forceful ones (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Reiff 2002). Humanitarian organisations are expected to simultaneously implement humanitarian and development activities to be multi-functional, or “double-hatted”.¹⁹ However, this was far beyond the role provided by international humanitarian law for the so-called classical traditional Dunant’s humanitarian organisations.

IHL humanitarian organisations are defined as “entities with a mission to prevent and/or alleviate human suffering in armed conflicts. They are usually involved in searching for, collecting, and transporting the wounded and sick, missing and dead; providing medical treatment to the wounded and sick; assisting prisoners of war; and assisting the civilian population through the provision of humanitarian relief” (Sassoli et al., n.d.). The relevant legal framework for the functioning of traditional humanitarian organisations can be found in the 1949 Geneva Convention. Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 9, common to the first three conventions, and Article 10 to Convention IV explicitly recognise that humanitarian organisations are legally entitled to offer to the warring parties of the conflict humanitarian activities known as the right of humanitarian initiative. According to *travaux préparatoires*, the founders of the Geneva Convention deliberately omitted to specify the concept of a humanitarian organisation entitled to the right of humanitarian initiative, apart from explicitly mentioning the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).²⁰ They also wanted to leave open doors for international, national, non-governmental, and governmental organisations.

The liberal approach rooted in the Geneva Conventions regarding the legal status of humanitarian organisations entitled to the right of humanitarian initiative is followed by a more restrictive attitude regarding the right to humanitarian access to the victims and their *modus operandi* in the field. The right of humanitarian organisations to provide humanitarian relief and protection is, therefore, subject to the consent of the party concerned. Since 1949, the concept of consent has considerably evolved. Nowadays, it is considered that “where a Party is unable or unwilling to address the humanitarian need of such persons, international law requires it to respond positively to an offer by an impartial humanitarian organisation to do so in its place” (ICRC 2016b, 1173). The Geneva Conventions also require a humanitarian organisation offering humanitarian assistance to be

¹⁹ IRRC, 2021, p.3.

²⁰ For the roots of the ICRC in the 1864 Geneva Convention, consult: Knežević-Predić Vesna. 2015. “Zaštita žrtava oružanih sukoba: 150 godina Ženevke konvencije za poboljšanje sudbine ranjenika na bojnopolju”. *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu* 54 (70): 59-79.

impartial. Humanitarian organisations are expected not to make any discrimination “as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. They should endeavour only to “relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress” of potential beneficiaries (Pictet, 1979). Although it is not explicitly mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the Geneva Conventions, the principle of neutrality is implied in the concept of humanitarian organisations authorised with the right to humanitarian initiative. Neutrality refers to the attitude to be adopted vis-à-vis the parties to the armed conflict: “In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all,... may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature” (Pictet, 1979).

Humanitarian organisations are authorised to provide protection and assistance to the victims of armed conflict. Although conventions do not provide the definition of the terms used or the exhaustive list of activities that are covered by them, it is broadly accepted that the “concept of ‘protection’ encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant body of law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and refugee law” (European Commission 2016, 5). Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions further specify that “in the context of humanitarian law, ‘protection activities’ refer to all activities that seek to ensure that the authorities and other relevant actors fulfil their obligations to uphold the rights of individuals affected by the armed conflict (beyond their mere survival)” (ICRC 2016b, 1143, 1144). Assistance activities encompass “all activities, services, and delivery of goods, carried out primarily in the fields of health, water, habitat (the creation of a sustainably living environment), and economic security (defined by the ICRC as “the condition of an individual, household, or community that is able to cover its essential needs and unavoidable expenditures in a sustainable manner, according to its cultural standards”) (ICRC 2016b, 1149). One of the explicitly mentioned activities in legal texts pertains to the missing persons, or, in the words of Additional Protocol I, the right of the families to know the fate of their relatives (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005). Undoubtedly, the primary responsibility for implementing these international obligations lies with the parties to the conflict, and only the auxiliary role has been reserved for international organisations. However, this turns out to be the starting point for the search for a new kind of humanitarian organisation.

Through their work in the midst of conflict areas and the people they engaged, they were likely to witness brutal crimes. Their testimony and the information they collect might be necessary for ending impunity and bringing the perpetrators to justice. Such expectations and the new landscape challenged their traditional operating principles as they are provided in international humanitarian law:

consent of the state concerned, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Some traditional humanitarian organisations, such as the quintessential International Committee of the Red Cross, found themselves in a complicated situation. If humanitarian organisations must dismantle those principles firmly embedded in international law and created based on more than a century-long experience, they risk not being perceived as neutral. Consequently, they will become targets of attack by warring parties and lose their ability to provide humanitarian protection to the victims of armed conflict. The dilemma had to be solved. The opportunity to be solved was offered by the bloody wars on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia.

Endogenous elements relevant to the establishment of the ICMP

ICMP between accountability and (new) humanitarianism

The ICMP was created in the immediate aftermath of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in 1996. US President Bill Clinton proposed the formation of an international Blue-Ribbon Commission on the Missing in the Former Yugoslavia to ensure cooperation between the ex-warring parties regarding the issue of missing persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Commission should have added momentum to addressing the issue of missing persons and pushed forward the already existing initiatives by the ICRC and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the actors who were already involved in the missing persons' issue, albeit from different standpoints (Clinton Digital Library 1996).

As already noted, the ICRC is considered a traditional humanitarian organisation. It provided substantial support during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. It acted as the mediator between the warring parties (IRRC 1991b) and called on them to respect International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (IRRC 1991a, IRRC 1992b). The ICRC also provided material support (ICRC 1996), conducted visits to persons who were detained (Young 2001, 784), and facilitated the release and repatriation of prisoners (IRRC 1992a). Moreover, the ICRC undertook various activities to shed light on the fate of missing persons in conflicts. For example, it launched a campaign to reach the public to provide information on the missing and led the expert group that was to provide standards for the exhumation and forensic examination of remains (Clinton Digital Library, 1996). The prominent role of the ICRC in the case of missing persons was recognised in the Dayton Peace Agreement.²¹

²¹ Dayton Peace Agreement, Article V, Annex 7: "The Parties shall provide information through the tracing mechanisms of the ICRC on all persons unaccounted for. The Parties shall also

On the other hand, the ICTY was established as an accountability mechanism. In the atmosphere of newly defined threats and reconceptualised sovereignty, the UNSC needed to tackle the situation of armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Deeply aware that the warring parties were not willing or able to provide justice for the victims of international humanitarian law violations in Yugoslav crises, the UN Security Council decided to establish the first international criminal court after the Second World War.²² It was designed to “achieve peace through justice” and to collect data and relevant evidence on the crimes committed. In that regard, the search for missing persons was of great importance.

While actively involved in the search for the missing throughout the entire conflict, the ICRC could not assist the ICTY. The intrinsic limitation stemming from the ICRC’s humanitarian character hindered its participation in judicial proceedings. In the words of Stahn, the ICRC “adopted a cautious approach towards international criminal law practice and judicial proceedings” (2016, 166). Bearing in mind the limitations of the ICRC and the needs of the ICTY, it became apparent that the “market” of humanitarianism as well as accountability needed newcomers. That is how the ICMP came to the fore “to help meet the Tribunal’s needs in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the humanitarian ones” (Cordner and Tidball-Binz 2017, 67). Wagner notices that the transitional justice efforts in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina are marked by “the proceedings at the ICTY (...), and the identification process led by the ICMP” (Wagner, 2010, p. 28).

From the outset, the ICMP pursued both accountability and humanitarian missions, which explains how it outshined its “improbable beginnings” (Ambassador Daniel Baer 2013). On the one hand, the work of the ICMP proved indispensable for the accountability process, as the ICRC’s role in that regard was limited because of its purely humanitarian character. The DNA-orientated approach of the ICMP complemented the work of the ICTY, especially in the cases of Haradinaj et al., Popović et al., Tolimir, Mladić, and Karadžić (Vanderpuye and

cooperate fully with the ICRC in its efforts to determine the identities, whereabouts, and fate of the unaccounted for”.

²² It was in 2002 that Eric Myjer and Nigel White stated that the council’s ‘competence in criminal justice matters is designed to achieve peace through justice, while its military component is designed to achieve peace through force’. In “The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?” (2002) 7(1) *JCSL* 5 at 6–7. See also, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct. 1994), pp. 784-805; Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 122-135; Rachel Kerr, *The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy*, 2004.

Mitchell, 2020, pp. 215-218; Fournet, 2020). On the other hand, the success of the accountability process was of great importance to the newly discovered mission of the UN and the Security Council. Therefore, it needed to be rooted in some greater goal, overcoming the determination of individual criminal responsibility and including the notions of justice, truth, and care for the victims. This is where the ICMP's humanitarian character was recognised.

In IHL, humanitarian organisations are defined as entities with a mission to alleviate human suffering in armed conflicts, including searching for the missing (Sassoli et al., n.d.). The mission of the ICMP was from the beginning conceptualised as the humanitarian one: in the 1996 Concept Paper it was stated that the "identification of the missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral part of creating the conditions for peace, stability, and reconciliation in the region" (Clinton Digital Library 1996); the 1998 Headquarters Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina referred in the preamble to "the work done by the ICMP in providing assistance to the families of missing persons and its contribution to find answers to the fate of the missing persons" (Headquarters Agreement 1998) and the 2014 Agreement in the preamble underlines that the parties are "aware of the cost to societies and families resulting from a failure to locate the missing, including the anguish suffered as a consequence of not knowing a loved one's whereabouts or the circumstances of their disappearance" and noted "that predominantly men go missing, particularly as a result of armed conflicts and human rights abuses, and that those left behind, women and children, are especially vulnerable" (ICMP Agreement 2014).

The ICMP's functions were constructed to deliver its humanitarian mission, which was understood in terms of new humanitarianism. They revolved around two segments: the enablement of cooperation between the states and the development of appropriate expressions of commemoration and tribute to the missing (ICMP Agreement 2014, Article II). Driven by its humanitarian mission, the ICMP expanded its operations beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia, as well as beyond armed conflict scenarios, to extend relief where needs arose. As early as 2002, the US Secretary of State, Collin Powel, stated at the Board of Commissioners' meeting in Washington that "The Commission has created a capacity that goes well beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina (...). Our challenge now is to translate that progress into a lasting change in the Balkans and throughout the world" (GlobeNewswire 2002). The global potential was soon proven. In 2004, the ICMP helped identify the 2004 Asian tsunami victims and stated that "the mandate of the ICMP is to assist in the identification of persons missing as a result of conflicts or human rights abuses, but as a humanitarian

measure, it has offered assistance in other situations, such as the identification of tsunami victims” (ICMP 2005).

ICMP’s internal structure and funding

The transformation in the ICMP’s operational approach necessitated a corresponding evolution in its legal standing. This transformation became imperative because, despite functioning as an international organisation, the ICMP lacked conventional attributes associated with international organisations; it was not established by an international treaty and did not possess explicit international legal personality. The first attempt in 2004 to constitutionalise the ICMP as a full-fledged international organisation failed (Knežević-Predić and Simentić Popović 2022). In 2013, success was realised through the joint efforts of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The initiative was solemnly perpetuated at the high-level conference “The Missing: An Agenda for the Future” held in the Hague at the end of October 2013.²³ The outcome of this initiative was the adoption of the Commission’s constitutive document, *the Agreement on the Status and Functions of the International Commission on Missing Persons (the ICMP Agreement)*, and the relocation of its headquarters from Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the Hague, the Netherlands.

Even though the main goal of the Agreement was to “establish a clear legal status for the ICMP as an international organisation in order to better enable it to carry out its functions internationally” (ICMP Agreement 2014, preamble), the institutional structure and the funding of the ICMP do not align neatly with the conventional design of an international organisation. Traditional international organisations are established by states with interconnected rights, duties, and benefits stemming from their membership. Regarding rights, states are represented in the organ(s) of the organisation. The correlative duty is to “participate in the organisation’s work by sending delegations to the meetings of its organs” as well as to “pay part of its expenses and to fulfil the specific obligations enumerated in the constitution or laid down in decisions taken by organs of the organisation” (Schermers and Blokker 2008, 13). The benefits stemming from membership are reflected in the exclusive possibility for the members to exploit the organisation’s knowledge, skills, and resources (financial and expert) to achieve certain goals and outcomes.

²³ Available at: <https://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ICMP-Conference-Report-1.pdf>

The ICMP Agreement provides for the following institutional structure: the Board of Commissioners (BoC), Director General and Staff (Agreement, Article III), Conference of State Parties (CSP), and optional subsidiary bodies (Article III 5).²⁴ The Director General and the staff could be considered the administrative organs of the organisation, while the BoC could be equated with the decision-making organ, composed of experts. The website of the ICMP states that it is run by a Director-General and governed by the BoC (ICMP n.d.a.). Notably, the organisation's management is not entrusted to members' representatives but to the experts. Members, parties to the ICMP Agreement, are represented in the CSP, whose powers are limited and do not include approval of the budget nor the election of any key official; its role remains to consider reports, propose policy directives, and recommend measures. These roles are, in essence, advisory and not governing. Therefore, this organ can only be considered the rudimentary form of the assembly-like plenary decision-making organ (Karns 2016: 779). This peculiar institutional design indicates that the ICMP is not conceived as a traditional international organisation.

Another indicator of the ICMP's non-traditional structure is its funding. The financing of the ICMP is purely voluntary. The state parties to the ICMP Agreement are not obligated to finance the ICMP operations; in practice, most of them do not make contributions. Namely, out of the current ten parties to the ICMP Agreements, only five (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and Germany) contribute to the organisation's budget. Other stakeholders, such as states and intergovernmental organisations, contribute to the budget despite not being state parties to the Agreement. These are, in alphabetical order: Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Greece, the Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, The City of The Hague, Turkey, and the United States of America (ICMP n.d.a.). This mismatch between the members of the ICMP and the stakeholders that fund the ICMP further demonstrates the deviation of the ICMP from the conventional structure of international organisations.

The internal structure of the ICMP propelled its success as well. In the words of one of the ICMP Commissioners, HM Queen Noor of Jordan, the ICMP

²⁴ The Inter-Agency Committee (IAC) brings together international and other organisations with a public mandate concerned with the issue of the missing; The Panel of Experts (PE) provides advice to the Director General on issues pertaining to the Organisation's current or future work program and compiles the Global Report on Missing Persons; The Global Forum providing an agora comprising the BoC, PE, and IAC, plus civil society organisations and representatives of families of the missing. The GF is currently a virtual space. (Programme and Budget 2021-2026).

constitutionalisation aimed to create a “light but efficient modern international organisation” (ICMP 2015). Our research shows that the lightness of the organisation is expressed through the absence of a traditional membership structure, which is evident in the peculiar institutional design and financing of the ICMP. Although it does not conform to the traditional model of an international organisation, the ICMP plays a crucial role in delivering public goods within the humanitarian sphere. In Drosses’s words, public goods “need to be used where they are most needed and not based on formal criteria relating to the association of a country with a specific organisation.” (2020, 142) In that sense, it is evident that the traditional membership structure, which provides exclusive benefits to its members, would impede the ICMP’s humanitarian mission of providing public goods. This hindrance is regarded as a rationale for the organisation’s loose membership structure.

The role of the ICMP does not boil down to the commensurate interests of states, which can sometimes be conflicting; instead, it provides expert knowledge rooted in factual information to provide global public goods such as “justice, truth, or relief to families”. The ICMP strives to “resolve the fate of the missing in a manner that is commensurate with human rights and the rule of law” (ICMP n.d.b.). This objective is also linked with the right to truth and the mission to counter the sense of impunity. The ICMP navigates towards attaining peace, with the Director General emphasising on various occasions that “accounting for the missing is an investment in peace” (ICMP 2018). To provide these public goods, the ICMP provides stakeholders with expert services, which are a public good on their own. The ICMP provides for capacity building (through strengthening the domestic capacities of the states in the field; providing access to information on the whereabouts of the missing; assisting the role of the judiciary, in particular of the criminal justice system; and pursuing legislative measures as part of domestic legislation to implement these principles) and technical assistance (DNA identifications, forensic archaeology, and anthropological location and examination of remains; the Integrated Data Management System (IDMS) (ICMP n.d.b.).

Conclusion

The ICMP was established in a turbulent era. The period was characterised both by the new post-Cold War paradigms of sovereignty and restructuring of international (legal) order and by New Humanitarianism, which emerged in response to armed conflicts of a new type. These external dynamics heavily

influenced the formation and success of the ICMP. The ICMP was established as the expression of New Humanitarianism. It proves that international organisations can act successfully despite their loose approach to traditional humanitarian principles. The flexible internal structure enabled the ICMP to efficiently provide public goods by disseminating its humanitarian mission to account for the missing. The ICMP seeks the truth about the missing persons to attain justice and provide relief to families of the missing by using scientifically purported facts. Therefore, the key to its success is its expert-rooted functioning and reliable (financial) support from relevant actors.

This expert and support-driven success is why the ICMP emerged as an acceptable model of cooperation between Belgrade and Priština. The 2021 Report of the Commission on Missing Persons of the Republic of Serbia states that 9.925 persons are still missing from the conflicts in former Yugoslavia: 1.621 in Kosovo and Metohija, 1.964 in the Republic of Croatia, and 6.340 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CMPRS 2021). It is also stated that Serbia has a legitimate interest in resolving the fate of 1.315 persons, mostly of Serbian nationality (CMPRS 2021, 6-7). The issue of missing persons cannot be addressed or resolved without Serbia's cooperation with other parties. We claim that it is in the national interest of Serbia to resolve the issue of the missing and, in that process, to collaborate with the relevant stakeholders, including Priština.²⁵

First, accounting for the missing persons from armed conflicts is a national interest *per se*. It is part of the achievement of the rule of law, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, care for the victims of armed conflict, regional cooperation, transitional justice, and reconciliation. Secondly, resolving the fate of the missing persons is part of Serbia's national interest in acceding to the European Union. The EU monitors the issue of missing persons under Cluster

²⁵ For other examples of instances in which Serbia relied on international law to promote its national interests, consult Knežević-Predić Vesna. 2024. "Protecting and promoting national interests through domestic implementation measures" and Simentić Popović Janja, Hrnjaz Miloš, "The Legal Nature of Agreements Concluded During Belgrade-Priština Negotiations: Pursuing National Interests Through International Law Mechanisms". Forthcoming in: Proceedings from the International Scientific Conference "National Interest(s) in World Politics", edited by Dragan Đukanović, Saša Mišić, and Nikola Jović. Belgrade: Faculty of Political Science; Knežević-Predić Vesna, Simentić Janja. 2015. "Serbia and International Law at the Crossroads of Centuries – Serbian Approach to International Law until the beginning of the First World War". In: Zbornik radova sa konferencije Politički Identitet Srbije u globalnom i regionalnom kontekstu, uredila Vesna Knežević-Predić, 181-201. Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka.

1 of the European Commission Country Report (EC 2023, 30-31, 92, 95).²⁶ Finally, resolving the missing persons issue is an international obligation of the Republic of Serbia that stems from the IHL (Geneva Conventions) and Serbia's membership in the ICMP.

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²⁶ The EU is consistently monitoring the advancement in the issue of missing persons through its Annual Country Reports. While the methodology for the assessment of progress was changed in 2020, the monitoring of the missing persons issue remained. For the change in the EU Enlargement Methodology consult 2022 Thematic Issue of International Problems 74 (3), 411–432.

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Vesna KNEŽEVIĆ-PREDIĆ, Janja SIMENTIĆ POPOVIĆ

**ZAŠTITA NACIONALNIH INTERESA PUTEM
NESTANDARDNIH INSTITUCIONALNIH OKVIRA:
SLUČAJ MEĐUNARODNE KOMISIJE ZA NESTALA LICA**

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad istražuje faktore koji su doprineli uspehu Međunarodne komisije za nestala lica koja je osnovana 1996. godine kako bi se rešilo pitanje nestalih osoba iz sukoba na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Misija Međunarodne komisije se kasnije proširila i na podsticanje saradnje među državama i pružanje stručne pomoći u pronalaženju nestalih osoba usled sukoba, kršenja ljudskih prava i katastrofa. Ovo istraživanje se zasniva na hipotezi da uspeh Međunarodne komisije proizilazi iz sadejstva egzogenih faktora, kao što su promene u međunarodnom pravu i humanitarnim paradigmama, i endogenih faktora, uključujući fleksibilan institucionalni dizajn Komisije i pristup radu koji je zasnovan na stručnosti. Putem analize strukture i funkcija Međunarodne komisije ovo istraživanje naglašava značaj prilagodljivosti i stručnosti u efikasnom radu međunarodnih organizacija. Delovanje Međunarodne komisije za nestala lica u Republici Srbiji i na teritoriji Kosova pruža uvid u to kako nestandardni institucionalni okviri mogu zaobići političke složenosti kako bi se postigli značajni humanitarni rezultati, ostvarujući neophodnu ravnotežu između nacionalnih interesa i međunarodnih obaveza humanitarne prirode.

Ključne reči: nestala lica, humanitarizam, međunarodno pravo, međunarodne organizacije, Republika Srbija, Kosovo, tranziciona pravda, institucionalni dizajn, finansiranje međunarodnih organizacija.

Pursuing the National Interest of Serbia through Interpresidentialism of the Open Balkan Initiative

Miloš HRNJAZ¹, Aleksandar MILOŠEVIĆ²

Abstract: This article attempts to answer the question of the relationship between Serbia's perceived national interests and the Open Balkan Initiative. It starts with a theoretical framework and concepts of national interests and regional integrations of the Western Balkans. It then proceeds with a concise history of these integrations and their relationship with the EU accession process of Balkan countries. The article's central part focuses on the economic, institutional, and legal aspects of the Open Balkan Initiative and how the perceived national interests of Serbia determine these aspects. The main conclusions are that political leaders of Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia have used interpresidentialism as a form of regional integration, deliberately avoiding institutionalisation, and decided to almost exclusively use non-binding instruments of international law in the Open Balkan Initiative. Additionally, the economic results of the initiative are limited so far.

Keywords: regional integrations, Western Balkans, Open Balkan Initiative, international law, European Union, national interests.

Introduction

The Open Balkan Initiative (OBI), one of the latest attempts at regional integration in the Western Balkans, has raised many controversies since its establishment in 2019. While public attention is significant, academic interest in the topic is slowly gaining pace, although the topic is still under-researched (Kulo and Novikau, 2023; Milošević and Hrnjaz, 2023). The research focus has primarily been on describing the OBI's achievements and its impact in the current

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geopolitical context. However, it is difficult to grasp public interest considering the initiative's lack of substantial economic results.

Regarding the concrete issue of regional integration and initiatives in the Western Balkans and the national interest of Serbia, the political leadership of Serbia presents those initiatives as part of their efforts for the improvement of the economic well-being of Serbia, collective self-esteem, and the attempt to establish itself as a political leader of the region (RTV 2022). That is confirmed in Serbia's strategic documents, including the Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Serbia, which stipulates that "activities within the framework of regional initiatives are of particular importance for strengthening trust, cooperation, and joint action in the field of promoting stability and security in the region" (The Strategy of the National Security of the Republic of Serbia 2019).

In this paper, we analyse the case of Serbia's participation in the OBI by using the concepts of national interest and interpresidentialism. We explore how the two concepts are related to this initiative. Our main argument is that the approach of interpresidentialism can adequately explain many features of the OBI. It is a direct product of how political elites legitimise their perception of the national interests of the involved countries—from the lack of institutionalisation and mostly non-binding nature of adopted documents to the proactivity of political leaders and the lack of a long-term strategy for the OBI.

The structure of the paper is the following: after the introduction, the second section of the article encompasses the theoretical and conceptual framework with a description of how we use the key concepts of national interests, interpresidentialism, and regional integration; the third section is dedicated to a short introduction to the regional integration in the Western Balkans; in the fourth section, we apply the previous concepts and conclusions to the case study of the OBI; finally, concluding remarks are provided at the end of the article.

Theoretical framework: the concept of national interest, motives for regional integration, and interpresidentialism

The Concept of National Interest

Some authors rightly claim that "despite its central place in foreign policy discourse, national interest is arguably one of the most inexplicable and controversial concepts in the science of international relations" (Danilović 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to explain how we understand the concept of national

interest in this paper. We do not align with the realist standpoint underlined by H. Morgenthau, who argues that national interest is not “defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship of a party but imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy” and “a fact to be discovered rather than a matter of contingent and constructed preferences” (1977). It is not easy to grasp the substance of national interest if one defines it like Morgenthau. Most constructivists seem right when they insist that even Morgenthau made an important amendment to his statement on the concept of national interest by stating that it is also determined by the political and cultural context in which foreign policy is formulated (Burchill 2005). Constructivists claim that shared ideas, beliefs, and values influence social and political action (Burchill 2005). These factors shape the social identities of political actors and, in turn, the interests they express. Interests and identities are constantly being moulded and remoulded through socialisation. National identity and, therefore, national interests do change over time (Burchill 2005).

However, even if one agrees with realists that an essence of the concept of national interest exists that is neither contingent nor constructed (for example, the survival of the state or the four national interests mentioned by Alexander Wendt: survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem), it is challenging to operationalise it in concrete foreign policy goals and decisions (1999, 199). The goals of state survival or increase of state power tell us next to nothing about *how* to accomplish them in the complex international arena. In addition, there are usually several national interests, and their accomplishments could be mutually opposed. Therefore, policy decision-makers need to choose ways to accommodate them. Thus, some authors try to make a hierarchy between competing national interests, making the classification of vital, very important, and important national interests (Art 2003, 46).

Considering all this, we conclude that even if one insists on the objective essence of the concept of national interest, there is a significant space for key foreign policy decision-makers to operationalise it in line with their particular interest or their subjective perception of collective interest. Naturally, in order to justify their decisions, these decision-makers typically frame them in terms of “objective” national interests. That is also visible in the case of the OBI.

Motives for regional economic integration and interpresidentialism³

Motives for joining regional economic integration initiatives can differ (Borzel et al. 2016; Van Langenhove 2016; Milošević 2022). Brada and Mendez, for example, consider the possible benefits of integration as the key economic reasons that can be achieved through a classic cost-benefit analysis (the so-called Vinerian approach) but also cite the undoubted influence and existence of the collective goals of the countries that aim to integrate (such as industrialisation, the so-called Johnsonian approach) (1993). According to these authors, political reasons for economic integration should be considered when researching specific agreements by analysing political benefits and costs. Ravenhill analyses the motives of governments for concluding regional economic agreements, dividing them into political and economic ones. Political motives can include the building of trust among the signatories of the regional economic agreement, the link between regional economic cooperation and the “new security agenda”, regionalism as a reward for security partners, and regionalism understood as a “means for negotiation” or as a “mechanism for ‘locking in’ reforms”, but also simpler negotiation and implementation of agreements (Ravenhill 2020). When understood as a tool for negotiation, regionalism implies the establishment of regional integration initiatives to strengthen negotiating positions during talks with other significant actors in the global system. The mechanism for locking reforms is understood as increasing the credibility of domestic economic reforms through the conclusion of a regional economic agreement because possible investors consider regional initiatives more attractive and safer to invest in.

Economic motives for concluding regional agreements versus multilateral engagement or unilateral action are protecting sectors that would not withstand global competition, creating opportunities for deeper integration, and creating larger markets that would contribute to achieving economies of scale and increased foreign investments (Ravenhill 2020). In the context of the Western Balkans, it is crucial to emphasise that joining regional economic integration is advantageous for less developed economies with limited markets. This is due to increased competition among countries with similar levels of development, the realisation of economies of scale, higher attractiveness for foreign direct investments, and the growth of bargaining power. Relying on Robson (1998), Grupe and Kušić call this motif the polygon effect (2005). When viewed in this manner, regional economic

³ Some parts of the text that follow are based on previously conducted research (Milošević and Hrnjaz 2023).

cooperation or integration becomes a means of fulfilling the national interests of the involved states. That can be achieved by expanding national markets, enhancing mutual trade, and improving economic well-being. In addition, it can also prepare the states for a more extensive form of integration or help achieve other political objectives, such as political promotion or building closer connections with potential geopolitical partners (Asian Development Bank 2013; Hinz 2023; Delimatsis 2023).

Most of the literature on regionalism, focusing on the creation and functioning of the European Union, at some point implies the institutionalisation of existing regional relations (Malamud 2018). Classical liberal approaches to regional integration implied the existence of a “demand” for regional agreements in the form of existing economic interdependence as a condition for improving regional cooperation or actual interactions of transnational actors who request national authorities or transnational regulators to facilitate existing transactions and improve institutional channels through which they dominantly occur (Mattli 1999, Moravcsik 1998, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). The first approach, known as liberal intergovernmentalism, measures interdependence among local actors through their export dependence and intra-industry trade. Another approach, labelled neo-transactionalism by Malamud, has its roots in transnationalism and functionalism and is less concerned with the interdependence between regional actors but emphasises the connection between integration and institutions (2018, 60).

A new theoretical approach, “interpresidentialism,” has been developed by Malamud to explain regional cooperation that does not follow the typical sequence of interdependence, integration, and institutionalisation (2018). Interpresidentialism focuses on the involvement of the highest state representatives, such as the head of state, in intergovernmental cooperation. Unlike liberal intergovernmentalism, this approach emphasises the influence of national leaders and their political preferences. Also, this approach pays particular attention to the veto power and discretionary actions of leading political figures. Notably, interpresidentialism is characterised by proactivity and the key role of state leaders in shaping international collaboration.

The positive aspects of interpresidentialism include flexibility, informal complexity, and a rapid response by the new framework to crises. However, the negative aspects include institutional (sometimes referred to as normative) deficiencies, challenges with implementing decisions at the domestic level, and the prevalence of political interests over economic ones. Provisions related to institutionalisation are limited, and most decisions of importance to the organisation are made at meetings held periodically (Malamud 2018; Preusse 2004; Hummel and Lohaus 2016). Underdeveloped institutions enable the most important regional actors to “keep” the regional integration process under their control through diplomacy at the highest

level. They then use it to achieve various goals, including economic benefits, political or party interests, and improving their image in the international community. Also, this framework can be an efficient tool for responding to crises when national leaders come together to manage common problems.

Contemporary regional integration initiatives of the (Western) Balkans: politics and economy

During the EU integration process of the Western Balkan countries, the question of their regional cooperation arose as an association and accession condition. In 2018, the European Commission adopted a strategy on the credible perspective of enlargement and enhanced engagement of the EU in the Western Balkans, which also included an initiative to support reconciliation and good neighbourly relations. Each European Commission's report on Serbia also contains a section concerning regional cooperation. In the 2022 report, it was stated that "good relations and regional cooperation are a key part of the European integration process of Serbia..." (Evropska komisija 2022, 93). More specifically, in the continuation of the report, it was stated that the Common Regional Market "will be key to increasing the attractiveness and competitiveness of the region" (Evropska komisija 2022, 94).

Regional cooperation was applied "from top to bottom", i.e., it was supported from the top and did not come so much from the Balkan states themselves. During the adoption of the Stability Pact, EU officials insisted that the EU should initiate regional cooperation in this way, but the Balkan states must be the bearers (Bechev 2005, 115). There is an important question of the relationship between the internal motives of the states for regional cooperation (such as interdependence, economic interests, power relations, etc.) and external incentives for that cooperation. Bechev, for example, claims that this second motive determines the regional cooperation of the Balkan states (Bechev 2005).

Another problem appeared in the last phase of the Balkan countries' accession to the EU. The EU has become burdened by internal crises that have called into question its enlargement project. Every new formal assurance by Brussels officials that enlargement (with the fulfilment of all membership criteria) remains the goal regardless of the crises brought new anxiety among the Western Balkans countries whose aim, at least formally, remains the EU membership. Critical voices began to suggest that the Western Balkans's regional economic integration may no longer be just a passing step and preparation for EU membership but that it can replace this membership (Kulo and Novikau, 2023; Đurović, 2023).

Certain Western Balkans countries insist that only the regional international cooperation aimed at EU membership can make sense. European integration was also a process of post-war recovery and, somewhat paradoxically, a matter of building a supranational community and rescuing nation-states in (Western) Europe (Milward, 1999). We should return to those facts when we talk about applying that integration model to the Western Balkans, where the questions of joining a supranational community and preserving so-called nation-states could be raised simultaneously.

The initial steps in the process of European integration after the Second World War and now in the Western Balkans have certain similarities but also numerous differences. Regional integration in the Western Balkans is seen as part of the broader framework of European unification, in which the bilateral relations of the six Western Balkan actors are considered in the broader context of European integration. Commitment and progress in achieving the goal of wider European integration can gradually increase the confidence among the six WB actors necessary for using all the results of improved trade and comprehensive economic relations.

As Nye warns, the issue of regional cooperation cannot be viewed in a vacuum; it does matter whether it is the Middle East or Scandinavia (Nye 2014). The Western Balkans is a post-conflict region where fundamental issues still need to be resolved. In addition, there is a perception among certain circles in the Western Balkans that Serbia wanted dominance in Yugoslavia and that the issue of improving mutual trade is just another way for Serbia to achieve its goals (sometimes, the same is said about Albanian national interests in the region). This is just one of the reasons why some actors insist on a process of regional cooperation in which the EU plays a key role and supervises the entire process. In addition, Serbia has not resolved its dispute with the authorities in Priština, which significantly complicates regional cooperation despite the mechanisms already implemented in their economic relations. It turned out, however, that these mechanisms and mutual trade between Belgrade and Priština are not a guarantee of peace between them (Milošević and Hrnjaz 2017). Finally, there are also very complex relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina that spill over into this issue of regional cooperation.

Regional economic integration in the Western Balkans

Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans extends beyond its borders to include the countries of Southeast Europe and other significant external actors, depending on the type and scope of cooperation. Therefore, some forms of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans involve the EU, Turkey, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US. The most notable forms of regional cooperation with a significant economic dimension are the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe

(replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008), CEFTA 2006, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan Initiative.

Unlike other continents, regional integration initiatives on European soil are dominantly economic, or they started developing that way. Due to the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, new regional tendencies through the new regionalism arrived in the Western Balkans later than in other European regions. The initial backlog was replaced by a proliferation of various projects and initiatives aimed at establishing and improving regional cooperation in the post-conflict area. Their original aim was to achieve peace and address security challenges, but they expanded their collaboration to include economic and broader social issues. That was fully in line with the concept of new regionalism as integration in multiple dimensions, unlike traditional regionalism, which was based exclusively on trade cooperation. Most of the new regional initiatives had limited effects primarily due to political instability, the unwillingness of ruling elites to make unpopular decisions related to cooperation with former rivals, and the sensitivity of regional actors to internal and external shocks.

An additional impetus to regional integration was provided by the fact that all national economies in the region have set membership in the European Union as their key political and economic goal. Thus, fulfilling the criteria for EU membership (the so-called Copenhagen criteria) became an essential part of their internal reforms and foreign policy agenda. Political and administrative conditions imply “the stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities” and the existence of rules concerning “administrative and institutional capacities to effectively apply the ‘acquis’ and the ability to fulfil the obligations of membership” (European Commission 2022a). An important economic criterion refers to the existence of a “functional market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the European Union” (European Commission 2022a). Establishing a functional market economy as a stable framework in which companies that are relatively equal competitors to their counterparts from the European Union could operate is becoming the central economic goal of regional actors. In this sense, the creation of regional economic integration represents an attempt to contribute to the economies of the Western Balkans in building their market economy through the creation of wider regional markets as a kind of pre-accession warm-up for membership in the European Union. For these reasons, it is understandable that political decision-makers accepted regional integration with European integration in mind (Delevic 2007).

The Open Balkan Initiative

Legal and institutional framework

The Mini Schengen initiative, later renamed Open Balkan, was launched by the President of Serbia, the Prime Minister of Albania, and the Prime Minister of North Macedonia. The first official step in this direction was taken at the meeting in Novi Sad on October 10, 2019, when the Joint Declaration on the Implementation of the Four Freedoms of the European Union in the Western Balkans (Declaration) was adopted. The Declaration first expresses “willingness to strengthen regional cooperation with the aim of economic growth, reduction of unemployment, fight against illegal migration and transnational organised crime... as well as to increase trade, investments, and employment in the area of the six Western Balkans”. After that, the declared aim is to “achieve a Regional Economic Area within the framework of the six Western Balkans, based on the inclusion of all and the principles of the ‘four freedoms’ of the EU: freedom of movement of goods, services, people, and capital” (Joint Declaration 2019).

Three political leaders mentioned several times the European Union’s importance for regional cooperation and integration. At the very beginning, they underlined “the importance of our common perspective of joining the EU and full commitment to mutual support, respect, and help on the European path” and that “the EU is the key driver of change in the entire region, at least after it was announced the promise of expansion” ((Joint Declaration 2019). And yet, throughout the Declaration, one can also see that regardless of the importance of joining the EU and the concrete steps taken towards that goal and the objective of improving regional cooperation, there remains a gap between the EU member states and the Western Balkans. Thus, the three leaders acknowledge in the Declaration the need for

“leaders of the Western Balkans to be more meaningfully involved in the use of the development potential of the Balkans. A more active and creative approach to the circulation of goods and capital, the movement of people and cross-border cooperation, and the integration of services and work is needed. The leaders of the region must take responsibility for shaping the region’s future... This is crucial for regional integration and encouraging the general development of the entire Western Balkans. In this sense, the clear intention expressed in the Declaration is for key political figures in the Western Balkans to take the initiative, and perhaps even a leading role, in connection with the further course of regional cooperation and integration”.

With such wording, there would barely be anything to complain about. Still, the Mini Schengen initiative came about at a moment of serious reconsideration

of the further process of European integration in the Western Balkans. Albania and North Macedonia felt their hopes regarding the EU accession process were dashed (BBC 2019) and that the process had reached a dead end. Serbia, particularly, failed to solve the knot of simultaneous EU accession, regional cooperation, and the official policy of the country regarding the status of Kosovo*. On the other hand, various ideas circulated in the EU—from the EU in multiple speeds and concentric circles (Le Mond 2022, Centar za evropske politike 2017), statements that the candidate countries cannot hope to join soon (European Commission 2014), to informal rumours that the enlargement process has been stopped until solutions are found for the internal crises of the EU.

In the described situation, the question of the true motives of the leaders of the three countries to launch and promote the Mini Schengen initiative arose. There were assessments that this is a signal of dissatisfaction directed towards the EU (e.g., Kalemaj and Čela, 2022), besides the already mentioned hidden nationalist and hegemonic ambitions of Tirana and Belgrade that should have been realised through this initiative. In addition, certain motives of Russia and lucrative motives hidden behind the non-transparency of the entire process were mentioned as the most important for starting the initiative (Đukanović and Đorđević 2020). It is never easy to get to the true motives, so in this paper, we analyse the content of the documents that were adopted as part of the initiative, their legal nature, the lack of institutionalisation, and the (alleged) economic results that have been reached based on the set objectives.

Legal nature of concluded agreements

In assessing the legal nature of the documents adopted within the OBI, we pursue the following sequence of steps: first, we determine whether the signatory parties have expressly stated their intention to create international legal obligations; after that, we analyse whether the content of those documents can help us shed light on this issue of their intention and investigate whether there are concrete obligations, with precise deadlines for their execution, as well as whether there are any mechanisms for settling the disputes; in the end, we examine whether the conditions for the entry into force of these documents have been met, as well as the relationship of these agreements to the already existing legal obligations of the contracting parties.

The agreements and memoranda of cooperation adopted within the framework of the OBI have an evident international character. It is necessary, however, to make a few preliminary remarks. First, the OBI can be criticised for its non-transparency, lacking a single place where it is possible to find all memoranda

of cooperation and agreements signed within the framework of this initiative. Even where they exist enumerated, as on the Serbian Chamber of Commerce website, it is impossible to access all the texts of the documents. Finally, it is not often clear whether some of the documents were adopted as part of the OBI or are the result of other efforts to improve relations among the three states, as well as whether the agreements were ratified in the national parliaments of the countries that initiated the Open Balkan.

Despite that, it is necessary to repeat that the name and method of adoption of the document do not determine its legal nature. Although it is common for memoranda of understanding not to have binding legal force, this is not necessarily the case, and the reverse is also true—documents bearing the name agreement do not have to be legally binding. Another condition for assessing the existence of an international treaty is the existence of the will for states to be bound by its provisions. At the same time, the will is not assessed based on their later statements regarding this issue but primarily on the content of the document, i.e., the content of its provisions, and then the context, i.e., the circumstances in which the document was adopted. This rule is generally accepted in the doctrine of international law (Schachter 1977; Villiger 2009) and the jurisprudence of international judicial institutions (International Court of Justice 1962).

States sometimes explicitly indicate in the document whether it is legally binding. Over time, certain informal rules have crystallised in practice regarding typical expressions used when states do not want the document to have a legally binding character. For example, in non-binding documents, as a rule, the term ‘will’ is used rather than ‘shall’, the term entry into the force is not used, etc (Aust 2007, 29). In addition, transitional and final provisions are usually not included in documents that do not have a binding nature, and the way to resolve disputes does not exist or is limited to consultations (Aust 2007). Also, it is more difficult to find examples of specifying things that should be done in advance and with precise deadlines in non-binding documents. The problems arise: a) when the intention of the states that adopted the document is not clearly expressed; b) there are indicators that can indicate both the mandatory and non-binding nature of the document at the same time; and c) when, after its adoption, there are different views of the states that participated in its adoption in terms of its legal character.

In any case, if we look at the content and context of the Declaration that started the Mini Schengen initiative, it seems clear that it does not have a binding character because no provisions refer to specific obligations. In addition, not all parts of that Declaration are formulated in the usual language of legal obligations. If we now summarise the conclusions reached regarding the legal nature of the documents

adopted as part of the OBI, we can classify those documents into at least three groups:

- 1) Memoranda of understanding, the content of which, as a rule, indicates that they do not have a binding character but which, nevertheless, must be analysed separately, that is, on a case-by-case basis;
- 2) Agreements, which, according to their provisions and the context in which they were adopted, have binding force but have not entered into force in all three countries (mainly because of the ratification process in North Macedonia);
- 3) A small number of agreements are binding and have entered into force in all three countries.

Finally, a few clarifications should be added regarding these conclusions. First, legal issues should be separated from the implementation of these documents. Namely, states sometimes implement non-binding documents and violate binding ones. Second, certain analyses show that the implementation of some documents has begun, although they have not officially entered into force in all states of the OBI (Centre for Economic Analyses, 2023). Finally, according to the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 18), signed but unratified agreements are not completely devoid of normative relevance because the signatory parties have the obligation not to destroy the object and purpose of the treaty if they do not express their intention not to become a party to the treaty.

Lack of institutionalisation of the Open Balkan

One of the most common criticisms regarding the OBI is its lack of institutionalisation. It has neither permanent bodies nor (judicial) bodies whose task would be to resolve disputes between parties. The initiators, however, had no intention of establishing an international organisation such as former European communities. There are various possible reasons for that. First, although institutions are important, they are expensive, and unlike most regional initiatives, this one did not have external support. Second, there is a question of how far and strategically the initiators of the Open Balkan looked in 2019 when launching this initiative. Then, perhaps most importantly, this initiative is primarily the brainchild of three people who wanted to maintain complete control over its development. Institutions are useful in various ways, including as an engine of integration, but simultaneously, as a rule, they limit power.

On the other hand, it would be incorrect to say that the OBI is some Frankenstein's monster of international or regional cooperation—an unprecedented example. Perhaps institutionalisation should be viewed as a continuum in which

the most common example of the European Communities and, later, the European Union is seen as one pole of extremely developed institutionalisation. However, not all forms of organisations fully follow that path. There are also types of organisations, i.e., MERCOSUR, which some authors call an “organisation through presidents and those who pay for that organisation” (Hummel and Lohaus 2012). Namely, these authors argue that this form of regional organisation was created to counterbalance external influence in the Latin American region through the diplomacy of the presidents and a highly centralised way of making their decisions.

The example of MERCOSUR and others shows that there is no single model of successful international organising with universal success. The lack of developed institutionalisation can lead to successful regional cooperation in certain situations, at least in the short and medium term.

However, institutionalisation is still important because of the longevity of the organisation and the legal certainty it provides to the actors. Namely, a clear legal framework and a greater degree of institutionalisation guarantee, among other things, that specific structures will continue to operate even after, for example, government changes in the member states. Without it, the survival of certain regional initiatives could last as long as the political careers of the presidents who promote them.

The Open Balkan Initiative – political and economic aspects

Among the agreements concluded within the framework of “Mini Schengen” and the OBI, the most important ones are the Agreement on conditions for free access to the labour market in the Western Balkans, the Agreement on the interconnection of schemes for electronic identification of the citizens of the Western Balkans, the Agreement on cooperation in the field of veterinary, food and feed safety and phytosanitary in the Western Balkans, the Agreement on cooperation in the Western Balkans in the field of mutual recognition of diplomas and scientific grades issued by higher education institutions and other authorised institutions, and the Agreement on mechanisms for ensuring the unhindered supply of basic foodstuffs in the Open Balkan. All three members of this regional initiative concluded all these agreements. In addition, there are significant agreements (memoranda) on cooperation and agreements concluded by two or three members of the initiative. The agreement that contributes the most to establishing a single market refers to the conditions for free access to the labour market in the contracting parties. Its main goal is to enable free movement, residence, and access to the labour market for citizens of all three countries in their territories, i.e., employment under the same conditions that apply to the local

population (PKS 2021). The three countries that signed this agreement aim to integrate the free movement of labour into their economic relations.

Certain indicators, such as a 50% reduction in the time required for import and export procedures for food products between the contracting parties, a 30-80% decrease in taxes and various fees (according to research by the American Chamber of Commerce), the establishment of a green corridor for the transport of food products, and the reduction of waiting times at border crossings due to dedicated lanes, support the OBI. However, the question remains whether the observed improvement in trade relations can be unequivocally linked to the effects of concluded agreements within the OBI (Nedeljnik, 2023; Predsednik Srbije, 2022).

Despite being promoted as a project aiming for deeper economic and political cooperation in a conflict-ridden region based on the principles of the European Union, the OBI regional initiative has been surrounded by numerous controversies since its beginning. Opponents criticise it for the lack of clear goals, the dominant influence of Serbia, the promotion of the “Serbian world”, and the unnecessary duplication of existing forms of regional cooperation (Joseph 2022; Mujanovic 2021). On the other hand, the proponents of this initiative believe that the leaders of some of the regional economies have finally become aware that the process of enlargement of the European Union has essentially stopped and that their proactive action and the establishment of “local ownership” over the process of regional integration are necessary to achieve any significant goals (Haddad and Marusic, 2021). The European Commission formally states that the OBI can positively impact the establishment of the Western Balkans’ Common Regional Market as an initiative promoted by the EU if it is accessible to all actors in the region and complies with the Union’s rules (European Commission 2022b).

Serbia views the Open Balkan initiative as a tool to fulfil its economic and geopolitical interests. The main economic goals are to attract more foreign direct investments in the integrated Western Balkan region and gain access to partner markets (RTV 2022). That is advantageous for Serbia, as it is the largest economy in the region (Karabeg, 2022).

The OBI can act as a mechanism to help balance Serbia’s European integration if there are significant delays or issues with joining the European Union. It can also aid in improving relations between Serbia and Albania, which have historically been tense due to the Kosovo* issue. In a larger context, improving relations between these two countries could indirectly contribute to fostering better relationships in the region (Kosovo Online 2024). Realising the full potential of the OBI would contribute to fulfilling the majority of economic or political objectives for achieving regional cooperation. However, it seems that the most important result, for now,

is the establishment of the single labour market of the Open Balkan, which began to function on March 5, 2024.

The OBI is to be a single market as it aims to be, at least according to the statements of its initiators. It does not meet the criteria for this form of economic integration, and it is difficult to imagine that the three founding countries will agree on establishing a customs union as a previous level of economic integration. Regional economic integration can take various incomplete forms, and its actual impact on member countries can only be fully understood once the agreements underpinning it are completely implemented. This is currently not the case with the OBI.

The numerous doubts regarding this regional initiative are certainly warmed up by the interpretations of the different approaches that significant external actors, the US and the European Union (primarily, Germany), have towards it. While American representatives look at this project with approval, German officials are sceptical of its goals and past results (Bonomi and Nechev 2022). In any case, the small number and limited scope of the agreements concluded so far within this initiative do not justify the reasons for the additional tensions that have arisen on this occasion in the region and among external stakeholders.

Conclusion

Regional economic integration can be a useful method for fulfilling national interests driven by economic or geopolitical motives.

Serbia officially views the Open Balkan Initiative (OBI) as an opportunity to promote economic cooperation in the region and enhance Serbia's economic standing. The initiative's focus on the four freedoms of the European Union and its proclaimed aim of accelerating the region's European path indicate that it is not intended as an alternative to European integration. However, there is an open question of how the Open Balkan Initiative fits into the Europeanization process. Additionally, many academic sources discussing the regionalisation process and the formation of a common market inspired by the EU model suggest the eventual establishment of regional institutions, which has not yet occurred in the case of the OBI.

This form of regional cooperation emphasises political motives for its emergence. The OBI was not a response to economic interdependence between regional actors nor a reaction to social demands. The leaders of the region's countries utilised their political will and capabilities to establish a tangible form of regional cooperation, indicating its predominantly political nature during its

inception. The predominant way of its functioning is evidenced by the acceptance of interpresidentialism, with all its advantages and disadvantages.

All these circumstances require the careful management of regional politics in the Western Balkans. The three political leaders of Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia should not undermine the proclaimed goals of inclusive regional cooperation with their statements and actions. Their domestically orientated statements should aim at building trust in the region, not feeding suspicions of an (alleged) attempt to achieve hegemony and national interests by other means.

In other words, work on improving regional cooperation and economic integration within the Western Balkans without a clear perspective of EU membership would imply a careful, long-term, and significant effort to build trust between the regional actors. Even under perfect conditions, it would be necessary to secure the support of the great powers. It is hard to conceive such a process without their support since past events have demonstrated that they have the means to thwart such endeavours or, if they so choose, make them far more difficult.

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Miloš HRNJAZ, Aleksandar MILOŠEVIĆ

**SPROVOĐENJE NACIONALNOG INTERESA SRBIJE KROZ MEĐUPREZIDENCIJALIZAM
INICIJATIVE OTVORENI BALKAN**

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad pokušava da odgovori na pitanje u kakvom su odnosu percipirani nacionalni interesi Srbije i inicijative Otvoreni Balkan. Rad počinje teorijskim okvirom i objašnjenjem koncepata nacionalnih interesa i regionalnih integracija Zapadnog Balkana. Zatim se predstavlja kratka istorija pomenutih integracija i njihovim odnosom sa procesom pristupanja balkanskih država Evropskoj uniji. Centralni deo rada je usredsređen na ekonomske, institucionalne i međunarodnopravne aspekte inicijative Otvoreni Balkan i kako percipirani nacionalni interesi Srbije određuju ove aspekte. Osnovni zaključci su da su politički lideri Srbije, Albanije i Severne Makedonije birali međuprezidencijalni model regionalnih integracija, da su svesno izbegli institucionalizaciju Otvorenog Balkana, kao i da su gotovo isključivo koristili neobavezujuće instrumente međunarodnog prava. Dodatno, ekonomski dometi inicijative su do sada bili ograničeni.

Ključne reči: regionalne integracije, Zapadni Balkan, inicijativa Otvoreni Balkan, međunarodno pravo, Evropska unija, nacionalni interesi.

Are Ambassadors Creators or just Executors of the National Interests? George Frost Kennan and the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade

Saša MIŠIĆ¹, Dragan ŽIVOJINOVIĆ²

Abstract: George Frost Kennan was one of the most famous foreign policy thinkers and strategists in the Cold War period. However, in terms of practical achievements, he was far less successful. First, Kennan's ambassadorship in Moscow (1952) was cancelled after only four and a half months because Stalin declared him *persona non grata*. Likewise, as an ambassador in Yugoslavia (1961–1963), he was not of better fortune; he resigned before the end of his mandate. The research question in this article is the following: Was George Frost Kennan a creator or just an executor of American national interests in Yugoslavia during his term as ambassador? Did he make a difference in relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, or was he just a bureaucrat implementing the decisions of his superiors? Our answer and our central thesis is that Kennan came to Yugoslavia believing that he would make a difference, and the Yugoslavs accepted him with the same belief. However, after Tito's speech at the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, in the next few months, Kennan was left high and dry by his government as well as by his Yugoslav hosts. The article consists of two parts: the first part will describe Kennan's interpretation of the concept of the National Interest; the second part will focus on Kennan's ambassadorship in Yugoslavia before and after the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade.

Keywords: national interest, ambassadors, foreign policy, diplomacy, United States, Yugoslavia, US foreign policy, Josip Broz Tito, Non-Aligned Movement.

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Introduction

Former Yugoslavia was an important country for the United States during the Cold War. This is evident because some key US Cold War foreign and security policy figures served in Yugoslavia. For instance, Brent Scowcroft, who later became the national security advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, served as an assistant air attaché in Yugoslavia from 1959 to 1961. Lawrence Larry Eagleburger, the only career diplomat to become US Secretary of State in 1992, started his diplomatic career in the economic sector of the Belgrade Embassy from 1961 to 1965 and served as ambassador from 1977 to 1981. However, the most famous name, at least at the time when he was ambassador in Yugoslavia from 1961 to 1963, was George Frost Kennan, an architect of the American containment doctrine and the author of the well-known “Long Telegram” and “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, documents in the foundation of the American Cold War strategy towards the Soviet Union.

Kennan’s role in Yugoslavia, especially before and after the pivotal 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, is particularly worth studying, even though there are many important works about this period (Močnik 2008, Bisenić 2011, Bogetić 2012a, Bogetić 2012b). Despite his significant influence on American foreign policy, Kennan never rose above the position of director of policy planning at the State Department in Washington. Nonetheless, his strategic thinking has left an enduring impact on 20th-century US foreign and security policy. Given the current state of American-Russian relations, his insights will likely remain relevant in the 21st century.

We believe it is worth studying Kennan’s real role in Yugoslavia, especially before and after the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade. This was a pivotal moment, not just in the relations between the two countries but also in the relations between Kennan and Yugoslavia, as well as between Kennan and the American government. After eight years outside the government, President Kennedy offered Kennan the position of ambassador to either Poland or Yugoslavia two days after his inauguration in 1961. Kennan chose Yugoslavia, uniquely positioned in European and global Cold War architecture. Despite his name going beyond his actual achievements, especially in practical terms, Kennan was an underachiever in practical foreign policy success. According to Kissinger, “George Kennan’s thought suffused American foreign policy on both sides of the intellectual and ideological dividing lines for nearly half a century. Yet, the highest position he ever held was that of ambassador to Moscow for five months in 1952 and to Yugoslavia for two years in the early 1960s. In Washington, he never rose above director of policy planning at the State Department, a position he occupied

from 1947 to 1950” (Kissinger 2011). Nonetheless, as a strategic thinker, his place in the history of 20th-century US Foreign and Security policy is firm, and his insights will continue to be important in the 21st century, especially considering the current state of American-Russian relations.

We have divided our article into two parts to address our research questions. The first part will describe Kennan’s interpretation of the concept of the National Interest, while the second part will focus on Kennan’s ambassadorship in Yugoslavia before and after the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade.

George Frost Kennan’s Understanding of the Concept of the National Interest

It is January 1947, and the best year of his professional life has just begun. George Frost Kennan is a Foreign Service officer, but he is currently on duty at the National War College, where he has been working as a deputy commandant and lecturer since its founding earlier. The “Long Telegram” document is already widely read, and Kennan is a figure of rising importance in the foreign policy establishment. Kennan’s star is set to shine even brighter with the newly promoted Secretary of State, General George Catlett Marshall, and his plans to reorganise the State Department to “achieve the policy coordination that had been missing during the war and, in his view, during the first year and half of peace” (Gaddis 2011, 252-253). Marshall, through his undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, offered Kennan a prominent position in this new organisation (Gaddis 2011, 253). On the last day of the month, in a letter to Acheson, Kennan gave an overview of the role of the new policy planning unit in the State Department. According to Milne, “What is important,” wrote Kennan, “is that somewhere in the government there should be an honest, detached, and authoritative assessment of what constitutes national interest in foreign affairs and of how the national interest might be best promoted” (Milne 2015, 292). According to Kennan, the main issue with US foreign policy was that it had been mainly reactive and not proactive, and that such a new unit “would redress this problem in being afforded the space and time to think proactively” (Milne 2015, 292). In the letter, he also identified the two main objectives of US foreign policy. Namely, Kennan wrote that those objectives are: 1) “to assure to the people of the United States physical security and freedom to pursue in their own way the solution of the problems of their national life”; and 2) “to bring into existence that pattern of international relationships that will permit the people of the United States to derive maximum benefit from the experiences and

achievements of other peoples and to make the maximum contribution to human progress anywhere” (Milne 2015, 293). Here, we can acknowledge the two elements of the national interest according to Hans Morgenthau’s well-known interpretation of this term. The first element is constant and relates to the national security of the state, while the second element is more “variable” and deals with the values and interests of a broader community (Morgenthau 1952, 972; Živojinović 2013, 252-256).

His understanding of national interests was typical of the realist theories of International Relations. Even though he was not a theoretician of International Relations, Kennan was of great help in cementing the predominance of that theory in those early Cold War years. His understanding of the national interest was more practical than theoretical. He saw American founding fathers, especially former US Secretary of State during President James Monroe’s administration and later President (1825-1829), John Quincy Adams, as role models and protagonists of the national interests, saying that “not only did he place the national interest at the centre of his foreign policies, but he served as the first US minister to Russia (1809–14)” (Congdon 2022, 33). As founding director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, he engaged as a consultant many important figures, such as professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago, Hans Morgenthau, protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Bedell Smith, former US ambassador to Moscow, and even J. Robert Oppenheimer, father of the atomic bomb and the director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (Gaddis 2011, 360).

Kennan’s understanding of the American national interest was made clear in a series of lectures and papers he delivered across the US in 1946. However, he explicitly outlined it only after retiring from his Foreign Service officer career. This was done in two ways: first, through a series of six Walgreen Foundation lectures at the University of Chicago in the spring of 1951, and second, through a book resulting from those lectures. The book, “American Diplomacy 1900-1950,” was published in 1951 (Kennan 2012).

According to Gaddis, in 1951, “Hans Morgenthau had arranged for Kennan to deliver a second set of lectures in April at the University of Chicago, under the sponsorship of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. The topic would be US foreign relations during the first half of the twentieth century” (Gaddis 2011, p. 420). Martin Leffler calls these lectures “the most famous series of lectures ever delivered on American diplomacy” (Leffler 2006, 8). In those six lectures (especially the sixth one), Kennan made national interest the main guiding principle of US foreign policy. As he wrote in the second volume of his Memoirs, he was disappointed that there is a mess in the American government about the

“concepts and principles in the formulation of US Foreign Policy” (Kennan 1972, 70). He was especially bewildered “by the contrast between the lucid and realistic thinking of early American statesmen of the Federalist period and the cloudy bombast of their successors of later decades” (Kennan 1972, 71). From this, it is understandable that there is one strong tradition in US foreign policy, which was “inherited from the statesmen of the period from the Civil War to World War II, and how much of this equipment was utopian in its expectations, legalistic in its concept of methodology, moralistic in the demands it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude it imputed to ourselves” (Kennan 1972, 71). For example, “the inordinate preoccupation with arbitration treaties, the efforts towards world disarmament, the attempt to outlaw war by the simple verbiage of the Kellogg Pact, and illusions about the possibilities of achieving a peaceful world through international organisation and multilateral diplomacy, as illustrated in the hopes addressed to the League of Nations and the United Nations” (Kennan 1972, 71). Simply put, we must always consider the realities of power because power is crucial in international relations, as “Government always implies and involves power” (Congdon 2022, 52).

As a result of those lectures, he published a book about American diplomacy (Kennan 1952; 2012). The book had eight parts; the first six were his six lectures given at the University of Chicago, and the last two were his foreign affairs articles, the famous “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” from July 1947 and “America and the Russian Future” from April 1951 (Kennan 1952; 2012). The book was a success and undoubtedly perfectly timed, considering the Korean War and the full-scale Cold War, especially after the Hydrogen Bomb test in 1952. The main argument of the book is that power matters and that the United States should abandon its legalistic and utopian approach to International Affairs.

We will illustrate his understanding of national interest in the episode of his policy paper Policy Planning Staff (PPS) analysis no. 35 titled “The Attitude of the Government towards Events in Yugoslavia” (FRUS 1948), which Kennan authored to help Yugoslavia in the case of the Tito-Stalin split in June 1948. John Lewis Gaddis, his official biographer, finds this paper “the most immediately effective policy paper he ever produced” (Gaddis 2011, 322). Slightly more than four pages long, the paper was brief (opposite to Kennan standards), and it became the official policy of the United States in just a few days (Gaddis 2011, 323). He recognised this event as a very important one and concluded that “the possibility of deflection from Moscow, which has heretofore been unthinkable for foreign communist leaders, will from now on be present in one form or another in the mind of every one of them” (Gaddis 2011, 322). He rationally and coldly recommended that the Yugoslav regime was their internal matter and that such things could not “prevent a normal

diplomatic and economic relationship” (Gaddis 2011, 322). In other words, to paraphrase Thucydides, “identity of interest is the surest guarantee for both states and individuals” (Morrison 1994, 527). What is especially important is that Gaddis sees some deeper meaning in this PPS/35 policy paper. Namely, he thinks “that PPS/35 set forth several propositions that, in varying ways at various times, would guide American Foreign Policy through the rest of the Cold War. One was that communism need not be monolithic... a second was that the United States should therefore cooperate with some communists to contain others... a third was that the domestic character of a government was less important than its international behaviour” (Gaddis 2011, 323). Gaddis holds that Kennan made explicit what US foreign policy was implicitly doing. In 1979, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ronald Reagan’s top foreign policy advisor, introduced the concept of “friendly autocracies,” updating George Kennan’s ideas from the late 1970s and early 1980s (Kirkpatrick 1979). This suggests that while values are important, common interests and the correlation of interests carry more weight in international relations.

George Frost Kennan and the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade

Kennan visited Yugoslavia less than a year before taking up his post as ambassador to Belgrade. This was in July 1960, at the insistence of the then-Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, Marko Nikezić. The official reason was a lecture he was supposed to give at the *Institute of International Politics and Economics* in Belgrade, but the Yugoslavs also arranged for him to meet and talk with many state officials, including a meeting with the president of the country, Josip Broz Tito. He spent part of his visit on vacation in Istria (AJ,1). The Yugoslavs viewed Kennan as a well-known diplomat, an expert on international politics, particularly in relations with the USSR, a highly regarded expert politician, and the author of the “containment policy” (AJ,1). During the visit, they wanted to give him a personal understanding of their country’s internal politics and ensure that his perspective on Yugoslavia received international attention. However, they did not achieve wider publicity for his visit due to Kennan’s efforts to keep the visit and discussions private.

One of the motives for the Yugoslavs to devote considerable attention to Kennan’s stay in Yugoslavia during the summer of 1960 was the belief that he might once again have a “stronger influence” on American foreign policy in the event of a victory by the Democratic candidate in the presidential election, which

was to be held in November of the same year (AJ,1). It turned out that they were right. When Democratic Party representative John F. Kennedy won the presidential election, one of his first foreign policy moves was to nominate Kennan as ambassador to Belgrade.

The news of Kennan's nomination was first announced by the *New York Times* in an editorial on January 25, stating that he was going to "one of the most sensitive centres of developing conflict within the contemporary communist world" (*New York Times* 1961.a). The editorial was published a day before the then-ambassador to Yugoslavia, Karl Rankin, informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Koča Popović, about the nomination. The State Department admitted to Yugoslav diplomats in Washington that the editorial had been inspired by them and stated that Kennan's appointment as ambassador to Belgrade "signifies a very good perspective for the further development of bilateral relations" (DAMSP,1). In Washington, Kennan was seen as an excellent combination of an experienced diplomat and an expert on the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, on the one hand, and a respected scholar in the field of foreign policy, on the other. They believed that, thanks to his reputation, he would have much closer and more frequent contact with the Yugoslav leadership and that his words would be carefully attended to in both Belgrade and Washington. Finally, his nomination was seen as a clear sign that the new Kennedy administration wanted to place more importance on non-aligned countries (DAMSP,1). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Yugoslavs approved Kennan's appointment just a few days after the US embassy in Belgrade officially requested that on January 26, 1961. (DAMSP,2). Koča Popović expressed his approval of Kennedy's decision to Secretary of State Dean Rusk during their first meeting in Washington in mid-March (DAMSP,3). Yugoslav government officials wanted Kennan in Belgrade as soon as possible, so Ambassador Nikezić was assigned to expedite his arrival for "general interests". However, due to prior commitments, Kennan only assumed his position in May (DAMSP,4).

Kennan enthusiastically accepted the nomination for ambassador to Belgrade for several reasons. In hindsight, he knew that his views on the Cold War did not align with those of the foreign policy establishment. Consequently, he realised he would not have advisory influence in shaping foreign policy. Instead, he would have to accept and implement the foreign policy formulated by Washington. However, he believed that the ambassadorial position in Yugoslavia would allow him to take a different approach due to the country's unique position and policies. Ultimately, he thought it would help improve the impression he left during his previous ambassadorship in the Soviet Union (Kennan 1972, 268-269).

As expected, he was welcomed in Belgrade in a friendly manner. As he testified, the mid- and lower-level Yugoslav state officials were “generally approachable, competent, and courteous, (...) always willing not only to listen but also to respond” (Kennan 1972, 275; Bisenić 2011, 55). However, he noticed that besides being good company—“cheerful, relaxed, helpful”—they also possessed characteristics typical of all communists, such as party discipline and a certain degree of mistrust towards foreigners. Kennan also had a positive opinion of the state leadership headed by Tito. He believed that the Yugoslav president had personal sympathies for him. However, as a professional diplomat, he was aware that “personal likes and dislikes have very little to do with the serious aspects of diplomacy” (Kennan 1972, 278; Bisenić 2011, 57).

Kennan was a welcome interlocutor for Yugoslav state officials, as can be concluded from the fact that he met with Tito four times in the first two and a half months after arriving in Yugoslavia. The first meeting was in May to present his credentials (AJ,2), followed by a meeting on June 8 to inform the Yugoslav president about the Vienna meeting and talks between Kennedy and Khrushchev (AJ,3). They had another meeting in mid-July on the Brijuni Islands, where they discussed international and bilateral issues (A,4), and finally, on July 30, he accompanied Under Secretary of State Chester B. Bowles during their meeting on the Brijuni Islands (AJ,5). It gave the impression that Tito’s doors were always open to him. In addition to Tito, Kennan frequently met with Secretary of State Koča Popović and many other state officials.

In meetings, he did not hide his enthusiasm about taking on the role of ambassador to Yugoslavia. He particularly enjoyed the fact that he could engage in “lively” ideological discussions with his interlocutors, which was not the case when he was in the USSR. He had an informal meeting with Secretary of State Koča Popović back in mid-March in New York, and their first official conversation took place on May 10. On both occasions, Kennan expressed his interest in Yugoslavia and its social and economic development (DAMSP,5; AJ,6). Popović assured him that he would have opportunities to talk not only with representatives of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP), but also with all other political leaders of the country. Both parties agreed that the two states’ policies must be deeply understood and positions should be taken even if they differ (AJ,6). Kennan also hoped that meetings would occur in official and unofficial settings, which, in the case of Koča Popović, was often the case. It was clear that both of them enjoyed long discussions that not only focused on current political events but also took on the nature of extended philosophical and historical debates. For example, their conversation on the Brijuni Islands on July 17 ended with Kennan saying they had “philosophised a little again,” to which

Popović responded that he thought it was “both useful and necessary” (A,4). Kennan concluded that he was deeply convinced of this and missed such conversations when he was the ambassador to the Soviet Union (AJ,4). It was, it seems, a completely different relationship between the Yugoslav head of diplomacy and the American ambassador compared to Popović’s relationship with Kennan’s predecessor, Rankin, whose arguments he often described as “very shallow” and “journalistic-barroom” (DAMSP,6). After their March conversation, Popović already assessed that Kennan belonged to the “most progressive” part of the new administration (DAMSP,7) and concluded that Kennan’s initial engagement was “on an incomparably higher level” compared to his predecessors as ambassadors (DAMSP,5).

Kennan was also warmly welcomed by his diplomatic staff in Yugoslavia, who believed that his arrival signified “raising the status of the embassy, which means making business with Washington easier” (DAMSP,8) and that it “opened better prospects” for his colleagues (DAMSP,9). Almost all American diplomatic officials at the Embassy and consulates, and those who came to Yugoslavia after him, held great respect and were impressed by Kennan’s personality. Some of them requested from the State Department to go to Belgrade precisely because they were impressed by his qualities. Such was the case with Eric Kocher, later Kennan’s deputy at the Embassy, who mentioned that he “purposely” tried to get to Belgrade to learn what Kennan was like as an ambassador and that he was particularly impressed by the way he wrote his diplomatic reports (ADST, Eric Kocher). Soon, however, the Embassy staff began to divide into those who supported his views and those who openly or privately criticised his policy towards Yugoslavia (ADST, William J. Dyess). Later, in their recollections of the time spent in Yugoslavia while Kennan was ambassador, most would claim that he was a wonderful person, an outstanding intellectual and writer, but a weak and ineffective ambassador (ADST, Yugoslavia). The main cited reason for his ineffectiveness was his emotional approach to problems and people. This led to his diplomatic tenure in Belgrade ending prematurely and unsuccessfully. Shortly after his appointment, events confirmed that his colleagues’ concerns were justified. The first of these events occurred in the first days of September and was related to the First Non-Aligned Movement Conference held in Belgrade.

The Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was held from September 1 to 6, 1961 (Bogetić and Dimić 2013).³ It was a time of heightened international

³ IIFE issued a thematic proceeding dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Belgrade Conference. See: *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement, 2021*, edited by Duško Dimitrijević and Jovan Čavoški. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.

tensions dominated by the opposing views of the two superpowers regarding Germany and Berlin, as well as the issue of resuming nuclear testing. Therefore, both the US and the USSR placed great significance on the positions that the countries gathered in the Yugoslav capital would take on these issues.

The Americans paid close attention to the Conference. Although officially maintaining a non-interference stance, they closely monitored the preparations and analysed the attitudes of individual countries towards this event. Kennan played a significant role, being informed about the preparations for the Conference through his discussions with Yugoslav officials, keeping Washington in the loop from the outset (Bisenić 2011, 76-114). The American ambassador believed that most participating states would take strong anti-Western and anti-American positions, but some countries would advocate neutral stances. He placed Yugoslavia in the latter group and expected the host of the Conference to align itself with the moderate states (Močnik 2008, 27-29). By early June, Kennan had already discussed with Koča Popović the dilemma of categorising future conference participants into anti-Western and “truly and consistently” non-aligned countries, receiving assurances that Yugoslavia would “strive for conference results contributing to reduced tensions” (DAMSP,10). Kennan also obtained assurances from Tito that Yugoslavia’s approach at the Conference would not be anti-American (Bisenić 2011, 76). Therefore, it is not surprising that the day before the Conference began, in another meeting with Popović, Kennan praised the organisation of the event, admiring both the organisational-technical preparations and the calm approach with which Belgrade approached the Conference (DAMSP,11).

Due to the aforementioned, the pro-Soviet speech delivered by Yugoslav President Tito on September 3 came as a real shock to the American ambassador. His reaction was very strong, and in the report sent to Washington, he stated that he was “deeply disappointed” by Tito’s speech (FRUS,96; Bisenić 2011, 129). Feelings of “surprise”, “disappointment”, and even “almost dismay” were shared by all State Department officials with whom Yugoslav diplomats spoke after the Conference (AJ,7). The Yugoslavs were criticised for their statements in private conversations with American diplomats in Belgrade being more moderate compared to Tito’s pro-Soviet speech. They also indicated that the consequence would be a change in US policy towards Yugoslavia (AJ,7). There was a negative mood in the American public as well, as many journalists from the US who were present at the Conference emphasised in their reports that the Yugoslav president supported the Soviet Union in almost every issue. The Yugoslavs believed that the US Embassy influenced the reporting in Belgrade and that journalists were simply relaying Kennan’s assessments of the events. This led to press coverage

shifting into a real anti-Yugoslav campaign (for more on Yugoslav-American relations after the Belgrade Conference, compare Bogetić 2012b, 41-52).

Kennan had the opportunity to discuss everything with Koča Popović on September 13 (DAMSP,12). He expressed his disappointment and concerns over Tito's positions at the Conference. Kennan stated that he had expected Yugoslavia to "care more about maintaining a balance between the two blocs" and to pay more attention to American views on world events. However, after Tito's speech, he "faced 'political realities'" (DAMSP,12). Although he tried not to frame his remarks as pressure on Belgrade, it was clear that a change in US policy towards Yugoslavia was imminent, especially in the economic sense. During the conversation, Kennan emphasised that his remarks were not born out of "anger" but "sadness", that he "loves and respects" the Yugoslav people, its leaders, and Koča Popović personally, despite their disagreements on many issues, and that he expressed these views as his own opinion. After the conversation, Popović concluded that Kennan was personally "excited and affected" and it was evident that he had "already built a whole system of distrust" towards Yugoslavia's policy (DAMSP, 12).

On the same day he spoke with Popović, Kennan received a telegram from the Secretary of State, Rusk (Močnik 2008, 33). It contained an *aide-memoire* about the attitude of the US government towards the Yugoslav posture at the Conference, which he was supposed to deliver to the Yugoslavs (text of aide-memoire see in AJ,8; see also Močnik 2008, 33-35; Bogetić 2012b, 45-46; Bisenić 2011, 147-149). Although it contained everything Kennan had previously communicated to Popović, it was much more sharply worded. That is why, when handing over this document to Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Leo Mates on September 15, it seems the ambassador "dramatically" emphasised that he did not expect to take such a step but also that the *aide-memoire* was put "in the same sense" as was his discussion with Popović (DAMSP,13). During the conversation, according to Mates' testimony, Kennan "began rather confusedly to express his hope that political misunderstandings ... would not affect personal relationships, courteous treatment, and cordiality towards official representatives and other citizens of the other side" (DAMSP,13). Mates reassured him that it would not affect personal relationships to "dispel" Kennan's "dark thoughts and stiffness". However hard he tried to maintain a friendly tone during the conversation, Mates failed to convince Kennan that the emerging crisis would not bring about a change "in the treatment of him as an ambassador, his associates, and the Americans in general" (DAMSP,13). Therefore, he concluded that Kennan "was strongly influenced by his experiences in the Soviet Union and the Stalinist period and was projecting them onto our country" (DAMSP,13).

After a few days, Mates and Kennan met again (AJ,9). This time, Mates handed over the Yugoslav *aide-memoire* in response to the previously submitted American document. In the *aide-memoire*, which Tito adjusted to soften some expressions, the American assessment of Yugoslavia's role at the recently held Non-Aligned Conference was highlighted as unacceptable. Particularly noted was that the US government, in its document, "cast doubt on" Yugoslavia's foreign policy orientation, especially its non-alignment stance (see text of the *aide-memoire* in AJ,10). Mates also emphasised that Belgrade was dissatisfied with the sharpness of certain expressions that could be seen as offensive. According to Mates, during the conversation, Kennan "adopted a defensive stance", justifying the sharpness of the American *aide-memoire* by explaining that his government and the State Department had prepared the document "under the pressure of a tense global situation, overloaded and rather hastily" (AJ,9). The ambassador refuted the claim that the US harboured any doubts about Yugoslavia's non-alignment and the independence of its foreign policy. Unlike the previous conversation, Kennan sought to maintain a friendly tone and spoke optimistically about the future of bilateral relations (AJ,9). On the other hand, in a report to his superiors in Washington, he called for official polemics with the Yugoslavs to cease and for the matter to be resolved through informal discussions, noting that he had moderated certain expressions to avoid irritating the Yugoslavs (FRUS,98).

Regardless of the friendly tone of the conversation with the Yugoslavs and the effort to calm the controversy, Kennan remained at the centre of the Yugoslav-American dispute. Moreover, the discussion increasingly focused on his personality. More and more voices began to reach the Yugoslavs that the ambassador was "personally affected by Yugoslavia's stance at the Belgrade Conference" and that, as a result, he was sending "very negative reports" to Washington, prompting discussions about potentially cancelling American economic aid to Belgrade (DAMSP,14). This discussion was already widespread among members of Congress who were orientated against Yugoslavia, and all of this had an impact on the negative coverage in the American press (Bogetić, 2012b, 47-48). On September 18, the Kennedy administration indeed took an economic measure: it suspended the issuance of export licenses to Yugoslavia until further notice (FRUS,45).

The Kennedy administration's reconsideration of further economic aid to Yugoslavia was the most direct consequence of Tito's pro-Soviet speech on September 3. Kennan, however, advocated for modifying existing economic relations even before the September events. In the early discussions in Belgrade, he represented positions that led the Yugoslavs to think the ambassador was "out

of touch” on economic matters and that his views could lead to difficulties in future cooperation (DAMSP,15). After several weeks in Yugoslavia, Kennan scrutinised all aspects of economic cooperation and began formulating a new policy, which he communicated to the State Department in mid-July (FRUS,97). Although he did not oppose Yugoslavia’s plans for long-term financing of investment construction, he believed that not all demands should be met and that they should be time-limited. He argued for a review, modification, and gradual reduction of forms of non-reimbursed US aid through the technical assistance program, support for US charitable organisation programmes, and the agreement on agricultural surplus delivery. He justified this view by stating that Yugoslavia was capable of ensuring its economic development without American assistance. With the crisis erupting in early September, he further sharpened his existing positions with proposals to immediately terminate certain types of aid, such as technical aid, while further reviewing and limiting others. He justified this based on Yugoslavia’s pro-Soviet positions presented at the Non-Aligned Conference (FRUS,97).

The Yugoslavs learned about Kennan’s views already in August. The “Kennan line” advocating for more restrictive measures in the policy of economic aid intended for Yugoslavia led state officials in Belgrade to blame the American embassy and the ambassador personally for the deterioration of bilateral relations after the Conference. Belgrade denied that it was a serious disruption of relations and considered it merely “a storm in a teacup” caused by Kennan’s emotional reaction and his anger towards the Yugoslavs (FRUS,99). Kennan rejected such conclusions, considering that the change in American policy towards Yugoslavia was not the result of his actions, but rather the essential need to reassess the relations between the two countries and establish them on different, more realistic foundations. He added that “no US ambassador who had the task of bringing this realisation home to the Yugoslavs could or should expect to be universally popular here, and he would not be doing his duty if he was” (FRUS,100; Močnik 2008, 39; Bisenić 2011, 155-156).

For these stated views, the ambassador had the support of the State Department and the White House at the time. However, things began to change in October. The reason for this should be researched in terms of the changed climate in Yugoslav-American relations. By the end of September, Koča Popović was in the US for the session of the UN General Assembly. In this forum, he delivered a much more critical speech about the Soviet Union than Tito’s position at the Belgrade Conference. Referring to the Soviet nuclear tests, he called this act “an ominous undertaking”, which received a positive response in the leading American press (Washington Post 1961; Love, 1961). On the sidelines of the session, he met with Dean Rusk, with

whom he had an “outspoken but friendly” conversation about bilateral problems (FRUS,100). Popović’s speech and the conversation with Rusk represented the beginning of reducing tensions between the two countries. Although Rusk supported Kennan’s arguments in the conversation with Popović (FRUS,100), the positions of the State Department and the ambassador will soon diverge.

Two weeks after the Popović-Rusk meeting, developments in Yugoslav-American relations accelerated. In an attempt to clarify matters, the Yugoslavs summoned Kennan for a discussion. The Vice President of the Federal Executive Council, Mijalko Todorović, was tasked with presenting Belgrade’s official stance (DAMSP,16). Todorović criticised the US policy towards Yugoslavia, accusing it of undermining relations. He warned the ambassador that if relations, especially economic ones, continued to deteriorate, Yugoslavia would be compelled to inform the public about it. In response to Todorović’s remarks, Kennan stated that the adverse American reaction stemmed not only from Tito’s speech at the Conference but also from a monthslong “growing feeling” that Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was not the policy of a non-engaged country but that it was “identical to the Soviet one on the most important issues of today” (DAMSP,16). He stated that he had hoped that the Yugoslav leadership would have a better understanding of the Kennedy administration, but those expectations deceived him. Finally, he stressed that he could not promise that the entire situation would not have negative consequences for the two countries’ economic relations and added that he believed that certain economic arrangements were ripe for modification even before he arrived in Belgrade. He would be compelled to advocate for certain changes even if the relations were not disrupted (DAMSP,16).

Although Kennan highlighted that the emerging crisis was not a result of the embassy’s reporting “as voices in Belgrade suggest”, the Yugoslavs believed he had come to Belgrade with “great pretensions and hopes” that he would be able to change Belgrade’s policy, experiencing failure and personal disappointment in that regard (DAMSP,17). The Yugoslavs concluded that he brought “his negative subjective moment” into bilateral relations, so they intended to shift the “focus of activity” to their embassy in Washington and Ambassador Nikezić in future contacts with officials in Washington (DAMSP,17). On the other hand, Kennan informed his superiors in Washington about his conversation with Todorović and sent them a proposal for possible measures to get out of the crisis (FRUS,104). He sent a letter a few days earlier in which he opposed the suspension of export licenses and normal economic relations but maintained his position on economic aid (Močnik 2008, 43). After that, he went on vacation to Italy.

Meanwhile, official Washington was preparing to untangle the complicated relationship between the two countries. The strong anti-Yugoslav sentiment in the

American public forced President Kennedy to act. He intended to solve the most pressing problem related to the suspension of export licenses, an economic measure that stirred up the Yugoslavs. Kennedy first stated at a press conference on October 11 that the US would not use economic aid to coerce countries to align their foreign policy with the US (JFK, NC17). Two days later, this issue was on the agenda of the National Security Council (NSC) meeting. In preparation for the meeting, the State Department prepared a briefing paper for Kennedy arguing for the continuation of the previous policy of support for Yugoslavia, emphasising that it is vital for American national interests “that Yugoslavia remain independent, that it continues to present to the satellite states the magnetic picture of a successful alternative to bloc membership under Soviet domination, and that it continues to be a disruptive element in the international Communist movement” (FRUS,45). For this reason, the suspension of export licenses needed to be lifted, as its continuation “would be interpreted to mean that the US has altered its basic concept of Yugoslavia as an independent nation, or else would be interpreted as an indication that the US is reacting towards Yugoslavia’s behaviour at the Belgrade Conference in an abrupt and vindictive manner” (FRUS,45).

The State Department’s recommendations were presented to Kennedy at the October 13 NSC meeting, and he accepted them (JFKNSF-313-018). A few days later, Rusk also spoke at a press conference about Yugoslav-American relations. When one of the questions from the attending journalists focused on economic aid to Yugoslavia, the Secretary of State stated in response that economic aid had enabled the Yugoslavs to preserve and strengthen their independence from the Soviet Union and that it would, therefore, continue (*New York Times* 1961.b). Rusk’s statement was favourably assessed at the Embassy in Washington (DAMSP,18).

Following this statement by Rusk, Nikezić was summoned to the State Department by Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, who reiterated to him that the US was not seeking anything from Yugoslavia in the realm of politics and had no intention of exerting pressure on it. He emphasised that any economic issues would be resolved based on the same principles as in the previous period. He highlighted that American policy had not changed and that the US stance towards Yugoslavia was “business as usual” (DAMSP,19). After statements from several American officials and assurances that policy would not change, the Yugoslavs considered that there had been no “significant change” in American policy, so they informed their diplomatic missions worldwide about this via circular letter (DAMSP,20).

The views of the State Department on the policy towards Yugoslavia, which were presented to Kennedy, were conveyed to Ambassador Kennan by Kohler in a personal letter dated October 12 (FRUS,102). Kennan responded to them only

after returning from vacation at the end of October (FRUS,106; see also: Močnik 2008, 48; Bisenić 2011, 159-160; Bogetić 2012b, 44-45). In a strongly worded letter, he reminded them that he advocated for a change in the conception of American policy towards Yugoslavia shortly after assuming the ambassadorship in Belgrade. He then extensively analysed the State Department's policy, criticising every aspect of Kohler's views. He spoke as a strategist and creator who wanted to change the existing policy rather than as an ambassador tasked with implementing an already established policy. This is eloquently stated in the statement: "The question is whether policies that may well have been generally effective in the more distant past retain their justification today, in light of the present international situation and of Yugoslavia's present stage of economic development, and in the face of a renewed and highly formalised commitment by Tito to an anti-American policy scarcely distinguishable from that of the Russians" (FRUS,106). Advocating for a change in economic policy towards Yugoslavia, he argued the facts that even in the case of a complete suspension of aid, it would not lead to the collapse of the Yugoslav economy but only to a slowing down of the pace of growth; that the independence of Yugoslavia no longer depends on American economic aid; and that it is not an important factor in shaping Yugoslav society. Finally, Kennan resignedly recalled that on September 15, at the request of the State Department, he handed over a harsh *aide-memoire* to the Yugoslavs and that he would oppose it "most vigorously ... for their only effect could then be to demonstrate to the Yugoslavs the emptiness of our statements and to confirm them in the view that they have nothing to lose by opposing us on the world arena" (FRUS,106). He also added that ignoring all his recommendations would make "the weight of any word I may personally have occasion to address to them (Yugoslavs), in the future, on questions of world affairs, will be precisely nil" (FRUS,106). He concluded by saying, "I feel, finally, that we will be making an egregious tactical error and will lose such slender possibility as we still have for influence over this Government if, having now talked widely and strongly, we fail to give any substance to our words in the form of actions" (FRUS,106).

Realising that his policy was not accepted by the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department, Kennan reached for the last and strongest card: President Kennedy. Relying on the letter that Kennedy sent to him on October 11, in which he told him that he had "with great interest" read his reports from Belgrade, that for him "they have been of great value" and praised Kennan's "insistence upon representing the interests and purposes of the United States Government, even when this involves abrasions with those to whom you are accredited", and that his views on economic issues with Yugoslavia are "carefully weighed" in the White House (FRUS,101), Kennan decided to approach Kennedy's national security adviser

McGeorge Bundy (FRUS,106; Močnik 2008, 47-48). The motive was a concern over “the lack of coordination here, as between the European Office of the State Department and others in Washington who have an interest in this subject”, and the desire that Kennedy be informed “of any action taken by the Department in this respect that conflicts with the recommendations made by this Mission and indeed with the analysis of the elements of the problem at which I have personally arrived” (FRUS,106). However, Kennan could not have known that the views of the National Security Council were closer to those of the State Department than his (Močnik 2008, 41-42). On the same occasion, Kennan addressed the undersecretary at the State Department, Bowles, complaining that his recommendations were not heeded in the State Department and that his views would not be presented to the NSC. He resignedly noted, “Do not mind being disagreed with, but do dislike being silently by-passed” (FRUS,107). Bowles, however, somewhat laconically replied to Kennan’s letter, stating: “whatever emotional reactions may have existed here a few weeks ago in regard to Yugoslavia have largely been brought back into fair balance” (FRUS,107). One also gets the impression that Kennan’s views and increasingly emotional attitude towards problems were not understood even within the Belgrade embassy among his staff. Some American diplomatic officials testified that after the Conference, “he reacted very personally and he felt almost betrayed by Tito personally” (ADST, Robert Gerald Livingston); that is, according to the words of then embassy official Lawrence Eagleburger, he was “furious with Tito’s support of the Soviets” (quoted according to Močnik 2008, 60).

While trying to gain Washington’s support for his policy, Kennan distanced himself from the Yugoslav state officials in Belgrade, and when they did meet, he avoided discussions on political topics and bilateral issues (DAMSP,21). Only on November 22, during a meeting at a diplomatic dinner with State Undersecretary Veljko Mićunović, did he start a conversation about past events. Kennan reassured his interlocutor in a “tone of personal disappointment” that he had been mistaken in his assessments of Yugoslav politics. According to Mićunović, the American ambassador stated that at the beginning of his service in Belgrade, “he had different assessments and opinions on some issues, that he now realises that his assessments were not realistic and that he now knows the circumstances better, but that as ambassador he always remained a supporter of the policy of good relations between the US and the FPRY” (DAMSP,22). Furthermore, he expressed his readiness to go to Washington and personally pleaded with Kennedy for good relations between the two countries. At the same time, economic ties improved, as the day after this conversation, the US government informed Belgrade that negotiations on wheat deliveries to Yugoslavia were being resumed, which had stalled after the Non-Aligned Conference (Bogetić 2012b, 48-51).

A few days later, Mićunović and Kennan met again, this time for dinner at Tito's. On that occasion, Kennan repeated the views expressed during the previous meeting. In response to Mićunović's remark that they had talked more in the last few days than in the previous few months, Kennan promised that he would make sure to speak to state officials more often. This was why Mićunović suggested in his report on this conversation that the American ambassador be allowed to meet with state officials (DAMSP,23). This recommendation was accepted since Kennan was invited to Edward Kardelj's house for an intimate dinner in December (DAMSP,24). At the same time, he again began attending talks at the DSIP (DAMSP,25), and the Yugoslavs now assessed how "more realistic and flexible" the American ambassador's views on bilateral relations were (DAMSP,26). However, the events that followed in the next year regarding the revocation of Yugoslavia's most-favoured nation status by the US Congress will put Kennan to new trials and ultimately lead to his resignation as ambassador to Yugoslavia and his retirement from the diplomatic service. Unlike the Moscow episode, this time, his departure would be permanent.

Conclusion

George Frost Kennan has no peer in the history of 20th-century American foreign policy, not just because of his accomplishments as the author of containment and the most successful American foreign policy Cold War strategy, but also because of the things he did not accomplish. One of those unaccomplished things is, for sure, his ambassadorships in the Soviet Union in 1952 and in Yugoslavia from 1961 to 1963, both ending prematurely. During his quarter of the century in the American Foreign Service, he witnessed many important events that shaped the history of the world and the relations of the United States in the world, especially with the Soviet Union. He became the most important Soviet Union and Russian scholar/practitioner in the United States, whose analysis explained the Soviet behaviour to the American government and helped to formulate the American Cold War Grand Strategy, especially in the critically important years 1947-1950. His understanding of foreign policy was quite realistic. Alongside Hans Morgenthau, Kennan is rightly considered one of the founding fathers of the realist theory of international relations. They emphasised the role of power and national interest in foreign policy. Similarly to Morgenthau, Kennan's understanding of the national interest was much more about preserving the national security of the states than about the values, and he was aware that states need to make gradations of the interests in terms of their importance, readiness, and capabilities to protect them. For that reason, he was

hypersensitive about moralism, universalism, and legalism in American foreign policy, which hold that America is of a different kind and an exceptional country.

In May 1961, after being out of the government for eight years, he had the opportunity to become an ambassador again and demonstrate his significance. Both Kennan and the Yugoslavs assumed their roles with high hopes. His regular meetings with Tito and other key figures in Yugoslavia were common, and he was keen on enhancing relations as much as possible. Everything suddenly changed after Tito's speech at the 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade. Kennan felt betrayed by his government and Yugoslav hosts, and he began to pursue his own policy, which led to his isolation from both sides. Kennan had initially thought that he would help shape the national interests and foreign policy of the United States towards Yugoslavia. However, after this episode, he realised that he had played more of an executive role than a creative one. Unfortunately, this was just the beginning. In 1962, Congress's radicalisation of policy towards Yugoslavia made Kennan's position even more difficult, ultimately resulting in his resignation from the ambassadorial position in 1963.

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Saša MIŠIĆ, Dragan ŽIVOJINOVIĆ

DA LI SU AMBASADORI STVARAOCI ILI SAMO SPROVODIOCI NACIONALNIH INTERESA? DŽORDŽ FROST KENAN I KONFERENCIJA NESVRSTANIH U BEOGRADU 1961. GODINE

Apstrakt: Džordž Frost Kenan bio je jedan od najpoznatijih spoljnopolitičkih mislilaca i stratega u razdoblju Hladnog rata. Međutim, u pogledu praktičnih dostignuća bio je daleko manje uspешan. Prva Kenanova ambasadura u Moskvi (1952) bila je okončana posle samo četiri i po meseca, jer ga je Staljin proglasio za *personu non grata*. Na sličan način, ni kao ambasador u Jugoslaviji (1961-1963) nije bio bolje sreće, podnevši ostavku pre kraja mandata. Istraživačko pitanje ovog rada je sledeće: Da li je Džordž Kenan bio odlučilac ili samo izvršilac američkih nacionalnih interesa u Jugoslaviji tokom njegovog mandata kao ambasadora? Da li je pravio razliku u odnosima Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Jugoslavije, ili je samo bio birokrata koji je primenjivao odluke svojih nadređenih? Naš odgovor i glavna teza našeg rada je da je Kenan došao u Jugoslaviju sa uverenjem da može da odlučujuće utiče na kreiranje politike prema Jugoslaviji i da su ga Jugosloveni prihvatili sa istim takvim uverenjem. Ipak, posle Titovog govora na Konferenciji nesvrstanih u Beogradu 1961. godine, tokom narednih nekoliko meseci, Kenan je ostao usamljen, bez suštinske podrške svoje Vlade i bez razumevanja svojih jugoslovenskih domaćina. Članak se sastoji iz dva dela: u prvom delu opisaćemo Kenanovo shvatanje koncepta nacionalnog interesa dok ćemo se u drugom delu fokusirati na Kenanovu ambasaduru u Jugoslaviji pre i neposredno posle Konferencije nesvrstanih u Beogradu 1961. godine.

Ključne reči: nacionalni interes, ambasadori, spoljna politika, diplomatija, Sjedinjene Američke Države, Jugoslavija, spoljna politika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Josip Broz Tito, Pokret nesvrstanih.

Velika strategija Sjedinjenih Država – da li je kucnuo čas za *uravnotežavanje s obale*?

Stevan NEDELJKOVIĆ¹

Apstrakt: U vremenu kada unipolarni trenutak počinje da jenjava, a svet multipolarnosti nadolazi, odvijaju se akademske debate o budućoj velikoj strategiji Sjedinjenih Država. Cilj ovog rada je da pruži doprinos toj debati kroz analizu *uravnotežavanja s obale* (*offshore balancing*), predloga velike strategije koji dolazi iz neorealističkog akademskog tabora. Ključno istraživačko pitanje na koje ovaj članak odgovara jeste – da li je *uravnotežavanje s obale* danas najpodesnija strategija za ostvarivanje vitalnih nacionalnih interesa Sjedinjenih Država (SAD)? Uzimajući moguću primenu ove strategije u Persijskom zalivu kao studiju slučaja – jednom od tri ključna regiona za nacionalne interese SAD – pokazaću da nije sazrelo vreme za strategiju *uravnotežavanja s obale* i da pati od sličnih manjkavosti kao i trenutna strategija dubokog angažovanja: prvo, povremeno ignoriše lekcije iz istorije i činjenice iz sadašnjosti; drugo, zanemaruje opasnosti vakuuma moći i izmenjeni strateški kontekst koji bi nastao američkim povlačenjem; treće, preterano se uzda u saveze u čiju delotvornost i sami realisti poslovično sumnjaju i četvrto, zanemaruje činjenicu da u XXI veku dobijaju na značaju asimetrične pretnje na koje je teško brzo i efikasno odgovoriti. Na kraju, iznosim tvrdnju da će *uravnotežavanje* iz daljine verovatno biti velika strategija SAD-a 2050. godine, ali da će do tada primat imati strategija selektivnog angažovanja.

Ključne reči: Sjedinjene Države, velika strategija, nacionalni interes, *uravnotežavanje s obale*, Persijski zaliv, neorealizam.

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Uvod

Dok je Frensis Fukujama (Francis Fukuyama) u leto 1989. godine pisao poslednje redove čuvenog eseja „Kraj istorije“ (*The End of History*), svet se vrtložio i menjao toliko brzo i duboko da su mnogima promakle razmere promena koje su se odvijale. Iako je Fukujama (1989, 4) teza o kraju istorije, i „univerzalizaciji Zapadne liberalne demokratije kao konačnog oblika ljudske vladavine“ preterana i empirijski potvrđena kao manjkava, njegov osećaj da se padom Berlinskog zida „nešto vrlo fundamentalno desilo u ljudskoj istoriji“ (Fukuyama 1989, 3), bio je ispravan. Lanac događaja koji je doveo do pobede liberalne ideologije i kraja Hladnog rata proizveo je ogromnu anomaliju u izučavanju međunarodnih odnosa. Mada nije došlo do kraja istorije kakav su opisivali Hegel i Marks, a od kojih je Fukujama pozajmio kovanicu, čuveni profesor sa Univerziteta Stanford je makar delimično i makar na kratko bio u pravu. Svet sa jednom supersilom, okončanje nadmetanja dva neprijateljska bloka bez rata i potpuni trijumf jedne ideologije nad drugom, situacije su bez presedana od uspostavljanja prvog međunarodnog sistema 1648. godine.

Padom Berlinskog zida nije se samo okončao Hladni rat, već je 9. novembar 1989. postao simbol dramatičnog zaokreta u svetu i polazna tačka u razgovorima o brojnim konceptima i izazovima u međunarodnim odnosima. Danas je gotovo nemoguće raspravljati o svetskom poretku, ravnoteži snaga, realističkoj školi međunarodnih odnosa, američkoj moći, transatlantskim odnosima i rusko-američkim odnosima, bez poziva na kraj Hladnog rata ili makar osvrta na taj fenomen. Pored toga, danas svaka diskusija o velikoj strategiji Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (SAD) počinje sa referencom na prvi dan u posthladnoratovskoj eri. Takođe, iako teoretičari međunarodnih odnosa neposredno posle okončanja Hladnog rata nisu mogli da se slože oko toga da li Amerika treba da se okrene sebi i zatvori u „Tvrđavu Amerika“, ili posegne za globalnom dominacijom, ili pak bira neki umereniji put, uglavnom nisu imali dileme da je „kraj istorije“ fokalna tačka u redefinisaju pristupa SAD-a prema svetu.

Jedan od predloga velike strategije potekao je od neorealista.² Kristofer Lejn (Christopher Layne), Džon Dž. Miršajmer (John J. Mearsheimer) i Stiven M. Volt (Stephen M. Walt) još od sredine 90-ih godina 20. veka kritikuju američki pristup globalnim poslovima i, kako oni tvrde, težnju SAD-a za globalnom dominacijom.

² Napomenuo bih da uravnotežavanje ne zastupa nužno sve neorealističke postulate. Uostalom, zagovaraju je i defanzivni i ofanzivni realisti, čiji je pogled na međunarodnu zbilju često različit. Ovu strategiju nazivam realističkom, jer su njeni ključni zagovornici odreda neorealisti.

Verovali su da se velika strategija liberalne hegemonije (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016) ili dubokog angažovanja (*deep engagement*) kako se još naziva (Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013; Nye 1995), koje su praktikovale sve administracije od Klintona do Obame, pogubna i da će u konačnici oslabiti američku relativnu moć, ugroziti nacionalne interese SAD-a i okrenuti ravnotežu snaga protiv Vašingtona. Dodatno, neorealisti tvrde da takva strategija neće samo motivisati takmace na uravnotežavajuću koaliciju, već će proizvoditi strah od geopolitičke nadmoći čak i kod najbližih saveznika (Layne 2002, 239). Da bi Sjedinjene Države zadržale dominantnu poziciju u međunarodnom poretku, očuvale vitalne nacionalne interese i da ne bi isprovocirale uravnotežavajuću koaliciju, Lejn, Miršajmer i Volt već gotovo tri decenije zagovaraju alternativnu veliku strategiju koju nazivaju uravnotežavanje sa obale (*offshore balancing*).

Esencija uravnotežavanja sa obale je vraćanje Sjedinjenih Država na realističko viđenje međunarodne politike i eliminisanje liberalizma koji je, prema zagovornicima ove strategije, nepodudaran sa racionalnom spoljnom politikom (Fleury 2023, 50). Amerika, prema „obalašima“,³ treba da primeni veliku strategiju u kojoj se fokusira na ključne regione (Evropa, Istočna Azija, Persijski zaliv) u kojima štiti vitalne nacionalne interese, i gde teži da sputa izrastanje regionalnog hegemonu oslanjajući se prevashodno na saveznike i direktno intervenišući tek onda kada je to neophodno za očuvanje regionalne ravnoteže. Neorealisti smatraju da će Vašington na ovaj način ubediti druge da je primat SAD-a poželjniji od mogućih alternativa (Walt 2005a), zadržati kapacitet da deluje unilateralno kada je to u nacionalnom interesu, redukovati pretnju po bezbednost i druge nacionalne interese, umanjiti percepciju kod ostalih da je Amerika pretnja po njihovu bezbednost, i dugoročno očuvati SAD kao najmoćniju silu u sistemu (Layne 1997, 2002, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016; Walt 2005a; Walt 2005b).

Iako nijedan posthladnoratovski američki predsednik nije prihvatio uravnotežavanje sa obale kao veliku strategiju Sjedinjenih Država, na papiru joj se malo šta može zameriti. Ukoliko su pretpostavke „obalaša“ tačne, SAD bi zadržale primat u globalnim poslovima, a smanjile nivo pretnje koji proizvode, troškovi takve strategije bili bi znatno niži od robusnog ulaganja u tzv. liberalnu hegemoniju, a relativna moć Vašingtona u odnosu na takmace ostala bi na istom nivou ili čak porasla. Pojedini kritičari tvrde da je reč o zapanjujućem predlogu, ali istovremeno i iluziji, jer su „ekonomske i političke dividende te strategije precenjene, dok su mogući troškovi i rizici potcenjeni“ (Brands 2015a, 8). Drugi opet zameraju logičku potku insistiranja na racionalnosti: „Ukoliko je uravnotežavanje iz daljine u biti

³ Ovim terminom obuhvatam zagovarače velike strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale.

racionalno, kako se tvrdi, i ukoliko je liberalizam iracionalan, onda bi to bilo očigledno svakom racionalnom posmatraču i anatema iracionalnom“ (Fleury 2023, 51).

Ključno istraživačko pitanje na koje ovaj članak odgovara jeste – da li je uravnotežavanje sa obale najpodesnija strategija za ostvarivanje vitalnih nacionalnih interesa Sjedinjenih Država? Na istraživačko pitanje ću odgovoriti uzimajući moguću primenu ove strategije u Persijskom zalivu – jednom od tri ključna regiona za nacionalne interese SAD-a – kao studiju slučaja. Imajući u vidu da je ključni nacionalni interes SAD-a u ovoj regiji sprečavanje izrastanja regionalnog hegemonu koji bi preuzeo kontrolu nad tokovima nafte, pokazaću da nije sazrelo vreme za strategiju uravnotežavanja sa obale. Tačnije, da nije najpogodnija za ostvarivanje američkih nacionalnih interesa u Persijskom zalivu i da pati od sličnih manjkavosti kao i trenutna strategija dubokog angažovanja: prvo, povremeno ignoriše lekcije iz istorije i činjenice iz sadašnjosti; drugo, zanemaruje opasnosti vakuuma moći i izmenjeni strateški kontekst koji bi nastao američkim povlačenjem; treće, preterano se uzda u saveze u čiju delotvornost i sami realisti poslovično sumnjaju i četvrto, zanemaruje činjenicu da u XXI veku dobijaju na značaju asimetrične pretnje na koje je teško brzo i efikasno odgovoriti. Članak će biti podeljen na tri dela. U prvom delu ću se ukratko osvrnuti na „unipolarni trenutak“ i strateške izbore koje je Amerika imala na raspolaganju, u drugom će biti predstavljene osnovne postavke velike strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale, dok će u trećem biti sadržana kritika strategije iz tri ugla – istorijskog, teorijskog i empirijskog.

Unipolarni trenutak i strateški izbori SAD

U čuvenom članku „Unipolarni trenutak“ (*The Unipolar Moment*), Čarls Krauthamer (Charles Krauthammer) je možda na najbolji način oslikao duh vremena i strukturu međunarodnog sistema s kraja XX veka. Tvrdio je da „momenat“ neće potrajati duže od jedne decenije (Krauthammer 1990), i pogrešio, ali je ispravno ukazao da svet nije multipolarnan i da Japan, Nemačka i druge ekonomske sile neće, makar neko vreme, izrasti u nove polove moći. Argument da jedinstveni poredak koji se tada rađao nazove unipolarnim pronašao je u činjenici da je Amerika „jedina zemlja sa vojnim, diplomatskim, političkim i ekonomskim sredstvima, koja joj omogućavaju da bude odlučujući akter u bilo kom sukobu i bilo kom delu sveta u kom želi da se angažuje“ (Krauthammer 1990, 24).

Zaista, svet o kome je Krauthamer pisao bio je netipičan za međunarodni sistem. Kineska, Maurijska, Rimska, Mongolska ili imperija Aleksandra Velikog pokrivala su široke geografske prostore, ali njihov položaj nije bio jedinstven i

dopiranje im je bilo ograničeno. Primera radi, u vreme Aleksandrove vladavine na prostoru sadašnje Kine različite dinastije borile su se za nadmoć i ujedinjenje Kine, na indijskom potkontinentu pripremalo se stvaranje Maurijske imperije sa Čandraguptom (Chandragupta Maurya) na njenom čelu, a Južna Amerika, podsaharska Afrika, najveći deo Evrope i Australija vodili su odvojene živote. Razlika između američkog kolosa i imperija iz prošlosti je, između ostalog, u tome što su Sjedinjene Države mogle neometano da projektuju moć u bilo kom kutku na zemlji.

Svetska istorija nije zabeležila toliku nadmoć jedne države. Pol Kenedi (Paul Kennedy) (2002) zaključuje da „ništa slično ovakvom disparitetu u moći nikada nije postojalo“. Autor čuvene studije „Uspion i pad velikih sila“ (*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*) navodi da je poredio „sve statistike troškova za odbranu i vojno osoblje iz prethodnih više od 500 godina (...) i nijedna država nije ni blizu“ (Kennedy 2002). Oko ovog pitanja su saglasni i realisti i liberali. Robert Džervis (2006) navodi da „mereno na bilo koji zamisliv način, Sjedinjene Države imaju veći udeo u svetskoj moći od bilo koje druge države u istoriji“ (Robert Jervis 2006, 7), dok Džon Ajkenberi (2003, 533) zaključuje da „ni u jednom drugom trenutku savremene istorije jedna država nije izgledala tako zamašno u odnosu na ostatak sveta“.

Iako je kolosalna moć Sjedinjenih Država *per se* budila podozrenje čak i kod saveznika, Vašington se u prvoj deceniji XX veka nije suočavao sa uravnotežavanjem ili značajnijim pretećim delovanjem. Sa svom moći koju je posedovala i liderstvom koje nijedan značajan akter nije dovodio u pitanje, Amerika se suočavala sa izborom koji nije imala nijedna druga sila pre nje: šta činiti sa svetom? Američki učenjaci iz oblasti međunarodnih odnosa i strateških studija proizveli su sijaset predloga velikih strategija. Iako se razlikuju po imenu, čini se da se predlozi konstituišu pet mogućih velikih strategija: izolacionizam, uravnotežavanje sa obale, uzdržanost, selektivno angažovanje i duboko angažovanje.⁴ S obzirom na to da je strategija uravnotežavanja sa obale u žiži ovog rada, ona će biti detaljnije elaborirana u narednom poglavlju, dok će ostale biti pominjane tek ovlaš kroz poređenje određenih karakteristika sa strategijom koja je predmet ovog rada.

⁴ Postoje autori koji tvrde da postoji i više strateških opcija. Na primer, Robert J. Art navodi da Sjedinjene Države imaju na raspolaganju osam opcija: *dominion, global collective security, regional collective security, cooperative security, containment, isolationism, offshore balancing, and selective engagement*. Ipak, stava sam da razlike između prve četiri nisu toliko velike da bismo ih razdvajali. Videti u: Art 2003.

Uravnotežavanje s obale: istorija, ciljevi, pretpostavke i praksa

Iako su realisti mahom podržavali veliku strategiju SAD-a za vreme Hladnog rata,⁵ posle završetka ovog orvelovskog fenomena dolazi do podele među pripadnicima ovog pravca. Dok su Stiven Bruks, Vilijem Volfort, Robert Kejgan (Robert Kagan) i Farid Zakarija (Fareed Zakaria) podržavali američko duboko angažovanje, autori, od reda neorealisti, kao što su Kenet Volc (Kenneth N. Waltz), Džon Miršajmer, Stiven Volt, Kristofer Lejn i Beri Posen (Barry Posen) žestoko su kritikovali Vašington. Kritičari su upozoravali na istorijske greške koje su činile sve velike sile koje su posezale za globalnom hegemonijom, ukazivali su na činjenicu da je raspadom Sovjetskog Saveza iščezla velika i realna pretnja po nacionalne interese SAD-a i tvrdili da će se Amerika brzo suočiti sa uravnotežavajućom koalicijom.

Kako bi efikasno ukazali na mane strategije u kojoj su videli primese liberalizma, neorealisti – pre svih Lejn, Miršajmer i Volt – razvijali su još od sredine 90-ih u svojim delima veliku strategiju za koju tvrde da ima uporište i u realizmu i u američkoj istoriji. Nazvali su je uravnotežavanje sa obale. Ukoliko *offshore balancing* posmatramo kroz semantička sočiva, lako su uočljive dve osnovne ideje stvaralaca koncepta: sa obale ili *offshore* – ukazuje na redukciju američkog prisustva izvan Zapadne hemisfere, dok uravnotežavanje ili *balancing* – sugeriše vraćanje na postulate ravnoteže snaga kako protiv SAD-a ne bi bilo pokrenuto uravnotežavanje, kao i podelu odgovornosti za uravnotežavanje spoljašnje pretnje u ključnim regionima oslanjanjem na saveznike. Naravno, ova strategija ne dolazi bez otvorenih pitanja. Zašto bi Sjedinjene Države menjale strategiju dubokog angažovanja koja ih više od tri decenije čuva kao jedinu supersilu u svetskom poretku? S obzirom na to da dolazi sa dosta nepoznanica, da li je uopšte izvodljiva? Koji su osnovni ciljevi i pretpostavke ove strategije i konačno, kako bi izgledala u praksi? Odgovore na ova pitanja potražiću u delima idejnih tvoraca i zagovarača, Kristofera Lejna, Džona Dž. Miršajmera i Stivena M. Volta, koje za potrebe ovog rada nazivam „obalaši“.

Najpre, treba odgovoriti na pitanje zašto uopšte menjati postojeću strategiju? Sjedinjene Države i dalje prednjače u vojnoj i ekonomskoj moći, još uvek imaju sposobnost da projektuju moć u bilo koji deo sveta, imaju ključnu ulogu u najvažnijim multilateralnim institucijama i lider su u mreži najvažnijih bezbednosnih

⁵ Valja ovde napomenuti da među teoretičarima međunarodnih odnosa postoji duboko neslaganje oko toga šta je zapravo bila hladnoratovska velika strategija SAD-a. Primera radi, Miršajmer i Volt tvrde da je to bilo uravnotežavanje sa obale, Džozef Naj (Joseph S. Nye Jr.) i Džon Ajkenberi (Gilford John Ikenberry) veruju da je reč o dubokom angažovanju (deep engagement), dok Džon Luis Gedis (John Lewis Gaddis) smatra da je Amerika primenjivala veliku strategiju obuzdavanja (containment).

aranžmana u Evropi i Aziji. Ipak, „obalaši“ ukazuju na nekoliko motiva za osmišljavanje ove strategije i zamenu postojeće:

- *Istorija*: dostizanje hegemonije znatno je lakše nego njeno održanje. Prema svim istorijskim zapisima, „države koje teže hegemoniji neizostavno završe manje, a ne više bezbedne“ (Layne 2002, 237). Stiven Volt (2011, 6) logički zaključuje da kada država „ostane sama na vrhuncu moći, nema drugog puta osim na dole“.
- *Geografija*: Sjedinjene Države treba da iskoriste geografski blagoslov i činjenicu što su ostrvska sila (insular power), čime se znatno smanjuje mogućnost od ugrožavanja vitalnih nacionalnih interesa. Istovremeno, da bi takav položaj kapitalizovala, ostrvska sila mora da vodi nepreteću politiku prema drugim regionima i liši se imperijalnih ili čak hegemonih ambicija (Layne 2009, 11).
- *Teorija*: prema teoriji ravnoteže snaga, svaki pokušaj uspostavljanja globalne hegemonije, rezultira kontrauravnotežavajućom koalicijom (Mearsheimer, 2014; Walt 1990).
- *Realnost sadašnjosti*: posle debakla u Iraku (2003–...), i talasa unilateralizma u XXI veku, relativna moć Sjedinjenih Država je opala. Dodatno, duboko angažovanje od 1945. nije ostavilo SAD bez posledica, a negativni efekti su prisutni pre svega na unutrašnjoj ravni.

S obzirom na to da je reč o „superiornoj“, „pristupačnoj“, „realističnoj“ i pogodnoj velikoj strategiji za očuvanje vitalnih interesa SAD, kako tvrde zagovarači (Layne 1997, 2002, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016), nameće se pitanje zašto je Vašington ne koristi i da li je uopšte izvodljiva? Ova strategija nije bez uporišta u prošlosti. Miršajmer (2014) tvrdi da svaka država teži da postane hegemon, ali da nijedna nije bila dovoljno moćna da to postane. U takvim okolnostima države primenjuju alternativnu strategiju i teže da postanu regionalni hegemoni i održe povoljnu ravnotežu snaga u drugim regionima. Upravo takvu strategiju primenjivalo je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo (UK) nekoliko vekova, kao i Sjedinjene Države u prvoj polovini XX veka, pa čak i za vreme Hladnog rata. Budući da UK nije predmet ovog članka, analiziraću samo američko iskustvo sa strategijom uravnotežavanja sa obale.

Naime, Sjedinjene Države su još tokom druge polovine XIX veka bile integrisane u međunarodnu ekonomiju, imale su diplomatska predstavništva širom sveta, topovnjačama „otvarale“ Japan, pobedom u Špansko-američkom ratu proširile teritoriju i sferu uticaja i učestvovala na važnim međunarodnim forumima kao što su Haške konferencije (1899, 1907). Početkom XX veka uveliko je tekao transfer ekonomske u vojnu moć, američka „Velika bela flota“ defilovala je okeanima, a Sjedinjene Države su konačno bile spremne da odbrane Zapadnu hemisferu od bilo kog neprijatelja i upuste se, ukoliko to žele, u globalne poslove u punom kapacitetu. Svoju moć su demonstrirale 6. aprila 1917. kada je Vudro Vilson objavio rat

Nemačkoj, a milioni Amerikanaca uputili su se preko okeana da odbrane Evropu od germanske dominacije i uspostave „svet bezbednim za demokratiju“.

Nekoliko godina posle Velikog rata, američka vojska se povukla iz Evrope, politički otisak SAD-a se smanjio, ali zainteresovanost Vašingtona za svetske poslove nije nestala. Istina, Amerika nije bila prisutna u Evropi u meri u kojoj je bila 1917–1919. godine ili za vreme Hladnog rata, ali reći da je sprovodila izolacionističku politiku, u kontekstu Monroove doktrine, prema mom sudu je pogrešno (Nedeljković 2020). Razloga je više: „Prvo, čak i ako uzmemo kao dato da je izolacionizam bezbednosna strategija, Amerika je učestvovala u sklapanju sporazuma kao što su Vašingtonski pomorski sporazum ili Brijan-Kelegov pakt koji su, pre svega, mirovno-bezbednosni sporazumi; drugo, Amerika je zadržala malu okupacionu silu u Evropi sve do januara 1923. kada su napustili Koblenz (Rajnska oblast, Nemačka); treće, kontingent od 1.000 američkih vojnika bio je stacioniran u kineskom gradu Tjenčin od 1912. do 1938. godine; četvrto, Amerika je diplomatski i ekonomski u međuratnom periodu imala globalno dopiranje“ (Nedeljković 2020, 80).

Iz navedenih razloga čini mi se da je uravnotežavanje sa obale, a ne izolacionizam, bila velika strategija koju je Amerika upražnjavala do Drugog svetskog rata. Kada je 7. decembra 1941. Japan napao Perl Harbur, Sjedinjene Države su odlučile da pošalju svoju vojsku preko okeana, samo ovog puta i preko Pacifika i Atlantika. Kao i posle Velikog rata, američki predsednik je krojio uslove mira i institucije posleratnog poretka, ali je ovog puta Vašington ostao u poretku i odlučio da ga predvodi. Miršajmer i Volt (2016) tvrde da su i za vreme Hladnog rata Sjedinjene Države dominantno koristile uravnotežavanje sa obale, iako takve stavove ne deli i Lejn (1997; 2002). Kada se Hladni rat završio, strategija za koju neorealisti tvrde da najviše podseća na uravnotežavanje sa obale napuštena je, a budućnost će pokazati da li na duži rok ili zauvek.

Više od 35 godina posle završetka Hladnog rata poruke poput „Vrati se kući, Ameriko“ sve su češće i osnovanije. Iako su Sjedinjene Države još uvek jedina supersila, u XXI veku dolazi do „uspona ostalih“ (Zakaria 2012), a relativna moć Sjedinjenih Država je značajno opala. Posle Iraka (2003), globalne finansijske krize (2007–2008) i povlačenja iz Avganistana (2021) kredibilitet SAD-a počeo je da se urušava, kao i meka moć, a domaći problemi su se rapidno umnožavali do mere da je Amerika danas duboko podeljeno društvo sa pregršt izazova. Uravnotežavanje sa kopna je strategija koja nastaje kao pokušaj odgovora na ove probleme. Iako nema potpune saglasnosti među „obalašima“ u pogledu toga šta velika strategija SAD-a treba da postigne, najmanji zajednički sadržalac se može pronaći u sledećim ciljevima: „da se očuva postojeća pozicija koliko god je moguće“ (Walt 2005), odnosno, da se očuva američka „dominacija u Zapadnoj hemisferi i suzbijaju mogući hegemoni u Evropi, Severoistočnoj Aziji i Persijskom zalivu“ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 71); da

se minimizuju „rizici uključivanja SAD u budućem ratu (moguće i nuklearnom) velikih sila“ (Layne 1997, 87) i uopšte da se smanji rizik po bezbednost SAD.

„Obalaši“ su o alternativnoj strategiji koju predlažu pisali gotovo tri decenije. Vremenom su se ideje nadograđivale, a stavovi koje su iznosili Lejn, Miršajmer i Volt nisu ni potpuno podudarni. Ipak, nastojao sam da izdvojim strateške pretpostavke oko kojih su saglasni:

- *Unipolarnost je nestabilna* – Ova vrsta polarnosti nije postojana i istorijska je anomalija, a druge velike sile sa podozrenjem gledaju na najmoćniju silu. Pre ili kasnije, protiv supersile biće oformljena kontrauravnotežavajuća koalicija, a vreme njenog formiranja zavisi od osećaja pretnje koju supersila budi kod ostalih.
- *Ostrvske države su blagoslovene geografijom* – Miršajmer (2014) tvrdi da „zaustavljajuća moć voda“ sprečava bilo koju silu da uspostavi globalnu hegemoniju. Dodatno, ostrvske države, u koje „obalaši“ ubrajaju i SAD, imaju znatno više strateških opcija, jer mogu da prebacuju odgovornost i odluče da li će i kada ući u rat.
- *Ukoliko ne znaš šta je dobro, vrati se realizmu* – „Obalaši“ dalje ukazuju da je američka strategija do Drugog svetskog rata bila zasnovana na realističkim pretpostavkama i da je na najbolji način čuvala američku bezbednost i prosperitet.
- *Ravnoteža snaga > hegemonija* – Protiv hegemonu će pre ili kasnije biti pokrenuta uravnotežavajuća koalicija, zato je ravnoteža snaga u ključnim regionima znatno bolja opcija.
- *Duboko angažovanje smanjuje, a ne uvećava bezbednost* – „Obalaši“ navode terorističke napade i rast terorističke pretnje u XXI veku kao ključni argument da istureno držanje (*forward posture*) ne garantuje bezbednost.
- *Ideološki krstaški pohodi nisu u američkom nacionalnom interesu* – Miršajmer i Volt [2016, 74] ukazuju da „liberalna hegemonija obavezuje Sjedinjene Države da širi demokratiju na nepoznatim mestima, koja nekada zahtevaju vojnu okupaciju i uvek uključuju mešanje u lokalne političke aranžmane“. Otuda veruju da širenje demokratije, otvorenog tržišta, izgradnja nacija i zaštita ljudskih prava gde god da su ugrožena, ne doprinose američkim nacionalnim interesima.
- *Uspon ostalih* – Do uspona ostalih svakako će doći, ali Amerika mora da bude dovoljno moćna da sa saveznicima spreči da u ključnim svetskim regionima izraste novi hegemon.
- *Vašington se ne treba a priori odreći unilateralizma* – „Obalaši“ ukazuju da Sjedinjene Države „moraju zadržati kapacitet unilateralnog delovanja u odbrani nacionalnih interesa. U isto vreme, da bi izbegli izazivanje protivudara kontrahegemonu, Sjedinjene Države moraju delovati uzdržano“ (Layne 2002, 242).

- *Uravnotežavanje sa obale nije izolacionizam* – SAD ne mogu i ne smeju da se povuku iz globalnih poslova i moraju zadržati sposobnost projekcije moći. Međutim, čak i kada intervenišu treba brzo da se vrate kući (Walt 2005a).
- *Moć je potrošna* – Sjedinjene Države ne treba da rasipaju moć kroz nepotrebne ratove ili finansiranje odbrane bogatih saveznika.
- *Hegemonija SAD je mač sa dve oštrice* (Layne 2002, 233) – Sjedinjene Države su neophodne saveznicima radi održanja globalne ili regionalne stabilnosti, ali istovremeno ih kolosalna moć „Ujka Sema“ plaši. Saveznici, pre svih Francuska i Nemačka, protiv Amerike neretko koriste oštru retoriku, a nekad čak i diplomatsko-institucionalne mehanizme poznate kao meko uravnotežavanje.
- *Nisu svi regioni podjednako važni* – Za „obalaše“ tri regiona imaju poseban značaj: Evropa, Istočna Azija i Persijski zaliv. U ovim regionima bi Sjedinjene Države trebalo da održe pogodnu ravnotežu i spreče izrastanje novog hegemonu i to oslanjajući se na svoje saveznike. Kad god je to moguće Vašington treba da prebaci odgovornost saveznicima, a interveniše samo onda kada je to neophodno da bi se sačuvala ravnoteža.
- *Prvo Amerika* – Duboko angažovanje ostavilo je značajne posledice na unutrašnju politiku SAD. „Obalaši“ smatraju da Vašington mora da „izbalansira međunarodne obaveze i usredsredi se na unutrašnje imperitive. Umesto gradnje novog Bagrama (vazduhoplovna baza SAD u Avganistanu, prim. aut.) u dalekim mestima malog značaja, vreme je da se posveti više pažnje 'sjajnom gradu na brdu' o kome naši lideri često govore, a koji još nije izgrađen“ (Walt 2011, 17).

Kako bi navedene principe nove velike strategije SAD preveli u praksu, „obalaši“ predlažu četiri važna koraka. Prvo, Sjedinjene Države treba da prioritizuju tri regiona „u kojima se nalaze supstantivne koncentracije moći i bogatstva ili kritični prirodni resursi“ (Walt 2005b): Evropu, Istočnu Aziju i Persijski zaliv. SAD treba drastično da smanje vojno prisustvo na Starom kontinentu i teret uravnotežavanja prebace na saveznike. U Istočnoj Aziji, Amerika treba da zadrži robusno vojno prisustvo i da nastavi da „gradi kooperativna bezbednosna partnerstva sa postojećim azijskim saveznicima“ (Walt 2005a). Direktno prisustvo Vašingtona u ovom regionu je važno, jer „ukoliko Kina nastavi svoj impresivni rast, verovatno će težiti hegemoniji u Aziji“ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 81). Naravno, u skladu sa premisama strategije Sjedinjene Države bi trebalo da se oslone na svoje saveznike, ali to možda ne bude dovoljno. Otuda Miršajmer i Volt (2016) sa žaljenjem konstatuju da su Sjedinjene Države u Istočnoj Aziji istinski „neophodna nacija“.

Kada je reč o Persijskom zalivu, „obalaši“ smatraju da SAD treba da se povuku iz ovog regiona i, oslanjajući se na saveznike, vrate se politici regionalne ravnoteže snaga. S obzirom na to da nema pretnje da će bilo koja neprijateljska ili prijateljska

država ostvariti hegemoniju i ugroziti svetsku ekonomiju kroz blokiranje puteva nafte, Vašington treba da se povuče iz regiona koji vekovima proizvodi puno nedaća. U sva tri regiona, Sjedinjene Države bi direktno intervenisale samo u slučaju direktne pretnje vitalnim nacionalnim interesima, poremećaja poželjne ravnoteže snaga i ukoliko saveznici ne bi mogli da se izbore sa narastajućim hegemonom. U svakom drugom slučaju treba raditi na tome da potencijalni regionalni hegemoni u Evropi i istočnoj Aziji – Rusija i Kina – „ostaju i dalje previše zabrinuti zbog svojih suseda, da bi lutali Zapadnom hemisferom“ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 73).

Drugo, Vašington mora da zadrži sposobnost projekcije moći širom sveta, a „kičma strategije bilo bi robusno nuklearno odvracanje, vazдушna moć i što je najvažnije, nadmoćna pomorska moć“ (Layne 1997, 113). Treće, širenje demokratije, promocija otvorenog tržišta ili zaštita ljudskih prava svugde u svetu više ne bi bili na agendi spoljne politike SAD-a. Argument „obalaša“ je da „niko ne zna da li bi svet sazdan isključivo od liberalnih demokratija bio u stvarnosti miran, ali širenje demokratije upiranjem puške, retko radi“ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 80). Širenje demokratije kroz ratove na Bliskom istoku redukovalo je moć i bezbednost Sjedinjenih Država, podriilo kredibilitet i drastično smanjilo privatnost Amerikanaca. Jedini način širenja demokratije koje zagovarači uravnotežavanja sa obale priznaju je putem primera.

Četvrto, Sjedinjene Države treba da ostanu deo multilateralnih inicijativa i institucija kao što su Ujedinjene nacije ili Svetska trgovinska organizacija i ostanu diplomatski aktivne širom sveta. Dakle, ideja „obalaša“ nije da se SAD otisne preko okeana i zatvori u „Tvrđavu Amerika“, već da primenom pametne strategije očuva povoljnu poziciju u svetskom poretku i štedljivo pristupa svojoj kolosalnoj moći. U narednom poglavlju nastojaću da testiram koliko bi potencijalna primena velike strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale bila delotvorna u Persijskom zalivu.

Velika strategija u sudaru sa realnošću: uravnotežavanja sa obale u Persijskom zalivu

Iako je uravnotežavanje sa obale danas samo slovo na papiru koje neorealisti od sredine 90-ih teže da ožive i nadgrade, ova strategija je već godinama predmet kritika. Podjednako su je kritikovali realisti, liberali i zagovornici teorije hegemonije stabilnosti. Najpre, Hal Brands i Peter Fiver (Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver) (2016) tvrde da su rezultati američke primene strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale „dvosmisleni u najboljem, a katastrofalni u najgorem slučaju“. Kao primer navode neuspeh Vašingtona da tokom 20-ih i 30-ih godina XX veka održi pogodnu ravnotežu

snaga u Evropi i Istočnoj Aziji. Takođe, isti autori kritikuju „obalaše“ da svojim pristupom ohrabruju širenje oružja za masovno uništenje. Tvrde da zagovornici ove strategije „mogu umanjivati opasnost od proliferacije, ali da, imajući u vidu razarajuću moć nuklearnog naoružanja, politički odlučioi ne mogu biti takvi kavaljeri“ (Brands and Feaver 2016). Pored toga, ističu i da su tvrdnje o ogromnom rezanju troškova i smanjivanju bezbednosnih pretnji, takođe, preterane i netačne (Brands 2015a).

Kritičari zameraju ponajviše Miršajmeru i Voltu zbog iznetih stavova koji su, prema mišljenju Brendsa i Fivera (2016), „preoptimistično i čak opasno razmišljanje“. Prvo, tvrde da jednom narušenu ravnotežu u ključnim regionima nije lako povratiti i da su to na teži način otkrili Frenklin Ruzvelt u Evropi i Istočnoj Aziji, Dvajt Ajzenhauer (Dwight Eisenhower) u Koreji i Džordž H. V. Buš (George H. W. Bush) u Persijskom zalivu. Drugo, smatraju da Miršajmer i Volt zanemaruju činjenicu da raspuštanje postojeće bezbednosno-logističke mreže značajno otežava projekciju moći. Treće, bez direktnog prisustva Vašington će teško naterati saveznike na bezbednosno obavezivanje. Četvrto, smatraju da Americancima nije dovoljno da se klade samo na „najboljeg konja u trci“ koji bi pogodio interesima SAD-a, već se zahteva i određeni nivo humanitarnih standarda. Konačno, da ignorišu činjenicu da su globalne blagodeti, kao što su otvorena trgovina ili mir među velikim silama, bili nemogući bez moći i dubokog angažovanja SAD-a.

Može se i kritičarima ponešto zameriti. Primera radi, „obalaši“ smatraju da Sjedinjene Države treba da intervenišu pre poremećaja u ravnoteži ili izbijanja rata, a ne kada druga sila već utaba put ka hegemoniji. Takođe, Vašington ima dugu istoriju tolerancije savezničkih diktatora i sklanjanja pogleda od dramatičnih kršenja ljudskih prava u državama saveznicima, te je komentar o humanitarnim standardima donekle i hipokritičan. Na kraju, teza da je mir očuvan zahvaljujući angažovanju Sjedinjenih Država prilično je nategnuta i zanemaruje ulogu nuklearnog oružja, pojačanih efekata globalizacije, institucionalizacije međunarodnih odnosa i slično. Ipak, uravnotežavanje sa obale svakako nije bez mana. U narednim redovima nastojaću da kroz studiju slučaja moguće primene postulata strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale na američku politiku u Persijskom zalivu ukažem na manjkavosti ove velike strategije.

Četiri pravca kritika postulata offshore balancing u Persijskom zalivu

Da se podsetimo – Persijski zaliv je značajan za Sjedinjene Države jer se u ovom regionu proizvede oko 30% svetske nafte (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016), a samo kroz Ormuz prođe više od 20 miliona barela nafte dnevno. Stavljanje ovog regiona pod kontrolu jednog hegemonu verovatno bi uvelo u nezgodan položaj globalnu ekonomiju i tržište energenata. Otuda „obalaši“ predlažu da se Sjedinjene Države

u ovom regionu vrata staroj strategiji, koja je i bila primenjivana sve do kraja Hladnog rata. Dakle, SAD bi trebalo da povuku vojsku iz Zaliva, oslanjajući se na saveznike da rade na očuvanju ravnoteže snaga, a intervenišu tek ukoliko je ta ravnoteža značajno narušena a regionu prete hegemonija neke sile. Takvim delovanjem bi se smanjili troškovi i rizik od terorističkih napada, a Amerika bi za druge takmace u regionu predstavljala značajno manju pretnju.

Na prvi pogled strategija izgleda dobro, možda i previše dobro da bi bilo istinito. Međutim, uveren sam da bi strategija na terenu izgledala ponešto drugačije. Iako „obalaši“ tvrde da je strategija koju predlažu zasnovana na teoriji realizma, verujem da ignorišu četiri važna postulata iz realističke škole međunarodnih odnosa: prvo, realizam vidi stvarnost onakvu kakva jeste, a ne kakva bi trebalo da bude, dok zagovornici nove strategije zamagljuje posmatraju činjenice iz istorije i sadašnjosti; drugo, realisti smatraju da su ljudska priroda i priroda moći nepromenljive, a neorealisti i da struktura moći oblikuje ponašanje država, a ti postulati su makar delimično zanemareni u predlogu alternativne velike strategije SAD-a; treće, realisti tradicionalno sa dubokom sumnjom gledaju na saveze, dok su u uravnotežavanju sa obale oni osovina ili kičma strategije i na kraju, iz strateškog kalkulusa isključene su asimetrične pretnje koje su danas sve prisutnije.

Lekcije iz skorašnje istorije i sadašnjosti

Najpre, „obalaši“ zanemaruju neke činjenice iz bliže istorije. Strategija jeste bila primenjivana za vreme Hladnog rata, ali njeni rezultati nisu blistavi. Vašington je u periodu od 1945. bio prinuđen da direktno interveniše više puta: u Libanu 1958, pa opet 1982–1984, a onda i u Iraku 1990–1991. (Brands and Feaver 2016). Posle Zalivskog rata, Vašington je zadržao stalno vojno prisustvo u regionu procenivši da dvojno zaprečavanje (*dual containment*), strategija u kojoj Saudijska Arabija treba da obuzdava i Irak i Iran, nije održiva bez američke pomoći. Ipak, čak ni uz stalno prisustvo iranska i teroristička pretnja nisu uspešno adresirane. Iran razvija svoje proksije u Libanu, Siriji i Jemenu i počinje da predstavlja značajnu pretnju regionalnoj ravnoteži i stabilnosti. Dodatno, turbulentna istorija u iransko-američkim odnosima i dalje igra važnu ulogu u odnosu Teherana prema Vašingtonu. Trampovo unilateralno povlačenje iz Zajedničkog sveobuhvatnog plana delovanja (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) narušilo je i ono malo poverenja koje je postojalo između Irana i SAD.

Dodatni problem za strategiju uravnotežavanja sa obale predstavljao bi uticaj Kine i Rusije u regionu koji je poslednjih godina sve vidljiviji. Sve države Persijskog zaliva deo su kineske inicijative Pojas i put (Belt and Road), dok je kineski multilateralni pristup prisutan i u pregovorima o slobodnoj trgovini između Saveta

za saradnju u Zalivu (*Gulf Cooperation Council*) i Kine. Peking je danas najveći trgovinski partner Saudijske Arabije, Irana, Katara, Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata i među pet najvećih trgovinskih partnera Omana i Kuvajta. Pored toga, iako je Kina godinama bila vrlo „stidljiva“ sa svojim otiskom na Bliskom istoku, pokazatelj njene diplomatske moći bila je medijacija između Irana i Saudijske Arabije koja je ishodovala sporazumom o obnavljanju veza između država čiji su odnosi decenijama bili urušeni. Čini se da danas nikoga ne bi začudilo ukoliko bi Kina posredovala i u drugim sporovima u Persijskom zalivu i Bliskom istoku. U ovom trenutku nema naznaka da Kina želi snažniji vojni uticaj u ovom regionu, ali ukoliko pratimo istorijske procese velikih sila, po pravilu je posle ekonomske i diplomatske, sledila težnja ka uspostavljanju i projekciji vojne moći.

Pored Kine, izazivač uticaju Vašingtonu u regionu je i Rusija. Njen uticaj u Persijskom zalivu nije toliko snažan kao u drugim delovima Bliskog istoka, ali partnerstvo Moskve sa Teheranom svakako je poziv na oprez. Sa početkom rata u Ukrajini 24. februara 2022. jačala je i vojna dimenzija tog partnerstva. Iako je Moskva dugo odbijala da prebaci ili proda Teheranu visoko razvijenu vojnu tehnologiju, nedostatak oružja i municije na ratištu u Ukrajinu su je primorali na takve korake. Tokom nešto više od dve godine Iran je Rusiji dobavljao municiju, artiljerijske granate, dronove i balističke projekte, dok će put Teherana uskoro krenuti ruski napredni vazduhoplovi, helikopteri i protivvazdušni sistemi (Avdaliani 2024). Takođe, kada se ovome doda vojna saradnja između Rijada i Moskve, nije lako zaključiti da bi primena strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale otvorila Pandorinu kutiju iz koje ne znamo šta bi moglo da izađe.

Sa druge strane, povlačenjem Sjedinjenih Država iz Iraka 2011, iako ne potpunim, otvorio se dodatni prostor za jačanje terorizma. Vakuum koji je nastao američkim povlačenjem, odmah su nastojali da popune drugi akteri. Dakle, suprotno predviđanju „obalaša“, posle povlačenja SAD-a teroristička pretnja se nije smanjila, već je ojačala. Po prvi put su teroristi kontrolisali teritoriju koja je površinski bila velika gotovo koliko Italija. Tek intervencijom Rusije, Sjedinjenih Država i drugih sila, teroristička grupa koja sebe naziva Islamska država stavljena je pod kontrolu. Međutim, njen nestanak nije označio i kraj terorističke pretnje. Iako teza „obalaša“ da je politika SAD-a na Bliskom istoku, a posebno invazija na Irak 2003, pojačala otpor prema Vašingtonu i dodatno potpomogla jačanje terorističkih grupa, teško mi je da zamislim da bi brzo povlačenje dovelo do rešenja. Danas kada se teroristička pretnja ukaže, Sjedinjene Države zahvaljujući bazama u regionu mogu rapidno da reaguju. Uostalom lider Islamske države – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – ubijen je vazdušnim udarom letelicom koja je poletela iz Erbila, američke vazduhoplovne baze u Iraku. Slično je i sa granatiranjem pomorskih puteva od strane Huta. Povlačenje bi lišilo Vašington mogućnosti dobre logistike i brzog delovanja

Vakuum moći i strateški kontekst

U skladu sa predlogom „obalaša“, Sjedinjene Države bi se vojno u potpunosti povukle iz Persijskog zaliva, a održavanje ravnoteže snaga koja pogoduje nacionalnim interesima SAD-a prepustili bi saveznicima. Takva strategija gubi iz vida nekoliko faktora. Prvo, „isplovljanjem“ Vašingtona stvorio bi se ogroman vakuum moći koje bi druge države težile da popune. Kako navodi Hal Brends (2015b, 44) „dok bi revizionističke sile kojima se ne dopada postojeći poredak u Evropi, Persijskom zalivu i Istočnoj Aziji verovatno pozitivno gledali na američko povlačenje, mogli bi isto tako da iskoriste američko povlačenje da silovitije nametnu svoje zahteve“. Imajući u vidu aktuelne trendove i kontekst, revizionističke sile bi najverovatnije bile Kina, Rusija i Iran. Sa povlačenjem Sjedinjenih Država teret uravnotežavanja bi pao na saveznike za koje nije izvesno da imaju moći i volje da se suprotstave. Primera radi, dok je Vašington primenjivao strategiju uravnotežavanja sa obale u Persijskom zalivu, Sadam Husein je zaposeo kuvajtska naftna polja i pretio da isto učini sa saudijskim, nikoga nije bilo da ga spreči.

Ukoliko bi Sjedinjene Države bile prinuđene da iznova intervenišu kako bi sačuvale ravnotežu ili sprečile izrastanje novog hegemonu u regionu, što bi se po svoj prilici desilo brže nego što Vašington očekuje, morale bi to da učine u potpuno izmenjenim okolnostima. Prvo, Kina, Rusija i Iran bili bi izvesno uticajni i moćniji akteri u regionu nego što su danas, jer bi popunili zamašan deo vakuuma koji bi nastao američkim povlačenjem. Drugo, u odsustvu logistike i baza, Vašington više ne bi mogao da reaguje brzo i efikasno kao ranije. Upitno je i koliko bi saveznici bili radi da se uključe u rizične poduhvate ukoliko bi povlačenje SAD shvatili kao izdaju.

Na kraju, ukoliko je prisustvo Sjedinjenih Država neophodno u Istočnoj Aziji, zašto ne bi bilo i u drugim regionima? Ako se Amerika može oslanjati na saveznike u dva regiona, zašto ne bi u sva tri, a pogotovo imajući u vidu da su saveznici Vašingtona koji bi bili uravnoteživači Kine (Japan, Južna Koreja, Indija, Tajvan, Filipini i drugi) moćne i razvijene države?

Da li se sme verovati saveznicima?

Realisti su poslovično sumnjičavi prema ulozi saveza, a međunarodnu politiku doživljavaju kao odnose u kojima vlada sistem samopomoći. Dakle, sve institucije, i posebno savezi, zasnovani su na pažljivoj kalkulaciji troškova i koristi i odražavaju „lični interes koji je primarno zasnovan na brizi o relativnoj moći“ (Mearsheimer 1995, 5). Ukoliko im nije u interesu, države neće ulaziti u savez, niti u njima ostajati. Tokom Hladnog rata američki savezi su opstajali jer je Vašington predstavljao garanciju od pretnje koja dolazi od Sovjetskog Saveza, ili drugog moćnog regionalnog aktera kao

što je to vremenom postala Kina. Poslednjih 35 godina američki savezi u vitalnim regionima opstajali su zahvaljujući inerciji, strahu od američke moći ili luksuzu manjeg izdavanja za odbranu, jer ih je bezbednosni kišobran „Ujka Sema“ pokrivaio. Ukoliko se Sjedinjene Države vojno povuku iz Evrope i Bliskog istoka, da li možemo biti potpuno sigurni da će saveznici ostati lojalni? Da li će izvesno uravnotežavati novog hegemonu? Uostalom, uravnotežavanje je gotovo uvek bio domen moćnih i velikih sila, dok su se male države i srednje sile često opredeljivale za uskakanje u vagon (*bandwagoning*). Takođe, ukoliko uzmemo u obzir činjenicu da su Sjedinjene Države daleko, a iranska pretnja blizu, da li je potpuno isključeno da bi se zalivske države opredelile za Iran? Ili, imajući u vidu da su po načinu vladavine bliže Kini nego Sjedinjenim Državama i da im je Peking značajniji ekonomski partner od Vašingtona, da li možemo isključiti scenario u kome se u odsustvu američkih trupa u blizini zalivske države, umorne od kritika da su nedemokratske i nazadne, opredele da se svrstaju uz Kinu? Naravno, sva ova pitanja su uproščena i zanemaruju niz faktora, ali nisu van domena mogućeg i predstavljaju ogroman rizik za koji nisam siguran da su politički odlučioi u SAD-u spremni.

Postoji i drugi važan faktor. Pretpostavka „obalaša“ je da će američki saveznici u Zalivu biti dovoljno koherentni i voljni da dugoročno „sputavaju rast hegemonu koji bi moga da utiče na tok nafte iz tog regiona“ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 73). Žestoko narušavanje odnosa između Katara i Arapske lige, koja je bila predvođena zalivskim državama Saudijskom Arabijom, Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima i Bahreinom, dogodilo se 2017. godine. Diplomatska kriza i *de facto* blokada Dohe, pokazali su da su odnosi među američkim saveznicima daleko od idiličnih. Štaviše, Saudijska Arabija je optužila Katar za podršku terorizmu, a ključni od 13 zahteva su uključivali snižavanje nivoa odnosa sa Iranom i Turskom i zatvaranje dominantnog medija u arapskom svetu koji je pod kontrolom Dohe, Al Džazire. Kriza je okončana 2021, ali ključni problemi među zalivskim državama nisu rešeni. Iako su ključne strane u sporu bili Rijad i Doha, a sukob diplomatsko-ekonomski, kriza je ukazala na dve opasnosti: prvo, bez prisustva SAD-a u katarskoj vazduhoplovnoj bazi Al Udeid, sukob bi možda prerastao u oružani i drugo, potvrdila se istorijska tendencija da među saveznicima Vašingtona u Zalivu nema puno „lepka“.

Pored koherentnosti, nameće se i pitanje volje američkih saveznika u Persijskom zalivu da deluju u skladu sa interesima Vašingtona. Prosto, interesi saveznika ne moraju biti nužno podudarni interesima Sjedinjenih Država. Dodatno, razlog za brigu SAD-a je i težnja država u regionu ka dehijerarhizaciji (Lake 2009). Drugim rečima, Rijad i Doha teže da napuste hijerarhijski ustrojeni odnos sa SAD-om i vode nezavisniju spoljnu politiku. Primera radi, Katar je već dugo glavni medijator na Srednjem istoku, podržava različite pokrete, uključujući i neslavno Muslimansko bratstvo i razvija više nego srdačne odnose sa Teheranom, što ne nailazi na

pozitivne reakcije u Vašingtonu i Rijadu. S druge strane, Saudijska Arabija, takođe, nastoji da pronađe nove vektore spoljne politike saradujući, čak i vojno, sa Rusijom i nastojeći da uspostavi dominantnu poziciju na Srednjem istoku. I dehijerarhizacija i nekoherentnost se odvijaju pod budnim okom Vašingtona, te nije očigledan put kako primenom strategije offshore balancing stvari ne bi bile gore po SAD i kako bi takva strategija vodila ostvarenju američkih nacionalnih interesa.

Da li su asimetrične pretnje „mrtav ugao“ strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale?

Na kraju, „obalaši“ zanemaruju manjkavosti svih strategija koje su Sjedinjene Države primenjivale od 1945, a koje bi primena strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale multiplikovala. Naime, od Kautilje do danas, maksima „teško je pobediti neprijatelja kome ishodi znače mnogo više nego tebi“ (Bremmer 2015) pokazala se nepobedivom. Očigledno je da tu lekciju Sjedinjene Države nisu naučile u Koreji i Vijetnamu. Na kraju, pouke mogu biti izvučene i iz Avganistana i Iraka. Razlika u moći ne vodi uvek očekivanim ishodima, čak i ako su ishodi inicijalno povoljni. Naravno, na osnovu svih relevantnih indikatora vojne moći, Sjedinjene Države mogu danas da pobeđe bilo kog takmaca u Persijskom zalivu, ali je cena previsoka a dugoročni ishodi nepovoljni.

Borba protiv asimetričnih pretnji je takva da u njoj može puno da se izgubi, a malo toga da se dobije. Kada su Sjedinjene Države napadnute na svojoj kopnenoj teritoriji 11. septembra 2001. godine, prvi put posle gotovo dva veka NATO je na inicijativu SAD-a „odmrzao“ član 5. Vašingtonskog sporazuma i objavio rat terorizmu. Globalni rat protiv terora, koji se zvanično okončao američkim povlačenjem iz Avganistana, u najboljem slučaju bio je Pirova pobjeda Vašingtona, a u najgorem diplomatski i ekonomski fijasko. Zapravo, iako je zvanično okončan, rat protiv terorizma neće se završiti dok se ne uklone strukturalni uzroci njegovog trajanja i sve značajnijeg zamaha. A terorizam je samo jedna od asimetričnih pretnji Sjedinjenim Državama, iako najznačajnija.

Već je napomenuto da su SAD mogle uspešno da se nose sa Islamskom državom i lociraju i likvidiraju al-Bagdadija zahvaljujući dobroj logistici u prisustvu na terenu. Takođe, uspeali su da spreče Hute da trajno blokiraju Suecki kanal i Bab el Mandeb i spreče iranske proksije da dobiju još veći zamah na Bliskom istoku. U svemu u čemu su uspeali, a treba reći i da umnogome i nisu, uspeali su zahvaljujući direktnom prisustvu. Ukoliko Huti reše da blokiraju Ormuz i spreče tok nafte, ili zajedno sa iranskim saveznicima rade na regionalnoj hegemoniji Teherana, odsustvom Sjedinjenih Država neće imati ko da ih spreči, ili će u najboljem slučaju

proteći puno vremena. Isti je slučaj sa teroristima, koji i sa nesofisticiranom tehnologijom, kao što su dronovi za civilnu upotrebu naoružani eksplozivom ili rakete iz kućne radinosti, mogu da izazovu ogromnu pometnju i spreče normalni tok nafte, što je Americi ključni regionalni cilj. U takvim okolnostima bila bi potrebna brza reakcija, a Sjedinjene Države lišene direktnog prisustva to ne bi mogle da učine.

Zaključak

S obzirom na to da sam u poslednjem delu rada nastojao detaljnije da analiziram manjkavosti strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale i ukažem da nema jasnih indikatora da bi ova strategija bolje štitila američke nacionalne interese u Persijskom zalivu od postojeće strategije, u zaključku ću nastojati da ukratko odgovorim na jedno važno pitanje koje nije adekvatno adresirano u radu, a za koje držim da je značajno: da li je strategija uravnotežavanja sa obale bolja od svojih alternativa?

Izolacionizam, uravnotežavanje sa obale, selektivno angažovanje i duboko angažovanje, svaka od ovih strategija ima empirijsko uporište u strateškoj istoriji SAD-a. Naravno, svaka je imala vrlina i manjkavosti, pogotovo posmatrano kroz prizmu strateškog konteksta u kome se primenjivala. Imajući u vidu baš strateški kontekst, odnosno da danas živimo u bitno drugačijem vremenu nego pre 150, 75 ili 15 godina, bilo bi nezahvalno da se o njihovoj budućoj upotrebi odlučuje kroz prizmu istorijskog uspeha/neuspeha. S druge strane, na papiru, uravnotežavanje sa obale je idealna strategija SAD-a. U strateškoj razmeri ciljevi–način–sredstva–kontekst, tvorci ove strategije tvrde da donosi najviše koristi po najnižoj ceni. Uravnotežavanje sa obale je sprovodiva strategija i, po mom sudu, najverovatnija je američka strategija 2050. godine. Ipak, čini mi se da ona u ovom trenutku nije najbolja opcija, već strategija selektivnog angažovanja, a na takav zaključak me navode tri faktora: efekat šoka, strateški kontekst i američka moć.

Ubrzano povlačenje Sjedinjenih Država iz Evrope i Persijskog zaliva proizvelo bi efekat šoka kod najbližih saveznika. Bez obzira na povremene trzavice na relaciji Berlin–Vašington, Pariz–Vašington ili Rijad–Vašington, strah od američkog odlaska daleko nadjačava nelagodu zbog prisustva kolosalne američke moći. Napuštanje bez dugotrajne i dobro isplanirane pripreme stvorio bi metež u kome ishodi moguće ne bi bili dobri ni za SAD ni za saveznike. U Evropi bi moguća alternativa bila ostvarivanje degolističkog sna o jačanju EU u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane, a takva EU ne bi nužno delovala u skladu sa interesima SAD-a. U Persijskom zalivu bi situacija bila još kompleksnija, a saveznici iz Zaliva su značajno manje vezani za Vašington nego Evropljani. Bez američkih baza i štita od Irana i asimetričnih pretnji,

scenariji kao što su ulaženje u stanje dublje anarhije ili uskakanje u vagon druge sile, ni najmanje nisu nezamislivi.

Drugi faktor je strateški kontekst. Brzo isplavljanje broda USS Amerika na put preko Atlantika, ostavio bi vakuum moći koje bi druge sile, pre svega revizionističke i neprijateljski nastrojene prema Vašingtonu, nastojale da popune. Primeri Prvog zalivskog rata (1990–1991), američkog povlačenja iz Avganistana ili današnjeg rata u Ukrajini pokazuju da vreme za uravnotežavanje sa obale još uvek nije sazrelo. Saveznici za to nisu spremni, a Sjedinjene Države su, još uvek, neophodna (indispensable) sila u brojnim regionima sveta: u Evropi usled nasrtljive politike Ruske Federacije, Istočnoj Aziji zbog nepoznanica u pogledu prirode i načina rasta Kine, i Persijskom zalivu gde američki takmaci dobijaju na snazi i uticaju. Ukoliko se i uzme kao validan argument da Sjedinjene Države ne moraju da haju za metež koji nastaje njihovim povlačenjem i da su sigurne u „Tvrđavi Amerika“, taj argument poništava činjenica da bi i američki nacionalni interesi u ključnim regionima bili ugroženi.

Treći faktor ukazuje da negativne posledice koje bi primena strategije uravnotežavanja sa obale moguće proizvela nisu nužne. Američka moć je, još uvek, kolosalna. Da, „obalaši“ su u pravu da američka relativna moć opada. Uostalom, i tvrdnje o američkom deklinizmu nisu nove (Simić i Živojinović 2010). Ipak, u poslednjih 35 godina apsolutna moć SAD-a je gotovo neprestano rasla. Dok je opadanje za najmoćnije aktere u međunarodnim odnosima neminovnost, unipolarnost i njeno produženo trajanje nisu. Amerika je i danas, bez premca, najmoćnija sila sveta. Ukoliko izuzmemo akumuliranu moć, SAD za odbranu u 2024. izdvajaju više nego narednih 10 država zajedno (GlobalFirepower 2024), američki nominalni bruto društveni proizvod biće u 2024. za trećinu veći od kineskog (IMF 2024), sa Ujedinjenim Kraljevstvom deli prvo mesto u indeksu meke moć (Brand Finance 2024) i ima ubedljivo najrazgranatiju mrežu saveznika. Iako je moć potrošna i „obalaši“ s pravom kritikuju rasipanje novca američkih poreskih obaveza i strategiju dubokog angažovanja koja obavezuje Ameriku van svake mere, Sjedinjene Države još uvek imaju dovoljno moći da održe institucije poretka u čijem su stvaranju imali zamašnu ulogu. I ne samo da ih održe. SAD jesu plaćale održavanje poretka, ali nisu ostali neuzvrraćeni blagodetima iz institucija koje su stvarale ili pregovora gde su nastupali kao dominantna sila.

Istorija i priroda međunarodnih odnosa navode na zaključak da će se američki otisak u svetu smanjiti, ali taj trenutak nije danas. Nažalost, i po običaju, međunarodni odnosi nisu najveštiji u pronicanju kada će se taj trenutak desiti. Ipak, kada bude došao, uravnotežavanje sa obale biće najpodesnija strategija za zaštitu američkih interesa. Do tada, najbolja nada Vašingtona je velika strategija selektivnog angažovanja – štednja a ne škrtičarenje, pokazivanje mišića, ali bez ulaženja u nepotrebne bitke. Na kraju, imajući u vidu sve izneto u ovom radu,

uveren sam da, ko god pobedio na predsedničkim izborima u SAD-u 5. novembra 2024, selektivno angažovanje ostaje dominantna ideja u Beloj kući i američka strategija koja će potrajati više od nekoliko izbornih ciklusa.

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THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
– IS IT TIME FOR *OFFSHORE BALANCING*?

Abstract: As the unipolar moment wanes and the world approaches multipolarity, academic debates are intensifying about the future grand strategy of the United States. This paper contributes to that debate by analysing *offshore balancing*, a grand strategy proposal from the neorealist academic camp. The key research question addressed is whether *offshore balancing* is the most appropriate strategy for pursuing the vital national interests of the United States today. Using the Persian Gulf, one of three key regions for US national interests, as a case study, this paper argues that the time is not ripe for offshore balancing. This strategy shares similar shortcomings with the current deep engagement strategy: it occasionally ignores historical lessons and present realities; it overlooks the dangers of a power vacuum and the changed strategic context resulting from an American withdrawal; it places excessive trust in alliances whose effectiveness is often doubted even by realists; and it fails to account for the emergence of asymmetric threats in the 21st century, which are difficult to address quickly and effectively. Finally, the paper contends that, while *offshore balancing* may become the US's grand strategy by 2050, selective engagement will likely take precedence until then.

Keywords: United States, grand strategy, national interest, *offshore balancing*, Persian Gulf, neorealism.

National interest implementation Matrix: Evaluating and measuring Serbia's achievements

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Abstract: This paper develops a matrix for measuring the realisation/degree of successful implementation of the national interest of the Republic of Serbia. The theoretical foundation of this matrix is “thin” constructivism in international relations, which is based on ontological inter-subjectivism and epistemological positivism. The methodology relies on two main pillars: the first defines Serbian national interests and their hierarchy, while the second measures the extent of their implementation/realisation. These pillars utilise a mix of various data collection and analysis methods, including desk research, descriptive statistics, content analysis, public opinion polls, and expert surveys. This paper’s primary theoretical aim is to enhance national interest in international relations by providing a tool to measure its implementation. The main empirical and policy goal is to assess the current state of Serbia’s national interest implementation. The analysis reveals that the implementation rate of Serbia’s national interest is just over 40% (an index score of 2.61 on a 1-5 scale). The paper also pinpoints specific areas that require policy improvements to enhance this score in the future.

Keywords: national interest, implementation matrix, Republic of Serbia, measuring, thin constructivism, inter-subjectivity, foreign policy strategy.

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Introduction

National interest is one of the most contested concepts in political science. Approaches to the ontology of national interest in international relations (IR) vary from completely objectivistic to entirely subjectivistic (Frankel 1970, 16). This concept is also an essential tool of political action, used by decision-makers and other stakeholders to mobilise support for the pursuance of a concrete policy and/or legitimise its implementation (Rosenau 1968). Even though world politics witnesses the rise of the influence of non-state actors, nation-states are still the most important units in the international system. Therefore, the concept of national interest is still very relevant to describe and prescribe (foreign) policy (Nye, 1999).

This paper focuses on the policy-prescription dimension of this concept. To make a concrete policy useful, rational, and adjustable to changing circumstances and hold policymakers accountable for their decisions, it is important to develop instruments for measuring the fulfilment of the national interest. However, matrices developed for this purpose are still very rare. This paper develops the National Interest Implementation Matrix, designed to measure the success of implementation in the case of the Republic of Serbia. By providing an answer to how to measure the implementation of Serbia's national interest, the paper contributes to the empirical literature on its foreign policy.

To address this research question, we first assess what Serbia's national interests are. They are formally proclaimed by the National Security Strategy (MoD 2019, 31-34). However, this strategy does not offer a clear hierarchy between different interests. The ranking of different (even conflicting) national interests seems blurry even in politicians' everyday speeches and acts. Different societal groups have different positions about which national interests should be prioritised (Viskovic 2018). Through a thorough analysis of how decision-makers articulate this topic and how the public and experts understand it, the paper explores the hierarchization of Serbian national interests and measures their implementation.

The theoretical approach is based on constructivism. International society is approached as ontologically inter-subjective and socially constructed through internal interpretations. Therefore, we follow a dynamic in the decision-makers-public opinion-experts triangle. However, like Wendt (1999), we adopt a positivistic epistemological approach, claiming that implementing national interests could be measured with appropriate methods. Desk research of primary and secondary sources, a public opinion poll, and an expert survey are used as the main data collection methods, with content analysis, descriptive statistics, qualitative and quantitative expert assessment, scaling, and indexing being the main data-analysis methods.

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Considering that the primary goal of this paper is to evaluate the degree to which Serbia's national interests are implemented, we focus on two critical issues: (1) conceptualisation and (2) measurement (Mnuck et al. 2020, 331). The main conceptual division regarding national interest in IR theory is between "objectivists", claiming that it exists independently of the views of individuals or groups, and "subjectivists", assuming that it varies depending on perceptions (Jović and Krstić 2024; Miletić 1978). The more precise classification outlines two triptychs: deductive/systemic/enduring and inductive/synthetic/temporary (Giusti 2022, 53).

Adcock and Collier (2001, 532-533) highlight that the stance on one concept depends on understanding other connected concepts or on the theoretical approach. The first triptych mostly corresponds to the realist school, perceiving national security and survival in the anarchic international system as the enduring core of national interest (Burchill 2005, 45; Trifunović and Ćurčić 2021, 82). The neoliberal paradigm also focuses on the systemic origin of interest and its objective essence, but claims that states focus on a broader range of interests besides survival, such as welfare or independence (George and Keohane, 1980). The second triptych consists of critically orientated approaches, most notably behavioralists (Giusti 2022, 25), classic liberal pluralists, or Marxists (Krasner 1978, 20-30), focusing on the particular interests of individuals, groups, or classes that stand behind proclaimed "national" interests.

This paper adopts a relatively middle-ground approach between two triptychs based on IR constructivism. Although Burchill (2005, 205) locates constructivism in the subjectivist camp of the literature, this approach is distinctive in its ontological inter-subjectivism. The inter-subjectivity approach perceives national interest as discursively and practically shaped by shared understandings of this concept within a group, influenced by various internal and external social elements (Weldes 1996). Constructivism treats national interest as temporary/changeable, but it also acknowledges that its content could endure for a long period due to the relative stability of social structures. Wendt (1999, 235-237) even adds a systemic element to his constructivist analysis, claiming that states usually have similar interests: survival, welfare, independence, and collective self-esteem.

The question of measuring is essentially connected with the epistemological approach. While positivists assume it is possible to gather knowledge about reality using adequate methods relatively accurately, interpretivists focus on "discourse, context, or traditions" (Furlong and Marsh 2010, 199). The first triptych is generally associated with positivism, and the second with interpretivism. However, this is

not strict, considering that scientific “realism” combines ontological positivism with epistemological interpretivism (Furlong and Marsh 2010, 204-205). Drawing on Wendt’s (1999) constructivism, this paper adopts positivist epistemology, assuming that the concept of national interest, despite its intersubjective ontology, could be relatively precisely conceptualised and measured using appropriate methods.

The second measuring-related question is what data we rely on to determine the content and measure the implementation of national interests. Chong-Han Wu (2017) developed a pioneering comparative matrix of indicators for measuring the national interest, starting from the assumption that the main national interest of all states could be grouped into well-being in the fields of security, community, and economy. While acknowledging that these interests are expected for most states, we believe that the conceptualisation of interest and the following operationalisation of indicators must be contextualised to the example in which we inquire. Regarding data, we assume that the implementation could be measured using relatively reliable, unbiased data, such as indexes based on statistical results or expert assessments.

Our starting assumption is that complex social phenomena should be investigated at the level of the structural components that constitute them and then through the measurement of those components. Since the positivist turn in the social sciences, measurement is viewed as a “general process by which numbers are assigned to objects so that it is also understood which types of mathematical operations can be legitimately used” (Alaimo 2023, 36). By collecting data and measuring them, we create a “process that allows the social scientist to move from the realm of abstract, indirectly observable concepts and theories into the world of sense experience” (McGaw and Watson 1976, 205). We strive to consider two key aspects of measurement: reliability and validity. Reliability means that the process and method of measurement are repeatable by any other researcher. Validity is achieved when the results “meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 530).

Building on the mentioned theoretical foundations and approach to measurement, the methodological approach developed in this paper is based on two pillars. The first pillar is designed to outline Serbian national interests and their hierarchy of importance, focusing on three analytical units that participate in articulating the national interest: political elites (decision-makers), public opinion, and experts. We conduct the following steps:

- 1) Desk research is conducted to gather the essential strategic documents and relevant recent program speeches of Serbian high officials, whose content is then analysed to outline what *decision-makers* present as the main national interest;

- 2) A public opinion poll on a representative sample is conducted to gather data about citizens' perceptions of national interests, which are then analysed using descriptive statistics to outline the hierarchy that *public opinion* makes between interests;
- 3) An expert survey with more than 30 participants is conducted to gather data on *experts'* stances on national interests, which is then analysed using descriptive statistics.

The second pillar is based on the combination of three methods, of which the first one is the most dominant. However, to decrease the possibility of subjectivity, which might arise from relying only on the first method, we conduct the following steps:

- 1) Authors' qualitative assessment of the implementation of national interests based on the data collected in desk research, indicating the fulfilment of the concrete goals listed in the National Security Strategy, which is then quantified and scaled in grades (1 to 5);
- 2) Correction of the findings from previous steps (to avoid potential subjectivity) through the inclusion of the findings of the expert poll, designed to evaluate the implementation of Serbian national interests;
- 3) Calculating the Implementation Index by summarising the values from the previous two weighted with their relative importance measured in the first pillar.

National Interest of Serbia: Outlining the Components

Studies of Serbia's national interests usually start with analysing official normative acts—laws, strategies, resolutions, etc. (Novaković 2013). Lipovac and Dimitrijević (2015; 2017) analysed the speeches of Serbian prime ministers from 2007 to 2017 to classify the intensity of national interests using Neuchterlein's matrix. Building on these studies, we analyse Serbian strategic documents to outline formally defined national interests. Considering that the strategic framework changes occasionally, we also focus on the program speeches of decision-makers to catch a more dynamic articulation of national interests. Afterwards, we analyse the public opinion poll and expert survey findings. We use Neuchterlein's (1976) matrix to classify national interests' intensity: (1) existential, 2) vital, 3) important, and 4) marginal.

Analysis of Strategic Documents

The National Security Strategy outlines the following national interests (MoD 2019, 31-34):

- 1) preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity;
- 2) preservation of internal stability and security;
- 3) preserving the existence and protection of the Serbian people wherever they live, as well as national minorities and their cultural, religious, and historical identity;
- 4) preservation of peace and stability in the region and the world;
- 5) European integration and membership in the European Union;
- 6) economic development and overall prosperity;
- 7) preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia.

There is no mention of ranking the interests by their relative importance/priority. Some interests are additionally emphasised in other normative acts. Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the first two interests seem the most important. Also, the 2005 National Strategy for EU Accession (still formally valid) proclaims EU membership as a strategic goal. Strategies in other fields emphasise economic development as a strategic interest. Therefore, certain interests seem to be more in the spotlight, but the hierarchy remains blurry due to the unclarity of the National Security Strategy.

Analysis of program speeches of decision-makers

The Government of the Republic of Serbia has the formal authority to define the country's foreign and security policy. Therefore, we focus on the government programme represented to the National Assembly by the Prime Minister before the election of the Cabinet. Considering that Serbia has only recently changed its government (the current one was elected in May 2024), we will analyse the programme speeches of the current and previous governments.³

The programme of Prime Minister Ana Brnabić from 2022 mentions national/state/citizen interests 12 times. In order of appearance, the two interests

³ We acknowledge the fact that the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has the biggest influence on the shaping of foreign and security policy in practice, despite his limited formal authority. However, considering that his inaugural speech from 2024 did not directly involve concretisation of the national interest (POTRS 2022), we will focus only on speeches of prime ministers Vučević and Brnabić.

mentioned the most explicitly are: (a) EU membership and (b) protection of territorial integrity. Even though economic development is not explicitly mentioned as the national interest, this domain is stressed as crucial in several parts of the document. The following interests are also labelled as important: independence (“full independence of Serbia in decision-making”); preservation of political stability and economic empowerment of the Serbs in Kosovo (including the return of property to Serbs and return of refugees) with parallel continuity of dialogue with Priština; and respect of the fundamental rights, language, identity, religion, and cultural heritage of Serbs in the region (Brnabić 2022).

The programme of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević from 2024 also mentions this term more than a dozen times. The most explicit reference was in the foreign policy section, which emphasises that the entire foreign policy “must have its grounding in the national interests of the Republic of Serbia”, outlining the two most important components of the national interests: a) defence of territorial integrity; and b) preservation of all developmental potentials. Membership in the EU was also stated as a “strategic goal of the Republic of Serbia”, which is “in the interest of our economy (...) and therefore in the interest of the state and citizens”. Therefore, EU membership seems to be secondary to the highest interest: economic development. Similarly, the preservation of peace in the regional and global context was also mentioned in the context of something necessary for economic growth (Vučević 2024).

In two analysed programmes, the following interests were emphasised: preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; preservation of internal stability and security; and economic development and overall prosperity (Table 1). The lowest ranking is the preservation of the environment and resources, the only interest from the Strategy that was not explicitly mentioned and labelled as the national interest in the two programs.

Table 1. Hierarchy of Serbia's National Interests as Defined by the Last Two Prime Ministers⁴

Level	Interest
Existential	Preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity
	Preservation of internal stability and security
	Economic development and overall prosperity
Vital	European integration and membership in the European Union
	Preservation of the peace and stability in the region and the world
Important	Preserving the existence and protection of the Serbian people (...)
Marginal	Preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia

Public opinion poll

The public opinion poll was conducted from August 5 to 15, 2022, for the scientific project National(S), funded by the Science Fund of the Republic of Serbia. The TAPI (Tablet-Assisted Personal Interview) survey method involved conducting face-to-face interviews with 1,186 respondents, selected by using a representative three-stage random stratified sampling method, with a confidence interval of $\pm 2.8\%$ and an expected incidence rate of 50%. The questionnaire consisted of 48 questions, primarily close-ended, and aimed to investigate perceptions of Serbia's national interest. Respondent randomisation occurred at three levels: polling stations, households, and selecting the household member with the nearest upcoming birthday. The demographic data shows our sample corresponds to census data (49.5% of respondents were male and 50.5% were female). The average age was 48 years, with almost 53% of them from urban areas and 47% from rural settings. One-quarter (25%) of respondents completed only primary education, 54% finished secondary education, and 21% obtained higher education degrees.

Citizens perceive that the seven national interests outlined in the Strategy are (completely or mostly) important (Table 1). However, EU membership is perceived as important only by a relative majority (49.3%), making it the lowest-ranked interest. The highest ranked is the preservation of internal security, as the only interest ranked by more than two-thirds of participants (72.2%) as "completely important" (in addition to 21% perceiving it as "mostly important"). Other interests

⁴All tables and graphs in this paper resulted from the research conducted within the project National Interests of the Republic of Serbia: from Contestation to Legitimation – National(s), supported by the Science Fund of the Republic of Serbia No. 7752625.

had positive scores of more than 80% of respondents (“completely” and “mostly important” combined—between 86.3% and 89.4%). Considering minimal differences, it is hard to hierarchise interests between 2nd and 6th place.


Table 2. Perceived Importance of Categories in Serbia’s National Interest

	Not at all	Mostly no	Neither yes nor no	Mostly yes	Completely	Don’t know
Preservation of sovereignty	0.4%	0.5%	4.7%	29.7%	62.4%	2.2%
Preservation of territorial integrity	0.5%	1.2%	8.4%	25.1%	63.4%	1.5%
Preservation of political independence	0.7%	1.5%	8.5%	25.2%	62.6%	1.5%
Preservation of Serbia’s military neutrality	2.2%	2.4%	10.7%	24.9%	56.9%	2.9%
Preservation of internal security	/	0.4%	4.9%	21%	72.2%	1.3%
Preservation of Serbian identity and tradition	0.6%	1.4%	7.3%	25.3%	64.3%	1.1%
Preservation and protection of the Serbian people wherever they live	0.9%	1.6%	9.5%	24.6%	61.5%	1.9%
Preservation of national minorities in Serbia	1.1%	2.4%	11.1%	25.3%	57.9%	2.2%
Preservation of peace and stability in the region and the world	0.7%	2.1%	6.3%	23.6%	65.2%	2.1%
Membership in the European Union	21.5%	7.6%	15.9%	22.1%	27.2%	5.7%
Economic development and overall prosperity	0.3%	1.6%	7.6%	23.2%	65%	2.3%
Preservation of the environment and natural resources of Serbia	0.3%	2.3%	8.5%	25%	61.7%	2.2%

To further rank national interests, we draw on a question in which citizens had to choose one out of the different offered groups of interests as the most important. To make the question less abstract, we grouped interests into five broader categories and explained their content (e.g., economic interests—economic growth, higher

income, a better living standard). Answers to this question indicate the dominance of economic interests as the most favourable choice for 47% of respondents, with the solid second position of “political interests” (such as the preservation of Kosovo and Metohija as a part of Serbia). Other groups (identity, ecological, and democratic interests) all had similar ranks, between 9% and 11% (Graph 1).

Graph 1. Perceived Importance of Serbia's National Interests



Combining the findings from the first and second questions, we can conclude that, besides preserving internal stability and security, economic development and overall prosperity could be qualified among the most important (“existential”) interests in citizens’ view. The following tier (“vital”) are “political” interests: the preservation of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and the preservation of peace and stability in the region and the world. A bit lower (but still “important”) are identity interests (preserving the existence and protection of the Serbian people wherever they live, as well as national minorities and their cultural, religious, and historical identity) and ecological interests (preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia). The last place (“marginal”) in a citizens’ view is reserved for European integration and membership in the European Union, as previously mentioned.

Table 3. Classification of Citizens' Preferences Using the Nuechterlein's Scale

Level	Interest
Existential	Preservation of internal stability and security
	Economic development and overall prosperity
Vital	Preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity
	Preservation of the peace and stability in the region and the world
Important	Preserving the existence and protection of the Serbian people (...)
	Preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia
Marginal	European integration and membership in the European Union

Expert survey

An expert survey was conducted June from 1 to 10, 2024, for the scientific project National(S). The survey was electronically distributed to a panel of 45 people identified by the authors as relevant experts in international relations, foreign policy, and security (35 researchers from universities and institutes, ten former diplomats, or think-tank experts). The survey was anonymous, and it was distributed and analysed using Google Forms. The questionnaire consisted of six sets of questions about the hierarchy of Serbian national interests, the state of their implementation, and the influence of the war in Ukraine on them. More than 70% of the contacted experts completed the survey (32/45). Considering the relatively smaller size of the expert community, we treat this as a reliable illustration of the attitude of Serbian experts in this field.

Table 4. Estimated importance of the following national interests for the Republic of Serbia today (small n = 32)

	Not at all important	Less important	Partially important	Very important	Of key importance
Preservation of sovereignty (...)			1	16	15
Preservation of internal stability and security			1	13	18
Preservation of the existence and protection of the Serbian people (...)		1	7	20	4
Preservation of peace and stability (...)		2	2	17	11
European integration (...)		2	10	13	7
Economic development and overall prosperity			2	14	16
Preservation of the environment (...)	3	2	4	12	11

The findings confirm the dominance of the preservation of internal stability and security (18 experts consider it “of key importance” and 13 consider it to be “very important”). Behind them are the preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as economic development and overall prosperity. Similar to the attitude of citizens, EU membership is at the bottom of the hierarchy. Still, this does not mean that experts consider this interest to be marginal, considering that a clear majority of 20 experts claim that this interest is either very important (13) or of key importance (7), with an additional ten experts considering it to be at least partially important. In that sense, this result is close to the score of the following two interests, some of which even have fewer answers that they are “of key importance”. Therefore, we leave the “marginal” category empty (Table 5).

Table 5. Classification of Experts’ Preferences Using the Nuechterlein’s Scale

Level	Interest
Existential	Preservation of internal stability and security
	Preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity
	Economic development and overall prosperity
Vital	Preservation of the peace and stability in the region and the world
Important	Preserving the existence and protection of the Serbian people (...)
	Preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia
	European integration and membership in the European Union

Summary: A three-tier model for calculating the relative importance of national interests

To calculate the relative value of national interests, we triangulate the data gathered from analysing stances on national interests among three tiers of the model (decision-makers, public opinion, and experts). For interests classified as “existential”, we assign 5 points; for “vital”, 4 points; “important”, 3 points; and “marginal”, 2 points. We establish the hierarchy based on the final score.

Table 6. A three-tier model for calculating national interests

Interest	Decision-makers	Public opinion	Experts	Total	%
Preservation of internal stability and security	5 (existential)	5 (existential)	5 (existential)	15	18,5%
Economic development and overall prosperity	5 (existential)	5 (existential)	5 (existential)	15	18,5%
Preservation of sovereignty (...)	5 (existential)	4 (crucial)	5 (existential)	14	17%
Maintenance of peace and stability (...)	4 (crucial)	4 (crucial)	4 (crucial)	12	14,5%
European integration (...)	4 (crucial)	2 (marginal)	3 (important)	9	11%
Preservation and protection of the existence of the Serbian people (...)	3 (important)	3 (important)	3 (important)	9	11%
Preservation of the environment (...)	2 (marginal)	3 (important)	3 (important)	8	9,5%

National Interest of Serbia: Measuring the Implementation

To measure the degree of implementation, similarly to Nedeljković and Dašić (2024), we take as indicators concrete, narrower goals defined by the National Security Strategy for each interest. The total number of indicators is 32. The degree of implementation is calculated by the average value of all indicators for one interest. The grade for implementing an indicator is assigned based on analysing the relevant sources for the situation in that field. The grading scale is from 1 (not implemented at all) to 5 (completely implemented), with the possibility of assigning the mid-grades (1.5-4.5). The grade assignment is conducted by the authors of the paper, who have expertise in Serbian politics and foreign policy. Each assignment is briefly explained. To avoid bias and subjectivity, we correct the grade of implementation assigned by authors with the average value for the implementation of each indicator assigned by experts in the mentioned expert survey. The final implementation value for each indicator is calculated as the average of a grade assigned by authors and a grade from an expert survey.

INTEREST 1: Preservation of internal stability and security—score 2.37

Indicator 1.1: Protection of human and minority rights and freedoms of citizens—2.86 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.71)

The Freedom House (2003) report classifies Serbia as “partially free”, with a constant backsliding for almost ten years. Organisations from Serbia also have a series of complaints (BCLJP 2024). Reporters Without Borders warned of the decline of media freedom (RWB 2024). The EU progress report classifies Serbia as having only “some level of preparation” and “limited progress” in negotiating Chapter 23, including fundamental rights (EC 2023). However, despite some controversial situations (e.g., the prohibition of a festival promoting cooperation with Albanians, “Mirdita–Dobar dan” in 2024, or the partial recalling of the Euro-Pride in Belgrade in 2022), flagrant cases of breaking minority rights are still exceptions.

Indicator 1.2: The rule of law and further development of democracy and democratic institutions—2.2 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 1.89)

The EU progress report (EC 2023) criticises the inefficiency of the prosecution and certain fallacies in the judiciary system. Controversies regarding the recent removal of certain prosecutors exemplify the existing problems (Inasajder, 2024). Regarding democracy, the ODIHR/OSCE reported many problems in the Serbian elections. Freedom House (2023) classifies Serbia as a hybrid regime, while Serbian expert organisations claim that elections are not free and fair (CRTA 2023). However, the recent formation of the parliamentary working group, which should handle the ODIHR recommendations, slightly improves the impression.

Indicator 1.3: Improving the security of citizens, the state, and society—2.41 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 2.31)

Despite the relative efficiency of police and intelligence, the fact that Serbia had two mass murders in only two days in 2023 (one of them in elementary school) indicated the fragility of the citizens’ security. These events have also triggered the biggest protest gathering of Serbian citizens this century. Also, the femicide rate in Serbia is high in comparison to European standards (Pavlov, 2023). However, certain recent acts, such as the moratorium on issuing new weapon permits, might have positive effects.

Indicator 1.4: Normalisation of conditions and relations in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija—1.85 (authors: 2, expert survey: 1.7)

Normalisation dialogue is in a deep crisis, despite agreements from 2023. Many agreements (including establishing the Community/Association of Serb-Majority

Municipalities) have still not been implemented. The security situation for Serbs worsened after Serbs in the North left Kosovo police and other institutions in 2022. Instead of a politically compromising solution, the government in Priština just filled the institutional vacuum with Albanians (including special police forces). Although this is primarily a fault of the radical agenda of Aljbin Kurti's government, the armed incident in Banjska in 2023 demonstrated that Belgrade does not have total control over security dynamics among local Serbs and that violence could occur from extreme wings on both sides. Still, the dialogue remains formally active.

Indicator 1.5: Efficient public administration—2.61
(authors: 3; expert survey: 2.22)

This is one area in which Serbia witnesses continuous progress, especially when it comes to digitalisation and the introduction of e-government services. However, there are still some “dark pockets” of inefficient state administration, especially when it comes to corruption in certain sectors. In that regard, Serbia is among the worst states in Europe.

INTEREST 2: Economic development and overall prosperity—score 2.73

Indicator 2.1: Improvement in citizens' standard of living—2.85 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.69)

According to World Bank data, Serbia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has steadily increased over the past 12 years. For instance, the GDP per capita in 2012 was \$5,340, reaching its highest level in 2023 at \$7,740 (TA 2024a). Another important indicator of the citizens' standard of living is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). A temporal analysis over the past 12 years shows that PPP has been rising. The initial position in 2012 was \$16,900, increasing to \$24,500 in 2023 (TA 2024b). However, since 2022, a significant rise in food prices has threatened the standard of living. According to data from the National Bank, consumer prices in Serbia increased by 11.9% from 2021 to 2022 (RZS 2023).

Indicator 2.2: Economic growth—2.91 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.81)

According to World Bank data, Serbia's GDP has increased by \$31.88 billion over the past 12 years. In 2012, the GDP was \$43.31 billion, rising to \$75.19 billion by 2023 (TA 2024c). However, examining the last three years, a more sensitive growth and progress index, the Full-Year GDP Growth, reveals a downward trend since 2021. In 2021, the full-year GDP growth was 7.389%, but it declined to 2.528% by 2023 (TA 2024d).

Indicator 2.3: Improvement of education, scientific, and technological development—2.37 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 2.23)

Regarding innovation and overall advancements, Serbia moved up two places in the Global Innovation Index last year, from 53rd to 55th (WIPO 2023). However, in a comparative context, Serbia holds a poor position (32nd out of the 39 ranked European economies). Innovation and technological progress are closely linked to education. According to the PISA test data over the past decade, the average results were roughly the same in mathematics, reading, and science, indicating slow or minimal progress in the education system. Serbia's average score in science for 15-year-olds is 447 points, compared to the OECD average of 485 points (OECD 2024).

Indicator 2.4: Improvement of economic and energy security—2.77 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.53)

According to the World Energy Trilemma Index, energy security has remained relatively unchanged over the last decade. However, since 2020, following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, each subsequent year has shown slight improvements in energy stability, security, and equity (WEC 2023). Examining various energy security factors from 2011 to 2021, Serbia has made progress in energy import dependency and diversity of electricity generation, especially after finishing the interconnector with Bulgaria.

INTEREST 3: Preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity—score 2.79

Indicator 3.1: Deterrence from armed threats and effective defense—3.73 (authors: 4; expert survey: 3.45)

The Global Firepower Index ranks the Serbian Army 56th in the world, which is a better score than any other Western Balkan state. From neighbours, only Hungary (54) and Romania (47) have a higher rank than Serbia (GFI 2024). Serbian military power is rising. Serbia is among the smaller percentage of states that spend more than 2% of their GDP on defence (World Bank 2024). The most important global actors acknowledge Serbia's military neutrality. The announced purchase of the French aircraft "Rafale" could further improve capabilities.

Indicator 3.2: Preservation of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija in the Republic of Serbia—1.78 (authors: 2; expert survey: 1.56)

There is a longer negative trend in this regard. Many Serbian institutions (such as the interior or judiciary) were removed from North Kosovo in the mid-2010s,

while the Community/Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (agreed in 2013/2015) has never been formed. Belgrade has recently accepted removing many remaining elements of its presence/sovereignty. The latest concessions included the acceptance of RKS (“Republic of Kosovo”) car plates and all documents issued by the government in Priština (e.g., ID cards). Moreover, in the 2023 Brussels/Ohrid Agreement, Belgrade accepted not to block membership of Priština in international organisations. However, the statement that there is no possibility for formal recognition of Kosovo or its UN membership indicates at least some red lines.

Indicator 3.3: Strengthening the reputation and international position of the Republic of Serbia—2.72 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.44)

Serbia has recently enhanced its strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China (“Community of the Common Destiny”), parallely aiming to establish a strategic dialogue with the US. The strategic partnership with Russia is still valid, while relations with the EU are of a special character due to Serbia’s candidacy. Serbia has general confirmation from all four foreign policy “pillars” regarding its international position. Hosting a specialised EXPO 2027 indicates an improved reputation. Still, despite the somewhat lower number of states that supported it, Serbia failed to prevent the adoption of the Resolution on Srebrenica in the UNGA (proclaimed by the government to be problematic), which indicates limits to its influence.

Indicator 3.4: Prevention and elimination of separatist activities—2.92 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.83)

Political representatives of national minorities are integrated into political institutions in Belgrade and Novi Sad (AP Vojvodina) and local governments in Vojvodina and Southwestern Serbia (Sandžak). Interethnic relations with the Hungarian national minority are often considered the best ever. There are no active separatist movements. However, the fact that a politician associated with Aljbin Kurti recently got elected as mayor of Preševo (a municipality with an Albanian majority) and that certain Albanian politicians make an analogy between the agreed Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities in Kosovo and their desires for similar autonomy in south Serbia indicate that the potential for radicalisation still exists.

INTEREST 4: Preservation of peace and stability in the region and the world—score 3.19

Indicator 4.1: Contribution to the development of international relations by internationally taken obligations—3.19 (authors: 3.5; expert survey: 2.87)

Serbia proves to be a relatively reliable partner and fulfils its obligations in the international arena. No major obstacles in this field exist comparable to those derived from the non-completed cooperation with the ICTY during the 2000s. Serbia respects the Dayton and Kumanovo Agreements, which are crucial for regional stability. However, although Priština is more to blame for the unfulfilled aspects of the normalisation dialogue, Belgrade also still avoids implementing some of its obligations from the agreements.

Indicator 4.2: Contribution to the preservation of international peace and security—3.5 (authors: 4; expert survey: 3)

The National Assembly (NSRS 2023) allowed the government to send its troops to 12 different UN missions, seven EU missions, and one EU crisis battlegroup (HELBROC). Serbian security staff currently participates in nine missions: four UN-led (Cyprus, Lebanon, the Central African Republic, and the Middle East—south Lebanon and Sinai), four EU-led (two missions in Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique), and one multinational operation led by the US (Sinai/Egypt). This is an intensive engagement for a country of Serbian size and wealth.

Indicator 4.3: Respect for international law and improvement of mutual trust—3.24 (authors: 3.5; expert survey: 2.97)

Serbia generally respects international law and principally condemns (at least declaratively) the breaking of its norms, even when friendly countries (such as Russia) conduct it. Serbian security policy is based on relative transparency when it comes to buying arms. However, sales of arms are not so transparent, considering recent allegations that ammunition and arms produced in Serbia end up in conflict areas (such as Ukraine or Israel) without the formal permit or public confirmation of the Serbian authorities for these transactions.

Indicator 4.4: Contribution to strengthening regional stability and improvement of good neighbourly relations—2.78 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.56)

Specific Serbian initiatives, such as the Open Balkan project, which established the common labour market with Albania and North Macedonia, were very positive. The strategic partnership with Hungary is very developed, while relations with

Romania and Bulgaria are positive and stable. Relations with Montenegro are better than before 2020, despite occasional turbulence. However, relations with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak politicians) could not be qualified as cordial. While the causes of such a situation lie on all sides, it is evident that Serbia is investing less positive effort in these relations than it used to.

Indicator 4.5: Strengthening comprehensive bilateral relations with all countries while respecting mutual interests—3.5 (authors: 4; expert survey: 3)

Serbia's nine strategic partnerships with geopolitically diverse actors (China, Italy, France, Russia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Hungary, the UAE, and Egypt) confirm the achievements in this area. The successful de-recognition campaign, in which more than a dozen states withdrew recognition of Kosovo, was the consequence of raising cooperation with many actors worldwide. However, relations with some increased countries (such as Germany, the leading Serbian economic partner) recently derogated, indicating limits in achievements in this field.

Indicator 4.6: Strengthening active participation in the work of international organizations—2.94 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.88)

Hosting the specialised EXPO 2027, delivered to Serbia by the Bureau for International Exhibitions, presents a significant achievement. Serbia presided over the OSCE in 2015, while Serbian ex-minister Vuk Jeremić presided over the UNGA in 2013. President Vučić has recently announced Serbia's ambition to qualify for the non-permanent seat in the UNSC (Cvetković 2024). Still, Serbia has recently failed to prevent the start of the accession procedure in the Council of Europe for Priština. Also, Serbia is still not a member of the WTO.

INTEREST 5: Preservation of the existence and protection of the Serbian people wherever they live, as well as national minorities and their cultural, religious, and historical identity—score 2.65

Indicator 5.1: Development of demographic potential—1.67 (authors: 1.5; expert survey: 1.83)

Serbia is the 9th country in the world according to the number of people it loses annually (Lukić 2023). The fertility rate is decreasing, with 2023 being the year with the all-time lowest number of newborns (RZS 2024a). The emigration rate is between 40.000 and 60.000 a year, while the poll conducted by the Umbrella Organisation of the Youth of Serbia (Stojanović et al., 2023, 198) shows that half of the young citizens want to leave Serbia. Demographic trends and brain drain

negatively influence the Serbian economy (Radonjić and Ostojić, 2023). Recent immigration from certain countries (e.g., Russia and Ukraine) has only slightly improved the situation.

Indicator 5.2: National unity and development of cultural, religious, and historical identity—3.05 (authors: 3.5; expert survey: 2.61)

The Day of Serbian Unity, Liberty, and National Flag, introduced in 2020, indicates that the government invests substantial symbolic and political resources for this purpose. Financial support to the Republic of Srpska entity and municipalities with a Serb majority in the region indicates the readiness to invest financial resources. However, the blurring of the differences between the state and political leaders in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska (and the labelling of those who criticise leaders as “traitors”) and the transformation of discourse in pro-government media from patriotic to discriminatory towards other states and ethnicities indicate many downsides of the current “top-down” approach.

Indicator 5.3: Improving the position of the national minorities—3.11 (authors: 3; expert survey: 3.21)

The situation is relatively positive and stable. Mechanisms for minority protection function quite well. Certain national minorities, such as Hungarians, have witnessed significant progress in political influence, but with a negative demographic trend. This negative trend is common for almost all minorities in Serbia due to the low fertility rate, emigration, and gradual assimilation. The exceptions in this regard are Bosniaks and, to a certain extent, Albanians. However, the glorification in many public spaces of people convicted of war crimes, which seems to be tolerated by authorities, sends a negative message to certain minority groups.

Indicator 5.4: Improving the position and protecting the rights and interests of the diaspora and Serbs abroad—2.79 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.57)

The preservation of the Republic of Srpska in BiH does not seem to be vitally endangered, despite political disturbances (contested election of the current High Representative, his unilateral decisions to change and impose laws, avoidance of the Presidency of BiH in the decision-making process regarding the UNGA Resolution on Srebrenica, etc.). The position of Serbs in Montenegro is better nowadays than until 2020, when the government endangered the Serbian Orthodox Church. Institutional protection of Serbs in Croatia is in place, but the number of Serbs decreased due to low fertility, gradual assimilation, and the low return of Serb refugees. In certain countries in the diaspora, such as the US,

progress in organising the Serb community is visible, while in others (such as Germany), the diaspora remains politically atomised.

Indicator 5.5: Protection of cultural and historical goods important for the Republic of Serbia and its citizens—2.62 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 2.73)

Financial investments in certain cultural and historical memorials are visible, from the renovation of the Golubac fortress to the renovation of museums in Belgrade. However, there are still significant problems in this regard. Many memorials are not adequately treated. The former concentration camp “Staro sajmište” (led by the Nazi occupation forces) is not adequately memorialised, and the Museum of Genocide Victims does not have its own building. Some old historical buildings in Belgrade recently vanished due to the failure of institutions to prevent their demolition in the wave of “new urbanism”, focused mainly on the interests of investors.

INTEREST 6: Shaping a modern and developed society based on common European values that are part of the Serbian national identity and historical heritage—score 2.28

Indicator 6.1: Shaping a modern and developed society based on common European values that are part of the Serbian national identity and historical heritage—2.24 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 1.97)

Serbia is economically closely tied to the EU. Nearly 60% of Serbian foreign exchange of goods is conducted with EU countries, which are also the biggest investors and donors (RZS 2024b). The convergence of EU economies is constantly progressing, including incorporating business and economic values. However, many other values, such as freedom of speech, the quality of democracy, and the level of tolerance for differences, seem to be in crisis. Politicians mostly justify EU membership goals through economic benefits and technical aspects, avoiding the debate about other values and their implementation.

Indicator 6.2: Achieving internal readiness for membership in the European Union—2.06 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 1.62)

Serbia has not opened any new negotiation clusters since 2021 of negotiations since 2021. Although this is the consequence of the stalemate in dialogue with Priština, variations in internal readiness are also an issue. As stated in the last EU progress report, Serbia needs further progress in many areas (EC 2023). Also, the support of Serbian citizens for EU membership (one of the crucial drivers of the

integration pace) is decreasing and is below the level of an absolute majority (MEI 2023, 5).

Indicator 6.3: Improvement of national security and defence through the process of European integration—2.53 (authors: 3; expert survey: 2.06)

As mentioned, Serbia participates in many EU defence missions, including the one EU battle group (HELBROC). Other aspects of security and defence cooperation with EU countries are pretty developed. However, in the foreign policy aspect, there is a decreasing tendency towards Serbian alignment with the EU declarations and measures (sanctions) adopted in the scope of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (ISAC 2024).

INTEREST 7: Preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia—score 1.93

Indicator 7.1: Monitoring, assessment, planning, and taking measures to mitigate the impact of climate change—1.86 (authors: 2; expert survey: 1.71)

The University of Notre Dame (ND) ranked Serbia 92nd in the index that measures states' climate change vulnerability (Energetski portal 2024). Serbia is in the first position on this negative list among European states. However, relevant experts from this field claim that the state is not doing enough to counter these harmful and potentially very vulnerable threats.

Indicator 7.2: Flood and fire protection—2.46 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 2.41)

Serbia has developed a solid fire protection infrastructure. It was also active in helping neighbouring countries fight fires, such as Greece or Montenegro. However, regarding floods, it seems that Serbia is not investing enough in prevention. The Notre Dame University (NDU 2022) ND Gain index points to the low dam capacity. Therefore, Serbia faces severe floods almost every year, although they are not as devastating as those in 2014.

Indicator 7.3: Improving the quality of the environment—1.54 (authors: 1.5; expert survey: 1.57)

The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) reports indicate that air quality constantly decreases (Spasić 2024). The National Ecological Association claims that the air was overpolluted in many places in Serbia, most notably in Belgrade. Certain municipalities in Serbia (such as Zrenjanin) still do not have drinkable water in the pipeline. There are rising doubts that new investments in

mining might additionally pollute water and land, although potential investors claim that there are no reasons for concern (Rio Tinto, 2024).

Indicator 7.4: Efficient management of hazardous waste—1.57 (authors: 1.5; expert survey: 1.63)

The City of Belgrade still has severe problems with waste management. Municipal waste is not managed correctly and is often considered “Serbia’s untapped resource” (Balkan Green Energy 2022). However, recently, it seems that Serbia has been trying to catch up with EU requirements on these issues and improve its situation with new projects.

Indicator 7.5: Improving the ability and capacity for resource management—2.21 (authors: 2.5; expert survey: 1.93)

Serbia has adopted a legal framework that should provide better resource management. However, ecological activists raise doubts about whether the exploitation of resources in certain mines (such as Bor and Majdanpek) meets environmental standards and whether the possible exploration of lithium in the Jadar region might harm the environment. Also, according to the ND Gain Index (NDU 2023), access to improved sanitation facilities remains problematic.

Summary: National Interest Implementation Rate


The final calculation is based on the average value of scores for all interests (determined in the second part of the paper) weighted by their relative importance (defined in the first part). The National Interest Implementation Rate for Serbia in 2024 is 2.61 (on the 1 to 5 scale), 40.25% of the maximum possible value (100%). Taken separately, only one interest is implemented more than half (>50%), while two are less than one-third (<33.33%) implemented (Graph 3). This indicates a need to improve implementation in these areas (Table 7).


Table 7. National Interest Implementation Index (Serbia 2024)

	Weight	Score
<i>Preservation of internal stability and security</i>	18,5%	2.37
<i>Economic development and overall prosperity</i>	18,5%	2.73
<i>Preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity</i>	17%	2.79
<i>Maintenance of peace and stability in the region and the world</i>	14,5%	3.19
<i>Preservation and protection of the existence of the Serbian people (...)</i>	11%	2.65
<i>European integration and membership in the European Union</i>	11%	2.28
<i>Preservation of the environment and resources of the Republic of Serbia</i>	9,5%	1.93
TOTAL INDEX VALUE	100%	2,61 (40,25%)

Graph 2. National Interest Implementation Index (Serbia 2024)

National Interest of the Republic of Serbia



Graph 3. Implementation of Different National Interests in % (Serbia 2024)

Discussion

The main objective was to create and test the National Interest Implementation Matrix for the Republic of Serbia. The second goal was to evaluate and quantify Serbia's progress towards achieving its defined national interests by combining desk research, content analysis, public opinion polls, and expert surveys. The matrix creation presents a methodological innovation that requires further validation under different circumstances or timeframes in future studies. Our approach, based on "thin" constructivism (ontological inter-subjectivism and epistemological positivism), has proven to be sufficiently insightful and reliable. Data collection and analysis in this framework have yielded results that indicate the implementation rate of Serbian national interests is just over 40% (an index score of 2.61 on a 1-5 scale). These data suggest considerable room for improvement, particularly in domains with the lowest score: preservation of the environment and resources, European integration and membership in the EU, and preservation of internal stability and security.

We also believe it would be helpful to analyse the need for reduction to a smaller number of more up-to-date indicators using the Delphi method. In this case, experts could evaluate which indicators will be crucial for implementing national interests in the future and weigh them accordingly. The model could also be expanded to include opposition politicians and other stakeholders. Additionally,

interviews with politicians about how they perceive national interests might provide further valuable insights, especially regarding how decision-makers prioritise national interests. Increasing the number of authors involved in the evaluation and the number of surveyed experts could further enhance the accuracy of the findings. Nevertheless, we consider that the matrix is already a valuable tool for analysis and that its results could benefit both policy and theoretical studies of (Serbian) national interests.

Conclusion

Our unique blend of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods provides valuable insights into the effectiveness of policy implementation in the Republic of Serbia. The findings reveal a moderate to low implementation rate of proclaimed national interests and highlight critical areas where further action is needed. The results of this pioneering study contribute to the empirical literature on Serbian foreign policy by offering a tool for assessing national interest fulfilment across different periods. Future research should focus on refining the matrix and exploring additional factors influencing the implementation. By addressing the identified gaps and incorporating feedback from various stakeholders, Serbia can enhance its policy strategies and better align its actions with national priorities and public expectations.

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Milan KRSTIĆ, Nikola JOVIĆ

**MATRICA IMPLEMENTACIJE NACIONALNOG INTERESA:
VREDNOVANJE I MERENJE POSTIGNUĆA REPUBLIKE SRBIJE**

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad razvija metodološku matricu za merenje ostvarenosti/stepena uspešnog sprovođenja nacionalnog interesa Republike Srbije. Teorijska osnova ovog indeksa je „tanki” konstruktivizam u međunarodnim odnosima, koji se zasniva na ontološkom intersubjektivizmu i epistemološkom pozitivizmu. Metodologija se oslanja na dva glavna stuba: prvi definiše srpske nacionalne interese i njihovu hijerarhiju, dok drugi meri stepen njihove implementacije/ realizacije. Ovi stubovi koriste mešavinu različitih metoda prikupljanja i analize podataka, uključujući kancelarijsko istraživanje, deskriptivnu statistiku, analizu sadržaja, ispitivanja javnog mnjenja i ekspertske ankete. Primarni teorijski cilj ovog rada je da unapredi literaturu o nacionalnom interesu u međunarodnim odnosima pružanjem instrumenta za merenje njegove implementacije. Glavni empirijski i društveni (praktično-politički) cilj jeste procena trenutnog stanja sprovođenja nacionalnih interesa Srbije. Analiza pokazuje da je stopa implementacije nacionalnog interesa Srbije nešto preko 40% (skor indeksa – 2,61 na skali od 1-5). Dokument takođe identifikuje konkretne oblasti u kojima su potrebna poboljšanja politike da bi se ovaj rezultat poboljšao u budućnosti.

Ključne reči: nacionalni interes, implementacija, matrica, Republika Srbija, merenje, „tanki” konstruktivizam, intersubjektivnost, strategija spoljne politike.

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Book review is a systematic description and/or critical analysis of the quality and significance of a book, edited volume, and textbook. Book review should include a general description of the topic and/or problem addressed by the work in question, summary of the book's main argument, basic biographical information about the author, summary of contents, strengths and weaknesses, as well as a concluding statement summarizing reviewer's opinion of the book. Each book review should refer to at least three other academic sources.

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia in contemporary international relations: strategic development directions and strengthening the position of Serbia in international integrative processes – foreign-political, international economical, legal and security aspects“ (No. 179029) for the period 2011–2015, realized by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, and financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

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Book

Reference list entry:

Jabri, Vivienne. 2007. *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html.

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2011. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy. Vol. 17 of *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–.

In-text citation:

(Jabri 2007, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995)

(Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

Journal article

Reference list entry:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

Adams, Tracy, and Zohar Kampf. 2020. "'Solemn and just demands': Seeking apologies in the international arena". *Review of International Studies*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210520000261>.

In-text citation:

(Nordin and Öberg 2015, 401) (Tracy and Kampf 2020)

Article in edited volume

Reference list entry:

Herman, Michael. 2004. "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001". In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Reference list entry:

(Herman 2004)

Conference paper (if not published in conference proceedings)

Reference list entry:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. "Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?". Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

Reference list entry:

(Korać 2016)

Book review

Reference list entry:

Firchow, Pamina. 2020. "Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics", Review of *Measuring Peace*, by Richard Caplan. *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 337–338.

Reference list entry:

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Legal and official documents***International treaties***

Reference list entry:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf>.

[TFEU] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, October 26. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>.

[UN Charter] Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html>.

In-text citation:

(PTBT 1963, Article III, para. 3)

(TFEU 2012, Article 87) (UN Charter, Chapter X)

UN documents

Reference list entry:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml>.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/67/18>.

In-text citation:

(UNSC Res. 2222)

(UNGA Res. 67/18)

National legislation

Reference list entry:

[Constitution RS] Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 98/2006.

Homeland Security Act. 2002. United States of America, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (November 25). https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf.

In-text citation:

(Constitution RS 2006, Article 111) (Homeland Security Act 2002)

Official reports

Reference list entry:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES.

[The 9-11 Commission] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Publication Office.

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Reference list entry:

Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosir). *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 295, 6 November 2013. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN>.

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Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, November 22. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0673&from=GA>.

Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 141, 5 June 2015. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=EN>.

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(Directive [EU] 2015/849)

Decisions of international courts and tribunals

Reference list entry:

[ICJ] International Court of Justice. Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports. <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>. [ICJ Order 1999] *Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom)*. International Court of Justice, Order ICJ Rep. 1999 (June 2). <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/113/113-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

[ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A] *Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32-A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictment, 30 October 2000. <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/ind/en/vasonly-ii000125e.pdf>.

Costa v Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61964CJ0006>. [CJEU Judgment T-289/15] *Hamas v Council*, Case T-289/15. Court of Justice of the

European Union, Judgment, 6 March 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:138. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?language=EN&critereEcli=ECLI:EU:T:2019:138> [Opinion of AG Bobek] *Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission*, Case C-352/19

P. Court of Justice of the European Union. Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 16 July 2020(1), ECLI:EU:C:2020:588. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=485A5D9AC129179D3D2F2.EC571A384CD?text=&docid=228708&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5064004>.

In-text citation:

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010, 411)

(ICJ Order 1999, para. 3)

(ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A)

(*Costa v ENEL*)

(CJEU Judgment T-289/15, para. 23)

(Opinion of AG Bobek C-352/19 P)

Newspapers and magazines

Reference list entry:

Gibbs, Samuel. 2017. "Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots", *The Guardian*, August 20.

Power, Matthew. 2013. "Confessions of a Drone Warrior", *GQ*, October 22. <https://www.gq.com/story/drone-uav-pilot-assassination>.

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In-text citation:

(Gibbs 2017, A10)

(Power 2013)

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Audio and visual media

Reference list entry:

Scott, Ridley. [1982] 2007. *Blade Runner: The Final Cut*. Directed by Ridley Scott. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Blue-Ray disc, 117 min.

Future Weapons. 2019. Waddell Media. Aired on August 7–16 on Discovery Science HD, 3 seasons, 30 episodes (43 min. each). <https://go.discovery.com/tv-shows/future-weapons/>.

Tech Legend. 2020. "Best Drones 2020 – Top 8 Best Drone with Cameras to Buy in 2020". Uploaded on February 7, 2020. YouTube video, 27:20 min. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6_4JU5Mspw.

In-text citation:

(Scott [1982] 2007)

(Future Weapons 2019)

(Tech Legend 2020)

Social media

Reference list entry:

National Library of Australia. 2020. "National Library of Australia's Facebook Page". Facebook, August 1, 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/National.Library.of.Australia/>.
Kruszelnicki, Karl (@DoctorKarl). 2017. "Dr Karl Twitter post." Twitter, February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. <https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl>.

Trapara, Vladimir. 2018. "Victory or nil". *Unwrapping the Essence* (blog). May 29, 2018. <https://unwrappingtheessence.weebly.com/blog/pobeda-ili-nista>.

In-text citation:

(National Library of Australia 2020) (Kruszelnicki 2017)

(Trapara 2018)

Doctoral dissertation

Reference list entry:

Rohrbach, Livia. 2020. *Beyond intractability? Territorial solutions to self-determination conflicts*. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Petrović, Miloš. 2018. *Nepotpuna integracija kao prepreka političkom razvoju Istočnog partnerstva Evropske unije*. Doktorska disertacija. Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu.

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Oxford Library. 2012. "Library Strategy". Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. <http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html>.

Google Maps. 2015. "The British Library, London, UK". *Google*. Accessed February 5, 2015. <https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/The+British+Library/@51.529972,-0.127676,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m2!3m1!1s0x48761b3b70171395:0x18905479de0fdb25>.

IPE [Institute of International Politics and Economics]. n.d. "Mission". Accessed August 1, 2020. <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/en/mission/>.

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(Oxford Library 2012)

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Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

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Gregory, Derek. 2014a. "Drone Geographies". *Radical Philosophy* RP 183: 7–19.

Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

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Ivona LAĐEVAC¹

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Rukopis mora da bude tehnički uredan, a jezički stil mora da bude jasan, čitljiv i usklađen sa pravopisom i gramatikom srpskog ili engleskog jezika.

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Ukoliko želite da koristite skraćenicu, onda kod prvog pominjanja punog termina (bilo u apstraktu, bilo u samom tekstu) navedite željenu skraćenicu u zagradi i potom je koristite dosledno u ostatku teksta. Koristite skraćenicu koje su opšteprihvaćene u domaćoj naučnoj i stručnoj literaturi.

Koristite samo sledeći oblik navodnika „ „, a kada se unutar ovih znakova navoda nalaze i dodatni navodnici onda koristite ’ ’.

Latinske, starogrčke i druge strane reči i izraze navodite u kurzivu (*italic*), npr. *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire* itd.

NAVOĐENJE IZVORA

Međunarodni problemi koriste navođenje referenci shodno formatu „autor- datum” zasnovanom na Čikaškom stilu – *The Chicago Manual of Style* (16th ed.), delimično dopunjenom shodno potrebama časopisa.

Izvore navodite u samom tekstu, i to tako što u zagradi dajete prezime autora, godinu izdanja i broj stranice (po potrebi). Pun opis izvora dajete u spisku korišćene bibliografije koji stavljate iza osnovnog teksta.

U samom tekstu, izvor uvek treba da stavite neposredno pre znakova interpunkcije. Kada ime autora pominjete u rečenici nije potrebno da ga ponavljate u zagradi, ali onda godinu i broj stranice navodite neposredno nakon pominjanja imena:

Johnson and Axinn (2013, 136) argue that killing with emotions is morally superior to killing without emotions, because military honour demands a clear will to assume a risk of sacrifice of health and life.

Kada je ime autora već u zagradi, koristite uglaste zagrade za navođenje njegovog rada: (opširnije o ovom konceptu videti kod Jovanovića [2013, 133–136]).

Kada u zagradi navodite više izvora, onda ih razdvojte tačkom i zarezom:

(Jabri 2007; Herman 2004; Rohrbach 2020).

Kada u istoj zagradi navodite dva ili više rada istog autora, onda ne morate da ponavljate njegovo ime:

(Jabri 2007, 2011; Gregory 2014a, 2014b).

Knjiga

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Vučić, Mihajlo. 2019. *Korektivna pravda pred Međunarodnim sudom*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamoto, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html.

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

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Navođenje u tekstu:

(Vučić 2019, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995) (Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

Članak u časopisu

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

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(Kostić 2019, 500)

(Tracy and Kampf 2020)

Članak u zborniku radova

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Herman, Michael. 2004. "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001". In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Zakić, Katarina. 2019. „Politika ekonomskih integracija Kine u Evroaziji“. U: *Integracioni procesi u Evroaziji*, uredili dr Dušan Proroković i dr Ana Jović-Lazić, 13–44. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Herman 2004)

(Zakić 2019)

Rad izložen na konferenciji (ako nije objavljen u zborniku sa konferencije)

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. "Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?". Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

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Prikaz knjige

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

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(Firchow 2020, 337)

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Pravni i zvanični dokumenti

Međunarodni ugovori

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf>.

[TFEU] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, October 26. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>.

[UN Charter] Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html>.

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Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml>.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/67/18>.

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Navođenje u tekstu:

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010, 411)

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(ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A)

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Scott, Ridley. [1982] 2007. *Blade Runner: The Final Cut*. Directed by Ridley Scott. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Blue-Ray disc, 117 min.

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Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

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Kruszelnicki, Karl (@DoctorKarl). 2017. "Dr Karl Twitter post." Twitter, February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. <https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl>.

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Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Rohrbach, Livia. 2020. *Beyond intractability? Territorial solutions to self-determination conflicts*. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Petrović, Miloš. 2018. *Nepotpuna integracija kao prepreka političkom razvoju Istočnog partnerstva Evropske unije*. Doktorska disertacija. Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Rohrbach 2020)

(Petrović 2018).

Izvor sa interneta

U slučaju da navodite nedatirani dokument sa interneta, priložite datum kada ste pristupili tom elektronskom sadržaju i godinu pristupa računajte kao godinu objavljivanja tog izvora.

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Oxford Library. 2012. "Library Strategy". Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. <http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html>.

Google Maps. 2015. "The British Library, London, UK". *Google*. Accessed February 5, 2015. <https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/The+British+Library/@51.529972,-0.127676,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m2!3m1!1s0x48761b3b70171395:0x18905479de0fdb25>.

IMPP [Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu]. n.d. „Misija”. Pristupljeno 1. avgusta 2020. <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/misija/>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Oxford Library 2012)

(Google Maps 2015) (IMPP n.d.)

Lična komunikacija

Izvori iz područja lične komunikacije obuhvataju razgovore uživo, intervjuje, materijale sa predavanja, telefonske razgovore, klasičnu i elektronsku prepisku. Izvore ove vrste navedite samo u tekstu, bez stavljanja u Bibliografiju, zato što je najčešće reč o podacima u koje čitalac nema uvid ili se zbog nematerijalnog oblika ne mogu naknadno proveriti:

... kao što je dr Slobodan Janković naveo u mejlu koji mi je poslao 10. decembra 2019. godine ...

Kada su objavljena u zbirkama, pisma se navode prema godini izdanja, s tim što datum kada je poslato pojedinačno pismo navodite u samom tekstu:

U pismu koje je Univerzitet u Beogradu 13. maja 2017. godine uputio Grinovoj (Green 2012, 34) ...

Sekundarni izvor (posredno navođenje izvora)

Kada želite da navedete izvor koji ste pročitali u nekom drugom izvoru, uvek treba da ukažete na oba izvora – originalni i posredni:

Navođenje u tekstu:

U knjizi *Moć*, objavljenoj 1975. godine, Luman shvatanje moći pretežno zasniva na literaturi o društvenoj razmeni i moći zajednice (navedeno prema Guzzini 2013, 79).

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

TABELE, DIJAGRAMI I GEOGRAFSKE KARTE

Grafičke priloge (tabele, dijagrame, geografske karte, grafikone i sl.) numerišete i dajete im pun naslov:

Tabela 1: Indeks ljudskog razvoja u zemljama članicama EU

Dijagram 2: Strane direktne investicije kineskih kompanija u Africi (u milionima dolara)

Karta 1: Nacionalne pomorske jurisdikcije i granice na Arktiku

Ukoliko je grafički prilog preuzet od nekog drugog autora ili iz nekog dokumenta neophodno je ne samo navesti izvor, već i dobiti pisanu saglasnost za objavljivanje priloga pre podnošenja rukopisa na razmatranje Uredništvu časopisa *Međunarodni problemi*. Dobijena saglasnost se dostavlja uz rukopis.

BIBLIOGRAFIJA

Na kraju članka, a pre apstrakta na engleskom jeziku, prilažete spisak korišćenih izvora naslovljen **Bibliografija**, koji sme da sadrži samo reference koje ste koristili u tekstu.

Bibliografske jedinice navodite prema prethodno predstavljanim pravilima za navođenje izvora, a ređate ih prema abecednom redosledu.

Ako imate dva ili više radova istog autora objavljenih iste godine, onda uz godinu dodajte slova a, b, c, itd. i ređajte bibliografske jedinice po abecednom redosledu prvog slova naslova rada:

Gregory, Derek. 2014a. "Drone Geographies". *Radical Philosophy* RP 183: 7–19. Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

Rukopisi koji nisu usaglašeni sa navedenim smernicama neće biti uzeti u postupak recenziranja.

Uređivački odbor

UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

Međunarodni problemi/International Problems je najstariji naučni časopis u Srbiji i na Balkanu posvećen međunarodnim odnosima. Prvi broj je objavljen u aprilu 1949. godine, samo godinu dana nakon početka rada njegovog izdavača – Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu iz Beograda. Objavljuje se na kvartalnoj bazi i kategorisan je kod resornog ministarstva kao nacionalni časopis međunarodnog značaja (M24).

Međunarodni problemi objavljuju rezultate naučnih istraživanja iz oblasti međunarodnih odnosa, međunarodne bezbednosti, međunarodnog prava i studija globalizacije. *Međunarodni problemi* objavljuju originalne i pregledne naučne radove i prikaze knjiga, na srpskom ili engleskom jeziku, koji prethodno nisu nigde objavljeni niti se nalaze u postupku razmatranja za objavljivanje u nekoj drugoj publikaciji. *Međunarodni problemi* ne objavljuju stručne radove, analitičke komentare niti predloge javnih politika, pa Vas najljubaznije molimo da ne šalžete te vrste članaka.

Uređivački odbor daje prednost analizi kontroverznih pitanja savremene teorije i prakse međunarodnih odnosa uz poštovanje bogatstva disciplinarnih i sazajnih perspektiva. Bez zastupanja konkretnog političkog i teorijsko-metodološkog stanovišta, a sa namerom da podstakne obuhvatniji naučni dijalog o ubrzanim promenama u svetskoj politici u 21. veku, Uređivački odbor smatra da su prioritetne sledeće tematske celine:

- Preobražaj prirode svetske politike u ranom 21. veku;
- Fenomenologija i praksa transnacionalnosti i kosmopolitizma;
- Problemi institucionalizacije međunarodnih odnosa;
- Različita teorijska tumačenja aktuelnih globalnih procesa;
- Kontroverzna pitanja upotrebe spoljnopolitičkih instrumenata vodećih globalnih aktera;
- Uticaj naprednih tehnologija Četvrtre industrijske revolucije na oblikovanje međunarodnih odnosa u 21. veku;
- Civilizacija, religija i identitet u kontekstu svetske politike i globalizacije;
- Konceptualni i metodološki iskoraci izvan tradicionalnog epistemološkog okvira naučne discipline međunarodnih odnosa.

OBAVEZE UREDNIKA, UREĐIVAČKOG ODBORA I IZDAVAČKOG ODBORA

Izdavački savet je savetodavno telo koje aktivno doprinosi razvoju časopisa *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems*. Zadaci i dužnosti članova Saveta su: podrška razvoju časopisa, promocija časopisa, podsticanje stručnjaka u naučnom istraživanju političkih, bezbednosnih i pravnih aspekata međunarodnih odnosa da se uključe u rad časopisa kao autori i/ili recenzenti, pisanje uvodnika, recenzija i komentara o radovima.

Članovi Uređivačkog odbora imaju zadatak da u akademskoj javnosti deluju kao svojevrsni ambasadori časopisa, da pruže doprinos u vidu preporučivanja kvalitetnih autora i rukopisa, podsticanja potencijalnih autora da podnose rukopise za objavljivanje u *Međunarodnim problemima*, te da recenziraju rukopise i pripremaju uvodnike i uredničke komentare.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik odgovara za objavljeni sadržaj i treba da teži stalnom unapređenju časopisa uopšte i procesa osiguranja kvaliteta objavljenog sadržaja, kao i zaštiti slobode izražavanja, integriteta i standarda naučnoistraživačkog rada od upliva političkih, finansijskih i drugih interesa. Glavni i odgovorni urednik treba uvek da objavi ispravku, objašnjenje, obaveštenje o povlačenju članka i izvinjenje.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik donosi konačnu odluku o tome koji će rukopis objaviti na osnovu: 1) ocene njegovog uklapanja u tematski okvir uređivačke politike, 2) ocene naučnog značaja, originalnosti, validnosti i disciplinarnе relevantnosti istraživanja predstavljenog u rukopisu, 3) ocene njegove usklađenosti sa zakonskim propisima koji se odnose na klevetu, kršenje autorskih prava i plagiranje. Glavni i odgovorni urednik zadržava diskreciono pravo da primljeni rukopis proceni i odbije bez recenziranja, ukoliko utvrdi da ne odgovara tematskim zahtevima uređivačke politike i opšteprihvaćenim standardima naučnoistraživačkog rada (tj. ako ne sadrži strukturne elemente originalnog ili preglednog naučnog rada). Radovi koji ne zadovoljavaju tehničke standarde propisane Uputstvom za autore, čak i u slučaju da je sadržaj korektan, biće vraćeni autorima na usklađivanje. U redovnim okolnostima, Uređivački odbor obaveštava autora u roku od sedam dana od datuma prijema rukopisa o tome da li se tema rukopisa uklapa u uređivačku politiku i da li je pokrenut postupak recenziranja.

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



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